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"Under the general name of commodity, I rank all those 
advantages which our senses owe to nature. This, of course, 
is a benefit which is temporary and mediate, not ultimate, 
like its service to the soul. Yet although low, it is perfect in 
its kind, and is the only use of nature which all men 
apprehend. [...] Beasts, fire, water, stones and corn serve 
him. The field is at once his floor, his work-yard,  his play-
ground, his garden and his bed." 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
Nature; Addresses and Lectures (1849) 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on the process of economic valuation of 
ecosystems in Dutch water management. As a starting point, it takes the 
argument that economic valuation has a potential to contribute to decision 
making processes in integrated water management. It analyzes how 
different stakeholders use valuation processes and how the context of this 
process plays a key role in determining the outcome. The goal is to come to 
conclusions and recommendations for the structure of valuation processes 
in water management. These recommendations are aimed at limiting 
inconsistencies in valuation processes.  
 
Economic valuation of ecosystems places a monetary value on the effects 
of changes in the environment. Valuation processes can play a particularly 
important role in highlighting the economic importance of ecosystems in 
addition to their ecological and socio-cultural importance and it also helps 
to formulate economic arguments for the sustainable management of 
ecosystems. Despite its important role, however, it has been shown that 
inconsistencies in outcomes of valuation processes persist. At the basis of 
these inconsistencies is the observation that economic valuation has an 
enormous variety of methodological tools that are at the disposal of 
practitioners with different goals and interests. The possibility exists that 
these inconsistencies may seriously undermine the usefulness of economic 
valuation processes in decision making in Dutch water management. Water 
management in the Netherlands is characterized by 'integrated water 
management' in which a key element is the balancing of relevant 
stakeholder interests. In the long-run, the risk prevails that decision makers 
may become increasingly skeptical to the usefulness of valuation studies if 
they tend to consist of a combination of methodologies that reflect 
subjective preferences of one stakeholder, while their decisions need to 
involve the preferences of all stakeholders. Seeking to limit these 
inconsistencies, this research analyzes how different stakeholders apply 
economic valuation in water management. The focus is on the process of 
economic valuation, in which strategic choices are made by actors with 
different interests and stakes in the outcomes of the valuation study.  
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The goal is to answer the following main research question: 
 
How are choices in economic valuation processes in water management influenced 
by the context in which they are made? 
 
The analytical perspective taken in this dissertation to answer this question 
is based on institutional theory, in which the context of formal and 
informal institutions influences actor behavior. This perspective views the 
valuation process within the context of: (1) actors and their relationships; 
(2) formal and informal institutions, such as rules, regulations, policy and 
scientific paradigms; and (3) specific characteristics of the economic 
instrument such as its goal, time and budget constraints. These elements 
influence the choices made within valuation processes and may explain the 
inconsistencies in their outcomes. 
 
The analytical perspective is applied to three case studies. These cases 
consist of cost-benefit analyses in Dutch water management, of which 
economic valuation processes are part. Both the choices made within these 
valuation processes as well as the context in which they are applied are 
analyzed. The focus is on explaining possible relationships between the 
two. 
 
The conclusions of this dissertation are as follows: 
 
1. Choices within a valuation process are influenced in particular by 
four elements in its context: (a) the prevalence or absence of 
guidelines; (b) the goal for which the valuation study is carried out; 
(c) participation of certain stakeholders within the process and the 
effectiveness of the communication of their ideas, and; (d) the time 
and budget constraints imposed on the valuation process.  
2. Through applying an institutional theory perspective, this dissertation 
contributes to the understanding of choices in valuation processes 
and explains the inconsistencies in their outcomes.  
3. Pursuing transparency within valuation processes as part of decision-
making tools such as cost-benefit analysis is necessary if these 
processes are to contribute to balancing stakeholder interests in 
water management. A transparent valuation process is characterized 
by a situation in which it is clear who has made the choices and for 
what reasons.  
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4. Transparency in valuation processes is enhanced by the participation 
of all relevant stakeholders and the effective communication of their 
interests.  
5. Transparency is further improved through the development of 
guidelines for valuation processes. 
6. Sufficient time and budget result in a more transparent valuation 
process in which inconsistencies of choices and their outcomes are 
limited. This increases the usefulness of valuation processes to water 
management decisions.  
 
The contribution of this dissertation to both theory and practice is 
discussed in line with the six conclusions. First, the theoretical contribution 
lies in a better understanding of valuation processes and the inconsistencies 
in their outcomes in particular. Second, this dissertation highlights 
transparency in the practical application of valuation processes in water 
management. This is pursued through more structured guidance of valuation 
processes by all relevant stakeholders, the development of guidelines, and 
direct linkage of valuation processes with Environmental Impact 
Statements. Furthermore, it is recommended that public participation processes 
be increasingly integrated in valuation processes. This allows not only for 
stakeholder participation, but also for effective communication of their 
interests. Finally, it is recommended that sufficient time and budget be allocated 
to at least one elaborate valuation study in the Netherlands to guide 
subsequent valuation processes.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
 
1.1 The Development of Economic Valuation of Ecosystems 
 
This dissertation focuses on the application of the process of economic 
valuation of ecosystems in Dutch water management. As a starting point, 
the dissertation takes the argument that economic valuation has a potential 
to contribute to decision making processes in integrated water 
management. It analyzes how different stakeholders use economic 
valuation in water management and how the context of this process plays a 
key role in determining the outcome. The goal is to come to conclusions 
and recommendations for the structure of economic valuation processes in 
water management, aimed at limiting inconsistencies in their outcomes.  
 
As the environmental effects which result directly from human activities 
become clear, there is a growing awareness in many countries that the 
environmental costs associated with various policies need to be integrated 
in water management decision making processes. This requires methods 
that measure environmental effects. One approach towards environmental 
valuation is economic valuation of ecosystems, which calculates monetary 
estimates for a wide variety of ecosystem goods like water and wood, and 
services such as recycling of nutrients, that reflect the economic value 
people attach to these goods and services. In this way, environmental 
consequences of actions are made more explicit and environmental effects 
of different policies can be weighed against other effects. Over the last 25 
years in particular, valuation methods have been developed and improved 
to value virtually all categories of environmental goods and services, and 
numerous empirical studies that measure environmental benefits have been 
carried out (Cropper, 2000). In this respect, a large number of these studies 
have been performed that estimate the effects of water management 
decisions on ecosystems, ranging from estimates of environmental effects 
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill along the Alaskan coast (Carson et al., 1994) 
to the value of specific ecosystem services such as the value of water quality 
improvements by wetlands (Ewel, 1997).  
 
Economic valuation of ecosystems was developed from neoclassical 
economic theory in the 1970s. Over the past twenty-five years, economic 
valuation has been subject to major development - many different valuation 
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methods have been developed and improved such that almost all categories 
of environmental benefits can be valued (Cropper, 2000). As a result, in 
many countries environmental valuation has been carried out in numerous 
cases in practice, and its influence in the policy world continues to grow 
(Grove-White, 1997). Especially in the United States, economic valuation 
has become an important tool in many government projects. A major 
turning point was President Reagan’s executive order 12291 in 1981, which 
made it mandatory for the Environmental Protection Agency to perform 
social cost-benefit analyses for major governmental regulations (Navrud, 
1992). In Britain, the promotion of economic valuation can be dated back 
to 1989, when Chris Patten became Secretary of State for the Environment 
and appointed Professor David Pearce as his Special Advisor (Grove-
White, 1997). David Pearce was perceived as Britain’s leading figure when 
it came to applying cost-benefit analysis and economic valuation of the 
environment. Within eighteen months of his appointment, “…the tools 
and techniques, however imperfect, had become established as a mounting 
preoccupation within many government agencies, and some NGOs in 
Britain.” (Grove-White, 1997: 23). Since then, economic valuation has 
played an increasingly important role in many Western countries. In Dutch 
policy-making, interest developed again particularly over the last few years.  
 
The underlying dissertation is in itself an indication of increased interest in 
economic valuation of ecosystems within the Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management1 in the Netherlands. The Ministry initiated 
this dissertation in 1999 and sponsored the entire research program with as 
a main goal the investigation of possibilities of increased integration of 
environmental effects in their policies through economic valuation of 
ecosystems. An important turning point for economic valuation in the 
Netherlands came with the publication of the so-called OEEI report in 
2000, a government-ratified paper in which social cost-benefit analyses 
were recommended for all large infrastructural projects (Eijgenraam et al., 
2000). Although the report itself says little about economic valuation of 
ecosystems, it formed the basis for discussions and research on how 
environmental effects of large infrastructural projects should be 
incorporated in social cost-benefit analyses in which economic valuation 
played a major role.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
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1.2 Application Contexts of Economic Valuation 
 
Despite the popularity of economic valuation in many contexts, and its 
continuous improvement and development, disagreement prevails 
concerning the methodological aspects of economic valuation. As a result, 
overviews of publications show that though a repetition of studies on the 
same subject is not uncommon, the outcomes of these studies vary 
enormously (Bal and Nijkamp, 1998). For example, Woodward and Wui 
(2001) found that the range in wetland economic values varies from $0.06 
per acre to $22,050 per acre. In environmental valuation in general, the 
research on these diversities involve the application of statistical meta-
analysis (for an overview of case studies of meta-analyses see Brouwer, 
2000 and Brouwer et al., 1997). The results of these meta-analyses indicate 
that differences in study design are an important explanation for the 
variation in valuation outcomes (Brouwer et al., 1997). Woodward and Wui 
(2001) evaluate two types of deviations in wetland valuation outcomes: (i) 
deviation due to bias or errors in estimations and (ii) deviations due to 
study site characteristics. The first aspect focuses on errors or bias due to 
study quality (the quality of the data, the theoretical consistency of the 
methodology, econometric techniques and statistical certainty), and the 
type of valuation method used. Through the application of a multivariate 
meta-analysis2, the authors derive several conclusions. First, poor 
econometric quality is strongly significant and tends to yield higher values. 
Second, Contingent Valuation, which attempts to obtain consumers 
willingness to pay for (or willingness to accept) a change in the level of an 
environmental good, generally tends to yield a lower value per acre. A third 
conclusion is that studies that incorporate the values of bird watching and 
commercial fishing activities yield higher values. In another study, Brouwer 
et al. (1997) conclude that use-values exert a stronger influence over 
willingness to pay than non-use values. Furthermore, the design of 
contingent valuation studies have a significant effect on the willingness to 
pay.  
 
At the basis of these inconsistencies in valuation outcomes lies the 
observation that economic valuation has an enormous variety of 
methodological tools that can be used by different practitioners with 
different interests. For example, the application of the discount rate in cost-
benefit analyses may differ between studies: in the Netherlands a discount 
rate of 4% is applied to government projects, while Germany has a rate of 
                                                 
2 This is a regression analysis that allows the researchers to incorporate several deviations 
in a meta-analysis at the same time. 
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3%, the United Kingdom of 6%, Denmark of 7% and France of 8%. The 
European Commission applies a discount rate of 5%. In none of these 
cases it is clear how this rate is defined, nor how it was realized (Eijgenraam 
et al., 2000). However, different discount rates result in different outcomes, 
and thus in different economic values. As a result, diverging 
methodological constructions in economic valuation studies result in 
diverging outcomes. 
 
Despite these inconsistencies, economic valuation does have important 
added value in environmental management, including water management. 
In particular, for decision-makers it can play a very important role in 
highlighting the economic importance of natural ecosystems, as well as the 
relative importance of other economic activities that depend on ecosystem 
functions. Moreover, economic valuation may be useful in countering 
arguments on ecosystem conversion. Putting a monetary value on activities 
can highlight the significance of different ecosystems for people and thus 
provide strong arguments for the conservation of natural lands and water 
as opposed to reclamation or conversion. In these cases, monetary 
valuation is an important complementary assessment to other, qualitative 
or quantitative assessments on ecosystem functions that cannot be 
monetarized. Since most decisions are based on economic and financial 
arguments, putting a monetary value on the environment may sometimes 
be the most effective way to convince decision-makers of the value of the 
preservation of ecosystems as opposed to the allocation of their lands and 
waters for other purposes. Furthermore, assigning economic values to 
certain ecosystem goods and services provides a system to weigh the 
different economic activities within a particular ecosystem in the 
development of, for example, management plans for the area.  
 
1.3 Economic Instruments in Dutch Water Management  
 
Life in the Netherlands is closely linked to water. As a result, water is often 
directly associated with many activities; whether it is the construction of a 
new bridge, the expansion of a city or the building of new houses - many 
activities will directly or indirectly affect water systems. Therefore, Dutch 
water management, both in quantity and quality, is often an integrated part 
of many other activities. In the case studies of the underlying research, for 
example, water management activities play an important part in the 
exploration and production of gas in the Wadden Sea as well as in the 
expansion of the Rotterdam port.  
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In particular the inhabitants of the low-lying areas in the Western and 
Northern parts of the Netherlands have always needed to compete with 
water, and the present country is largely the result of this struggle. Faced 
with water surplus in one part of the country and water shortage in 
another, the Dutch have become masters at adjusting water systems to their 
needs. The result is a country in which water systems are almost completely 
managed. The reclamation of land from the sea (called “polders”) mainly 
for the purpose of agriculture, for example, has led to a situation where salt 
water is constantly threatening the livability and agricultural productivity of 
these polders, forcing people to apply expensive methods to keep the salt 
water out. As a result, an enormous amount of money is spent each year on 
pumping fresh water through these polders, while simultaneously pumping 
salt water out. Consequently, surface levels are sinking, which – together 
with a rising sea level – calls for additional measures to protect land from 
floods. 
 
The Netherlands are situated in a river delta and more than sixty percent of 
its land is situated under sea level. As a consequence, it has fought water 
abundance throughout its history, and initially the main task of the Dutch 
water manager was flood protection, which involved the management and 
control of water for the protection of humans. Gradually, the control of 
water received a more prominent role, which consisted of the management 
of water aimed at different stakeholders, such as navigation, agriculture and 
industry (MinV&W, 1985). During the 1950s and 1960s, the Netherlands 
experienced rapid economic growth that put increasing pressure on spatial 
planning and has led to major changes in the infrastructure on both land 
and water. Measures involved the canalization of major rivers, the 
normalization of rivers and brooks, the adaptation of shorelines, an 
expansion of the port of Rotterdam and the construction of the Zuiderzee- 
and Delta projects (MinV&W, 1985). The consequences of the 
interventions in the water system throughout Dutch history were noticed 
by the end of the 1960s in the form of water pollution, degradation of 
nature and landscape, desiccation, and pressures on use functions such as 
drinking water and recreation. There was a growing awareness that a 
different approach towards water management issues was needed in order 
to overcome these problems. Since then, the approach towards water 
management has shifted towards a ‘water system approach’, often labeled 
as integrated water management - an integrated approach that puts the entire 
water system at the center, and balances the demands of society with the 
functioning of water systems (MinV&W, 1985). Integrated water 
management connects water quantity management with water quality 
Valuation of Water 
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management and surface water with ground water (van Ast, 2000). Events 
such as major floods in the 1990s further stimulated the move towards an 
ecosystem approach to water management, aimed at giving water systems 
more space and giving an important role to ecosystem functions in flood 
management. 
 
This transition to an integrated water management approach calls for tools 
to balance the needs of the water system with the different functions water 
has for society. There is currently an increased interest with policy makers 
in the Netherlands to use economic instruments as such balancing tools. 
These instruments are often characterized by the fact that they are 'market-
based' - they use the market mechanism to alter behavior of individuals or 
groups of individuals. Examples of economic instruments are the direct 
alteration of prices or cost levels, indirect alteration via financial or fiscal 
means, and market creation and market support (Opschoor and Turner, 
1994). These instruments all provide incentives to actors to behave in a 
socially more appropriate way.  
 
The increased interest in economic instruments within Dutch water 
management is linked to a broader trend in the global water management 
discourse, at the basis of which is a more general move away from 
"bureaucratic" government regulations towards "more efficient" markets 
instruments to deal with environmental issues. Since the introduction of 
the term "world water crisis", water has become a major focus of 
international discussions. Different groups with divergent backgrounds 
have proposed solutions to deal with this crisis. A dominant discourse 
seems to consist of economic approaches to water management issues, a 
trend that was set in more general environmental policy making by the 
report “Our Common Future” of the World Commission for Environment 
and Development (WCED, 1987). This report combined economics with 
environment in the term “sustainable development”, by stating that 
economic growth was compatible with environmental protection. The role 
of economics in environmental management has become increasingly 
important in the 1990s. In this respect the United Conference on 
Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro must be 
mentioned as it explicitly recognized the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) on a 
global scale. This Principle states that the price of all goods and services 
should reflect the total cost, which includes environmental costs. The result 
is that economic approaches and economic instruments play an increasingly 
important role in many environmental policies in most Western countries, 
and water management in the Netherlands is no exception.  
Introduction 
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In the 1980s, the perspective towards water in the Netherlands shifted 
from "water as a resource" to "water as part of ecosystems" in which the 
environment was given a more prominent role. The Dutch Ministry of 
Water Management (MinV&W) in particular has shown serious interest in 
the possibilities of using one type of economic instrument in their policy-
making processes, namely the social cost-benefit analysis. While a financial 
cost-benefit analysis balances costs and benefits as seen from one particular 
actor, often businesses, the social cost-benefit analysis balances costs and 
benefits from the point of view of society. It therefore also includes 
environmental costs and benefits, which can be measured though 
economic valuation of ecosystems. The underlying study is an example of 
one of the studies financed by the Ministry that focuses on such economic 
instruments. Another study financed by the Ministry is carried out by Boot 
(forthcoming), and will focus on the different economic approaches in 
Dutch water management. 
 
1.4 Problem Statement 
There is a  possibility that the persistent inconsistencies in economic 
valuation studies as described in the previous section may seriously 
undermine the value of the economic valuation concept in different 
decision making contexts in Dutch water management. In the long-run, 
decision-makers may become increasingly skeptical to valuation studies if 
these studies tend to consist of a combination of methodologies that reflect 
the subjective preferences of one stakeholder, while the decisions often 
need to involve preferences of numerous stakeholders. Therefore, taking as 
a starting point the argument that economic valuation is potentially useful 
in certain decision-making contexts, it is necessary to pursue improvements 
in economic valuation studies by limiting the inconsistencies in these 
studies.  
In the pursuit of limiting these inconsistencies, a focus on the process of 
economic valuation is required in addition to other current research efforts 
focusing on methodological issues of economic valuation. Valuation is a 
process in which actors make decisions in a series of operations or actions 
that are designed to achieve a certain end (or ends). Differences in the 
process of economic valuation may also contribute to inconsistencies in 
economic values and may even be at the root of the diverging 
methodological applications among stakeholders.  
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This study will take a process approach to economic valuation. Viewing 
economic valuation as a process, recognizes the fact that it consists of 
actors with different interests and stakes in the outcome of the economic 
valuation study, that operate within a specific context. The emphasis on 
stakeholders in the valuation process is not new in itself; studies have been 
carried out on how to integrate social aspects into valuation studies. For 
example, the VALSE project (1996-1998), financed by the European 
Commission, applied different procedures in case studies to analyze how to 
bring different actors’ views and preferences into environmental decision 
making processes (O’Connor, 1998). However, these studies focus only on 
value formation and value statements, while it is equally important to 
recognize that principals and contracting parties are also part of the 
valuation process and thus of the value formation. Therefore, by 
recognizing economic valuation as a process in which a wide variety of 
stakeholders with different perspectives and goals make choices, this study 
could further contribute to the integration of stakeholder perspectives in 
valuation studies. This integration involves stakeholders that are directly 
responsible for the choices made in the valuation process and those that 
indirectly influence these choices.  
The process approach of this study focuses on stakeholders and their 
choices and aims at understanding those choices. Economic valuation is 
based on neoclassical economic theory, where individuals make choices 
that maximize their utility and firms make choices that maximize profits. 
The motives behind these choices, however, are exogenous to neoclassical 
economic analysis. To understand the types of choices that these actors 
make within the process, therefore, other theories must be consulted to 
explain the actors and their contexts, thereby making the implicit variables 
of the valuation process more explicit. Institutional theory provides such an 
approach.  
Institutionalist schools in economics believe that understanding the 
influence of the institutional structure on economic behavior is necessary 
for a better understanding of the performance of firms, markets, agents and 
economies in different settings (Groenewegen et al., 1995). From an 
institutional perspective, therefore, the behavior of stakeholders in the 
valuation process is determined by their institutional context, or to put it 
conversely: stakeholder behavior can only be understood by understanding 
its institutional context.  
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Research concerning the institutional effects on economic valuation of the 
environment has focussed mainly on the effects of institutions on the 
outcomes of economic valuations. A major aspect of this research involved 
the contingent valuation method. Among others, institutional analysis was 
used to understand the influences on the answers consumers give, such as 
the effects of the construction of the questionnaire, the effects of the 
perspective of the consumer on the specific problem, and the effects of 
different preferences of consumers (see for example O’Neill, 1997, Brown 
and Slovic, 1988, Blamey, 1995).  
 
This study will take an institutional theory approach towards the process of 
economic valuation in the context of Dutch water management in which 
multiple perspectives, goals and relationships between actors as well as 
their institutional context are seen as part of this process. The goal of this 
study is to understand how choices are made in the valuation process, 
focussing specifically on this process in water management. These choices 
can only be understood by analyzing the institutional context of these 
actors when they make choices. Once choices are understood, this study 
will draw conclusions and recommendations on how to improve the 
valuation process in water management, by providing arguments on how to 
structure the process in order to limit inconsistencies in valuation 
outcomes. 
 
1.5 Research Questions and Structure  
 
The previous section explained that the goal of this study is to understand 
how stakeholders make choices in economic valuation processes in Dutch 
water management. Explanations will be sought in the institutional context 
in which multiple actors make such choices. Understanding the institutional 
context and its influence on stakeholder choices can contribute to an 
explanation of the inconsistencies in such choices which, in turn, can result 
in inconsistent outcomes of economic valuation processes. The problem 
statement of this study as discussed in the previous section leads to the 
following research question: 
 
How are choices in economic valuation processes in water 
management influenced by the context in which they are made? 
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To answer this research question, the following two sub-questions must be 
analyzed: 
 
1) Which choices are made in economic valuation processes and how? 
2) Which factors can be distinguished in the context of choices in economic 
valuation processes? 
 
These sub-questions will be answered in the following chapters. Chapter 2 
will provide answers to the first sub-question from an economic theory 
perspective. An explanation is given of the theoretical base of economic 
valuation rooted in neoclassical economics, followed by a discussion on the 
practical applicability and limitations of economic valuation. The chapter 
will end with the introduction of economic valuation as a process. In 
Chapter 3, the second research question will be discussed. The view on 
economic valuation as a process is further elaborated, and the chapter is 
dedicated entirely to the explanation and discussion of an institutional 
theory perspective on the valuation process. In Chapter 4, the empirical 
case study analysis that follows in Chapters 5 and 6 is introduced. The role 
of economic valuation of ecosystems in water management in the 
Netherlands and the methodological approach that will be taken in the 
empirical analysis are discussed. The chapter will conclude with an 
analytical model of the economic valuation process, applied to three case 
studies of cost-benefit analyses in Dutch water management in Chapters 5 
and 6. The aim of the case study analysis is to understand the valuation 
process in practice, guided by the theoretical perspective developed in 
earlier chapters. Hence, while sub-questions one and two have been 
addressed from a theoretical perspective in Chapters 2 and 3, these 
questions will be addressed from an empirical approach in Chapters 5 and 
6. In addition, the relationship between the choices of the economic 
valuation process and their context will be discussed in each of the cases. 
Chapter 7 provides an overview and will discuss the major findings of the 
three cases, leading to the answers to the research question from an 
empirical perspective that will be discussed in Chapter 8. In addition to 
drawing conclusions regarding the research questions, recommendations 
will be made for both the theory and the practical application of economic 
valuation in water management.  
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Chapter 2 Economic Valuation 
 of Ecosystems in 
Perspective 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the theoretical background of the economic valuation 
process is given. The field of economic valuation of ecosystems will be 
explained, which includes both the background of the concept of economic 
value in economic theory in sections 2.2 and 2.3 as well as perspectives 
towards the practical application of economic valuation in section 2.4. The 
chapter will conclude in section 2.5 with the introduction of the perspective 
that views economic valuation as a process in which an institutional theory 
perspective towards economic valuation will be introduced. This 
perspective will form the basis for the next chapters. 
 
2.2 Economics and the Environment 
 
2.2.1 The Economy-Environment Relationship  
 
At the basis of the relationship between the economy and the environment 
is the relationship between humans and their environment. The term 
environment originates from ecology, in which it is referred to as the natural 
surroundings that influence an organism (Cunningham and Saigo, 1992). In 
ecology, the relationship between different living organisms and their 
environment is studied (Sutton and Harmon, 1973). This relationship may 
be analyzed from different viewpoints: the energy viewpoint, where the 
basis is energy flows; the cycle viewpoint, approaching a whole class of 
phenomena as a sequence of events that recur regularly; the populations 
viewpoint that studies members of one species of organism; and the 
communities or ecosystem viewpoint, which studies the interaction of 
organisms in a given area (Sutton and Harmon, 1973). When the 
relationship between one specific organism - humans - and the 
environment is studied the field is called environmental science, which is by 
definition a populations viewpoint.  
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The basic unit of the interaction between organisms, including humans, 
and their environment that results from the complex interplay between 
living and non-living elements is called an ecosystem (Sutton and Harmon, 
1973). Fresh water and salt water, and the organisms that live in this water, 
are part of aquatic ecosystems, which include wetlands3, river basins, oceans, 
and so on. Several approaches towards the relationship between 
ecosystems and humans exist, and one approach is to focus on the 
ecosystem functions on which humans depend, an approach developed by 
de Groot (1992). In this approach, it is useful to distinguish between 
characteristics, structure, processes and functions of ecosystems (Turner et 
al., 2000). 
 
Characteristics describe an ecosystem area in the simplest terms, and include 
biological, chemical, and physical features. The ecosystem structure consists 
of the biotic and abiotic webs of which characteristics are elements, such as 
vegetation and soil type. Ecosystem processes refer to the dynamics of 
transforming energy into matter. These processes enable the development 
and maintenance of the ecosystem structure. Lastly, ecosystem functions are 
the result of the interactions between characteristics, structure and 
processes. These functions can be classified into four categories (de Groot, 
1992): 
 
a) Regulation Functions: ecosystems regulate ecological processes that 
contribute to a healthy environment  
b) Carrier Functions: ecosystems provide space for human activities 
c) Production Functions: ecosystems provide resources for humans 
d) Information Functions: ecosystems contribute to mental health 
 
Taking a fresh water wetland ecosystem as an example, the regulation 
functions they perform include the recycling of nutrients and human waste 
and watershed protection. They also provide fertile grounds for agricultural 
activities as carrier functions, as well as numerous production functions, 
including water for drinking, washing and cooking; reeds for baskets, mats 
and roofs; and fish for food. Lastly, wetlands provide scientific, esthetical 
and spiritual information. 
 
Ecosystem functions therefore are the capacity of natural processes and 
components to provide goods and services that satisfy human wants 
                                                 
3 Wetlands are defined as “areas of marsh, fen, peat land or water, whether natural or 
artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or 
salt, including areas of marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six 
meters” (Ramsar Convention, 1971). 
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directly or indirectly (de Groot, 1992). Ecosystem services, such as cleansing 
and recycling, are conditions and processes through which natural 
ecosystems sustain and fulfill human life. They maintain biodiversity and 
the production of ecosystem goods, like wood, water, and medicine (Daily, 
1997). 
 
At the same time, humans also interfere with the ecosystems they depend 
on (van Ast and Geerlings, 1995). First of all, humans interfere by adding 
something to ecosystems, which is called pollution. Secondly, humans may 
interfere by changing the structure of ecosystems, called modification or 
injury. In aquatic ecosystems, common interferences are canalization of 
riverbeds and the construction of hydroelectric dams. The last disturbance 
is called exhaustion, where humans interfere by withdrawing from 
ecosystems. 
 
As a consequence, while humans are entirely dependent on ecosystems the 
condition of the world’s ecosystems is also for a large part dependent on 
the activities of humans. This relationship between humans and ecosystems 
has often been characterized by a conflict. In order to understand this 
conflict, four types of ecosystems must be distinguished (Sutton and 
Harmon, 1973): 
 
- Mature natural ecosystems: ecosystems in their natural state, such as 
wilderness, mountains and desert 
- Managed natural ecosystems: ecosystems managed by man for 
recreational use or for the production of natural products – examples are 
parks and managed forests 
- Productive ecosystems: ecosystems used by man for the intensive 
production of food or natural resources, such as farms and cattle ranches 
- Urban ecosystems: ecosystems in which man lives and works, including 
cities and towns 
 
Over the past centuries, the growth in population has led humans to seek 
increasingly more space to live, to grow food and to pass their free time. In 
this process, ecosystems in their natural state were considered of little value 
to man, mostly because these ecosystems were little understood in terms of 
their productive capacity (Sutton and Harmon, 1973). As a result, humans 
have allowed the development of mature natural ecosystems into managed, 
productive and urban ecosystems, which were believed to be of higher 
productive value. The consequences of this are increasingly being felt in 
numerous ways, and one particularly important consequence for humans is 
the loss of important genetic information. Mature natural ecosystems are a 
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key source for important genetic information, which is being destroyed 
with the transformation of these rich ecosystems into younger ecosystems. 
 
The relationship that has been depicted between humans and ecosystems is 
at the basis of the relationship between ecosystems and the economy. The 
economy is an open system, which ‘extracts, processes and discards large 
amounts of physical materials’ (Turner et al., 1994). For these materials, it is 
dependent but also constrained by the environment. The relationship 
between the environment and economy can be presented via the materials 
balance model, which is shown in Figure 14. The model can be illustrated 
by applying it to an aquatic ecosystem like wetlands. The economy extracts 
useful materials from a wetland, such as fish, water and wood. These 
materials are subsequently changed in the economy, which involves 
changes in their energy states and entropy states5. In the end, output will be 
produced, where certain output will be recycled in the economy and waste 
products will be returned to the environment. This perspective makes clear 
that humans and their economies impact the environment and that 
environmental quality impacts the economy (Turner et al., 1994).  
 
Although integration between the environment and the economy is 
important, conflicting perspectives hamper the execution in practice. A key 
source of conflict is the fact that perspectives of humans towards the 
environment are often dominated by anthropocentrism, a human-based ethic 
that views the justification of the protection of species or entire ecosystems 
in terms of their benefits to humans. Once these benefits are unclear or not 
recognized, humans will transform or destroy ecosystems in the pursuit of 
gains. This can also be observed in the economic and political perspectives 
on time. While for economics, long-term thinking usually covers a period 
of several decades, and for politicians even a few years6, this is short-term 
thinking when it comes to environmental processes. In the environment, 
                                                 
4 The model is based on the First and Second Laws of Thermodynamics. The First Law 
states that we can't create or destroy energy and matter - it ends up somewhere in the 
environmental system. This points to the boundaries of viewing the economic system as a 
closed system; instead, it is integrated with the environmental system. The Second Law 
relates to the fact that materials get used entropically, where "entropy" is a measure of 
disorder, and includes spread out and diffused. The relevance of the Second Law to 
economics is that materials that are used get diffused and spread out into the economic 
system, which places limits on the recycling of wastes. Those materials that cannot be 
recycled will end up in the environment. Hence, the Second Law further places a boundary 
on viewing the economic system as a closed system. 
5 Entropy means ‘usefulness’: materials enter the economy in a state of low entropy (useful 
materials) and leave in a state of high entropy (useless materials) (Turner et al., 1994). 
6 This is also known as the political-ecological anachronism. 
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long-term thinking implies a period of hundreds or even thousands of 
years. These  different approaches have often resulted in a conflict between 
economic and environmental interests, where so-called solutions have 
often been dominated by short-term economic motivations, rooted in 
anthropocentric perspectives towards the environment.  
 
Figure 1 Simplified Materials-Balance Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Materials are extracted from the environment, and the primary material and energy inputs are 
processed and fabricated to result in final product output for consumption. Each of these processes 
generates non-product outputs, some of which may be recycled and modified to be returned into 
the economy for basic processing. However, residuals may also be generated during the recycling 
process that result in environmental damage. Other non-product outputs require direct disposal into 
the environment, which results in direct environmental damage. 
During extraction, certain materials are also directly inputs for recycling, indicated by the dashed 
arrow. After recycling, the products may be liable for modification so that they may be brought back 
into the economy for basic processing. The residuals that are generated in the recycling process 
again result in environmental damage. 
 
Source: Turner et al., 1994 
 
Another body of literature that is important in the context of the economy-
environment relationship focuses on the relationship between economic 
development and the environment. Although it is clear that the 
environment and the economy are part of the same system and therefore 
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interdependent, the direction of the impact of economic growth on the 
environment remains ambiguous. Part of the debate concerns the inputs of 
economic activities (Perman et al., 1996: 196). When economic growth 
involves an increase in material and energy inputs, negative environmental 
effects are more likely to take place. If, on the other hand, growth becomes 
more efficient such that lower relative quantities of inputs are required for 
the same outputs, economic growth may not necessarily have such negative 
environmental effects. Furthermore, changing relative resource scarcities 
are up to a certain extent reflected in changing resource prices, which may 
result in substitution effects on both demand and supply side. To what 
extent such substitutions are possible is another source for debate. 
 
An idea that has become popular is the possibility that economic growth 
may be necessary for environmental improvement. This view is based on 
the Environmental Kuznets curve, which states that as per capita income 
increases in an economy, total environmental impact of economic activity 
initially grows, reaches a maximum and then falls (Perman et al., 1996: 304). 
This theory has resulted in opinions (by for example the World Bank) that 
economic growth results in higher levels of wealth, so incentives to protect 
the environment become of greater priority in the political agenda (Perman 
et al., 1996: 302). This stimulates resource substitution, technological 
innovation and changing patterns of demand. However, these hypotheses 
are hardly conclusive and are countered by those who claim limits to 
economic growth do exist, including physical resource constraints (see for 
example Meadows et al., 1972), social limits (Hirsch, 1977), and biophysical 
limits (Daly, 1987).  
 
As becomes clear from the preceding paragraphs, there is no consensus on 
the relationships between economic growth and the environment nor the 
direction of this relationship. This dissertation will not further elaborate on 
this debate, but the paragraphs do show that the relationship between the 
environmental and economic systems are extremely complex and that 
perspectives on environment and economics relationships are still very 
much diverged. 
 
2.2.2 Economic Approaches towards the Environment 
 
The concept of economic value has its roots in neoclassical economics. 
Before explaining the theoretical background and foundations of economic 
valuation, however, it is important to explain the context in which the 
theory of neoclassical economics emerged. The perception of natural 
resources in the history of economic thought varies with time and 
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economic schools. These perceptions range from natural resources being 
the source of all value (the physiocrats), to being the most important 
restriction on the growth of productivity (some classical economists and 
ecological economists), to natural resources as relatively abundant factors 
of production (most neoclassical economists) (Dietz et al., 1994: 27).  
 
The physiocrats, or Les Économistes, in the eighteenth century emphasized 
that the value of a good was determined by the natural resources that were 
processed in the good. Only agriculture and mining where productive in 
the sense that they added value; handwork and trade only transformed 
natural material and therefore did not add value. Natural resources received 
a central place in their economic theories and the economy as a circular 
course was introduced for the first time (Dietz et al., 1994).  
 
In the last third of the eighteenth century, the Industrial Revolution came 
to England and with it factories, factory towns, workers and investments in 
machinery (Galbraith, 1987). Society went from being mercantilist to 
industrialist and the classical economist tradition emerged. 
 
The classical economists at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the 
nineteenth centuries mostly concentrated on industrial development – 
economic growth, formation of capital and income distribution7. Classicists 
had different opinions on how to deal with natural resources. Adam Smith 
(1723-1780), for example, had a very optimistic view about future 
production and consumption possibilities - natural resources formed no 
restrictions (Dietz et al., 1994: 31). As long as economic transactions were 
allowed to operate on the basis of freely competitive markets, economic 
and social progress would prevail (Pearce and Turner, 1990: 6). Thomas 
Malthus  (1766-1834) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), on the other hand, 
were more pessimistic about (agrarian) production possibilities in the future 
(Dietz et al., 1994: 33). Malthus stated that population would keep 
increasing exponentially while food production increased linearly, and 
therefore overpopulation would always persist. Only moral restraints on 
reproduction itself would result in an escape from this pattern. Such a 
pessimistic view on the prospects of economic growth due to the scarcity 
of natural resources was shared by David Ricardo (1772-1823) (Pearce and 
                                                 
7 Classical tradition is not limited to this time period; the Austrian school that emerged in 
between the two World Wars contained the “…most committed exponents of the classical 
orthodoxy in its purest form.” (Galbraith, 1987: 190). The most well-known of these were 
von Mises (1880-1973) and von Hayek (1899- ). Both believed that socialism was an 
impossibility and any departure from classicism to be an inevitable step towards socialism. 
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Turner, 1990: 6). He believed that diminishing returns would set in because 
the available land varied in quality and society must therefore move on to 
successively less productive land. John Stuart Mill was also pessimistic 
about agrarian production possibilities in the future, but viewed the 
prospect of a ‘stationary state’, in which population is stable and thus does 
not exceed food production, with some optimism (Pearce and Turner, 
1990: 7; Dietz et al., 1994: 33). The stationary state could only be achieved 
if nature is no longer over-exploited, welfare is evenly divided and humans 
restrain their reproduction; or, if these aspects are not achieved, nature 
itself would force the steady state upon humans (Dietz et al., 1994: 34).  
 
Many criticisms of classical tradition and industrial society (at this time still 
based mostly in England) came from Germany, France and the United 
States, but among the greatest critics was Karl Marx (1818-1883) (Galbraith, 
1987). Pearce and Turner (1990: 8,9) argue that Marx took a “material-
balance approach” to the production process over time. Marx emphasized 
that a viable basis for society could only exist if the production system was 
capable of reproducing itself, and natural systems could be a limit to 
reproduction. According to Marx, capitalist economies fail to be 
reproductive, or sustainable, and one source of this is environmental 
destruction.  
 
In general, it can be said that the classicists had an integrated view of the 
economy and the environment, where nature and the economy were 
viewed as closed systems. However, as societies became more and more 
industrial in the course of the nineteenth century, the predictions of 
Malthus and Mill disappeared into the background (Dietz and van der 
Straaten, 1994: 35). Mass production and the market as a coordination 
mechanism grew and economists became more interested in the patterns of 
exchange by agents on markets; in around 1870 the neoclassical economists 
emerged (Pearce and Turner, 1990). They introduced a new analytical 
instrument called ‘marginal analysis’, the study of the relationships between 
small or incremental changes. Economic activity was the result of the 
interaction between productive activity and the preferences of individual 
buyers, constrained by the range of income and choice (Pearce and Turner, 
1990: 10). This interaction implied that a certain exchange ratio existed 
among goods; if money was used in this exchange, all exchange ratios could 
be expressed in terms of money (Dietz, 1994: 41). Hence, the price of a 
good was the ‘exchange value’ of the good expressed in monetary terms. In 
the neoclassical period, the problem of the availability of natural resources 
that the classical economists recognized was perceived as irrelevant. For 
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example, Marshall stated that technological development proved that 
Malthus’ pessimistic viewpoints on economic growth were wrong (Dietz, 
1994: 43). He discussed ecological processes only insofar as they appeared 
on the market; goods that were not available on the market do not have a 
price and therefore seem to be abundant. However, Marshall did introduce 
the concept of ‘external effect’, although he explained the concept only on 
the benefit side. Pigou (1877-1559), Marshall’s successor at the University 
of Cambridge, was aware of both positive and negative externalities (Dietz, 
1994: 44), and he discussed negative external effects in terms of 
environmental problems, where the solution to these negative externalities 
could be found with government interventions.  
 
The neoclassical views on the environment are generally perceived to be of 
great influence on Environmental and Resource Economics (ERE), although 
David Pearce and Kerry Turner (1990:5), two well-known advocates of 
ERE, call this a sub-discipline of economics that consists of a diversity of 
doctrines, including neoclassical, institutional, Marxist and co-evolutionary 
economics. ERE views the economy and the environment as two separate 
systems in which the environment is an asset that provides the economy 
with a variety of goods and services. This approach is based on the concept 
of weak sustainability, in which the sum of economic and natural capital be 
maintained: human-made capital is a perfect substitute for natural capital, 
and resource scarcity can be continually augmented by technological means 
(Hussen, 2000). Therefore, economic growth and environmental 
improvements are compatible. The market is the main medium for 
resource allocation, where market prices equate supply and demand such 
that equilibrium is obtained. Environmental degradation is viewed as a 
market failure because the prices for goods and services either do not exist 
or do not reflect the true value of the resource. As a result, environmental 
degradation occurs, which is viewed as a negative externality -  negative 
effects that take place outside the market, caused by one economic agent 
onto another without any form of compensation being paid (van den 
Bergh, 2000). These market failures can be corrected through creating 
markets by attaching a price to previously free services, or through 
modifying markets by centrally deciding the value of natural goods and 
services and ensuring those values are incorporated in their prices (Davis, 
2001). Creating hypothetical markets of supply and demand allows for the 
construction of prices of environmental goods and services which results in 
a more efficient allocation of these resources.  
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, Institutional Economics emerged. 
Although it consists of a wide variety of views, institutionalist schools in 
economics believe that the understanding of the influence of the 
institutional structure on economic behavior is necessary in order to better 
understand the performance of firms, markets, agents and economies in 
different settings (Groenewegen et al., 1995). They often stress the 
importance of the ecological foundations of any economic system (Pearce 
and Turner, 1990: 16); the economy is an open system that receives 
impulses from social, political and physical systems. Individuals hold both 
private and public preferences, and the latter may justify an active public 
sector in the economy. Institutionalists view the individual either as a 
cultural product (Old Institutionalism) or as a rational individual (New 
Institutionalism). While the first perspective criticizes the core assumptions 
of neoclassical economics, the latter perceive institutional theory as a 
perspective that can enrich economic theory by creating an awareness of 
human motivation in economic behavior. The perspectives of the school of 
Institutional Economics will be further explained in Chapter 3. 
 
The awareness of the environment grew at the end of the 1960s and 
beginning of 1970s, which stimulated economists to analyze the 
environment systematically. A minority of economists disagreed with the 
approach of ERE, in which environmental problems were perceived as 
externalities that needed to be internalized (Dietz and van der Straaten, 
1994: 75). Hence, a second school of thought emerged called Ecological 
Economics (EE), or Co-evolutionary Economics, which was founded at the 
end of the 1980s (van den Bergh, 2000)8. Thinkers in this school such as 
Norgaard and Daily integrate the disciplines of economics, ecology, 
thermodynamics, ethics and a range of other natural and social sciences to 
create an integrated approach towards the environmental-economic system 
(van den Bergh, 2000). It is based on the concept of strong sustainability, 
which requires that both economic and natural capital be maintained 
separately (van den Bergh, 2000). It views the economy as a subsystem of a 
larger ecosystem - the environment and the economy are integrated and co-
evolving systems. It thereby sets limits on the physical growth of the 
economy and questions whether the world’s resources can actually support 
economic growth on a global scale indefinitely (Hussen, 2000). Limits are 
placed on the availability of energy and on the resilience of natural 
ecosystems. Central to the EE perspective is the steady-state economy 
                                                 
8 The economists K.E. Boulding, H.E. Daly and N. Georgescu-Roegen, and the ecologists 
C.S.Holling and H.T. Odum are considered to be the intellectual founders of Ecological 
Economics (van den Bergh, 2000). 
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(SSE), a theoretical growth model that incorporates biophysical growth 
limits and ethical considerations (Hussen, 2000). In SSE, economic growth 
is bounded by the ecological system such that the stock of physical wealth 
and people is constant. Ecological economists recognize the limitations to 
the application of the market mechanism to the environment and instead 
strive for a dialogue with natural scientists to include both disciplines in the 
solution to environmental degradation (Gowdy, 1995). The total economic 
value of changes in the environment is not regarded as the sum of private 
values since this takes no account of such crucial aspects as internal 
environmental system functions, life-support functions, future generations 
and intrinsic values (van den Bergh, 2000). Although the difference in 
opinion regarding the use of economic values in environmental policy 
within EE are pronounced, economic values may be used as part of a 
multiple set of criteria that needs to be considered in the solution (Munda, 
1993). This method, called ‘multicriteria-analysis’, constitutes an integration 
of economic and ecological tools for the management of ecosystems, as 
opposed to the direct application of neoclassical-economic theories to 
ecology (Gowdy, 1995). Decisions regarding the environment are then not 
made on basis of economic values alone but on a number of criteria, as a 
dialogue between the ecological and the economic systems. The 
government, as opposed to the market, ultimately decides how the 
resources shall be allocated. 
 
Differences in economic approaches towards the environment become 
more apparent when they are related to different perspectives on 
sustainability. In this respect, Turner et al. (1994: 60) distinguish four 
approaches to sustainable development: 
 
a) Very weak sustainability 
b) Weak sustainability 
c) Strong sustainability 
d) Very strong sustanability 
 
The two weak forms of sustainability can be perceived as technocentric 
approaches, which adhere the position that no constraints should be placed 
on individual consumers or markets. Technocentrics support an open, free 
market, which is backed by the belief that technological developments can 
overcome environmental problems (Turner et al., 1994, p. 60). Very weak 
sustainability is the approach generally supported by the neoclassical 
economics school of thought. They support the belief that the overall stock 
of capital should remain constant over time, but that consumption should 
only be held constant with respect to exhaustible resources when the rents 
derived from the intertemporal efficient use of those resources are 
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reinvested in reproducible capital (Turner, 1993). The London school of 
thought adhere weak sustainability, which introduces an upper bound on 
the assimilative capacity and a lower bound on the level of natural stock 
necessary to support sustainable development. Certain key species and 
processes cannot be substituted by man-made capital, and therefore some 
degree of restriction is placed on resource-using economic activities 
(Turner, 1993). The two strong forms of sustainability are ecocentric 
approaches, which support the belief that the regenerative capacity of 
renewable natural capital should not be threatened even if the economic 
benefits outweigh the economic costs to society (Turner et al., 1994). 
Strong sustainability is supported by the post-Keynesian school of 
economics, who support the view that whatever benefits foregone, natural 
capital losses are unacceptable. It is not sufficient to protect the overall 
level of capital; natural capital must be protected because certain critical 
natural capital is non-substitutable (Turner, 1993). The very strong 
sustainability approach is generally supported by the thermodynamic school 
(including Ecological Economics) who call for a steady-state economic 
system based on thermodynamic limits and constraints placed on the 
macro-economy. They plead for zero economic growth and zero 
population growth (Turner, 1993). 
 
The different sustainability approaches result in different perspectives 
towards economic valuation (see Turner et al., 1994; Bouma and Schuijt, 
2001). In the weak sustainability approach, extended monetary valuation 
methods are likely to be applied to value those ecosystem functions and 
services both with and without a market price and hence a full set of 
ecosystem functions and services may be included in the analysis. 
Economic valuation in the strong sustainability, on the other hand, may be 
utilised in decision making only if fixed standards with regard to 
safeguarding the functions of ecosystems are applied. Under the regime of 
very strong sustainability, economic valuation of ecosystems is likely to be 
completely rejected as assessment tools, while very weak sustainability is 
likely to value only those ecosystem functions and services of water systems 
that have market prices.  
 
2.3 The Concept of Economic Value 
 
2.3.1 Allocation of Resources 
 
The study object of economics can be explained by distinguishing between 
‘material object’ and ‘formal object’ (Dietz et al., 1994: 15). The material 
object indicates what aspect of reality is the subject of study and in 
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economics this is society. Economics studies human behavior, relationships 
between humans and social institutions (government, unions) and abstract 
institutions like money, markets and democracy. Usually, however, 
economics is defined with respect to its formal object, which states the 
perspective from which reality is studied. In this respect, economics is 
concerned with the allocation of scarce resources, including land, labor, 
capital and natural resources. Scarcity refers to a situation where the wants 
(or preferences) of an individual or group of individuals exceed the 
resources available to satisfy them (Bannock et al., 1987). Scarcity is 
therefore a relative concept: resources are scarce relative to the preferences 
of the individuals for these resources. The term global water scarcity, for 
example, is subject to much debate - while scarcity of fresh water is 
definitely a serious issue in many countries, including countries in the 
Middle East and Africa, other countries including many European 
countries like the Netherlands are often faced with water abundance that 
results in flooding. Yet other countries may be faced with both extremes: 
Mozambique has faced water shortages in certain parts of the country, 
while other parts experience severe flooding. This clearly illustrates the 
relativity of the term scarcity. As a result, emphasis is increasingly placed on 
the distribution of fresh water around the globe and less on terms like 
global water scarcity.  
 
Production aims at meeting the desires of humans for scarce resources. 
However, in all societies, resources are inadequate to produce all the goods 
and services necessary to satisfy these wants (Wills, 1997); therefore scarcity 
is present in any society in which desires can’t be completely satisfied. 
Economists would like to know what choices individuals make when 
resources are scarce. For example, in consumer choice theory, on which 
economic valuation of ecosystems is based, the process by which 
individuals as consumers allocate their income at the margin among an 
array of consumer goods is described (Gowdy and Mayumi, 2000). These 
individuals are represented by Homo Oeconomicus: an autonomous rational 
person.  
 
In making their choices, rational individuals as a rule seek to satisfy their 
preferences, a pursuit of individual welfare maximization. Individual welfare, 
also known as utility, is the amount of preferences an individual can satisfy, 
given the relative scarcity of resources (Dietz, 2000). The preferences that 
individuals have are revealed by the choices they make, but the reasons for 
these preferences, or motives, are not explained by this behavior. In 
economics, the choices of individuals in the context of scarcity are studied, 
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while the motives on which these choices are based are treated as 
exogenous variables (Dietz, 2000). The assumptions of rationality and 
stable preferences, therefore, do not account for preferences that differ 
among individuals and change over time, nor for the capability of humans 
to act altruistically (Pearce and Turner, 1994).  
 
Some scarce resources are allocated in the market place, where consumers 
that demand goods and producers that supply goods meet and interact. In 
terms of aquatic ecosystems, goods such as fish and in some circumstances 
clay or gravel are typical resources that are sold in a market place. The 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that in perfect 
competition, the market mechanism provides an efficient allocation of 
resources (Nas, 1996). Efficiency in economics is defined as allocative 
efficiency, which is met when the following efficiency criteria are met (Nas, 
1996): 
 
- Production efficiency: if it is no longer possible to increase the output of 
one good without reducing the output of some other good 
- Exchange efficiency: if it is impossible to make a person better off without 
making another person worse off 
 
If these criteria are met, economists speak of a Pareto optimum situation. Such 
a situation is obtained on the market place through an interaction of supply 
and demand, which results in resource prices. In a perfect market, prices 
allow for an optimal allocation of scarce resources and are the main 
orientation point for consumers and producers in making decisions. In 
other words, prices, and especially changing prices, have an information 
function (Dietz, 2000). The relative scarcity positions of resources are 
reflected in their prices; a change in these relative scarcity positions then 
results in a change in prices. Changes in prices in turn lead consumers and 
producers to react and adjust their demand and supply of the resources 
such that an efficient allocation of the resource is secured (Dietz, 2000).  
  
A Pareto optimum situation in the market place is, however, not always 
attained - a situation that is characterized by a market failure. One cause of 
market failure is the absence of perfect competition, as is the case with 
increasing returns to scale9 and asymmetric information between buyers 
                                                 
9 A production associated with decreasing average costs, such is the case with a monopoly 
or an oligopoly (Mamuth, 1993). 
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and sellers10. Another cause is the prevalence of external effects in 
production and consumption. External effects appear when the consumption 
or production by one individual or group of individuals affects another 
party without compensation taking place (Mamuth, 1993). These effects 
can be both positive and negative11. Mamuth (1993) states two main 
reasons for external effects:  
 
- The effect is a by-product of consumption or production 
- A lack of well-defined property rights 
 
An example of the first aspect is pollution of water, associated with certain 
production processes of factories – these productions cause negative 
external effects on surrounding communities. The prevalence of the second 
aspect, a lack of well-defined property rights, means that it is impossible to 
determine who should pay for the consumption of a certain good. Property 
rights reflect the owner’s right and privilege to use the resource (Tietenberg, 
1992). De Vries (1992: 43) explains that the exchange of scarce goods is in 
fact a trade in ‘bundles of property rights’. Money and prices make this 
trade easier. In this respect, property rights are the total of economic and 
social relations that determine the position of each and every individual 
towards the use of the scarce resources (de Vries, 1992: 44). Well-defined 
property rights are characterized by 4 aspects (Tietenberg, 1992): 
 
- Universality: all resources are privately owned and ownership is completely 
specified 
- Exclusivity: all costs and benefits as a result of resource ownership accrue 
only to the owner 
- Transferability : all property rights are transferable from one owner to 
another 
- Enforceability: property rights protect the owner of the resource from 
involuntary seizure of the resource by others 
 
Natural resources are characterized by the fact that they often lack well-
defined property rights. The lack of well-defined property rights results in a 
characterization of most natural resources into public goods and common 
                                                 
10 In a perfect competition, it is assumed that all actors have access to perfect information, 
represented by equilibrium prices; in the absence of perfect competition (in a monopoly or 
oligopoly), consumers and producers may not have perfect information. 
11 David Ricardo (1771-1823), a famous economist, believed that acts of consumption and 
production result in both positive and negative externalities but, according to Ricardo, 
externalities are often more negative, and consequently, it is the negative externalities that 
capture our attention. 
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pool resources. This characterization is based on two elements (Wills, 
1997): 
 
- Rivalry: certain environmental goods are rival goods when the consumption 
of the good by one person reduces the amount available to others. 
Consumption of non-rival environmental goods, on the other hand, will not 
reduce the amount of the same good available to others. 
- Exclusivity: an excludable good is a good whose consumption by non-payers 
can be excluded by some technical means. Consumption of non-excludable 
goods, on the other hand, cannot be excluded from non-payers. 
 
When goods are both non-rival and non-excludable, these goods are called 
public goods. Examples of public goods are defense and air quality. Many 
natural resources have public good characteristics – the functions natural 
retention capacity and flood control of aquatic ecosystems could be 
considered public goods. If goods are rival but non-excludable, the goods 
are labeled common pool resources. Natural resources provided by aquatic 
ecosystems such as fish and water are rival since one person’s consumption 
of them decreases the amount of the good available to another but cannot 
be excluded in consumption from those who are unauthorized users (Wills, 
1997). 
 
Both public goods and common pool resources are subject to external 
effects, and hence markets fail with respect to the efficient allocation of 
most environmental goods and services. In mainstream economics, market 
failures can be a motive to allow governments to intervene to protect those 
who suffer from externalities12. In this case, government has the following 
policy instruments at its disposal (Hazeu, 2000):  
 
- Judicial regulation: laws and rules 
- Financial regulation: subsidies, levies and other financial stimuli 
- Social regulation: discussion, negotiation, and education 
 
Hence, governments may set regulations on behavior, impose quality 
standards on the environment that actors need to comply with, or negotiate 
with actors so as to stimulate a change in behavior. In all these cases, the 
government decides to play an active role. Another solution is to focus on 
an improvement of the market place by internalizing the environment in 
the market place. In fresh water management, such discussions are held 
around issues of water pricing. In most countries, the price paid for water 
                                                 
12 Other motives for government intervention are the provision of public goods and the 
intervention when imperfect competition prevails (Nas, 1996). 
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consumption does not represent the true cost of water extraction, which, 
ideally, should not only include extraction, production and transportation 
costs but also the costs of extracting fresh water to the environment. An 
example of such costs is the depletion of groundwater resources in certain 
areas of the world. In such cases where fresh water is under-priced, the 
allocation of water is not economically efficient and may result in over-
consumption of water that eventually contributes to local water scarcity. 
One approach to deal with this problem is to value such resources so that 
they receive a market price and consumers can make a trade-off (Turner et 
al., 1994) - this is called economic valuation of the environment. 
 
2.3.2 Economic Value  
 
Before turning to the concept of economic value, a distinction must be 
made between ‘price’ and ‘value’. In perfect functioning markets, prices of 
goods reflect the (exchange) value of the good expressed in monetary 
terms. This exchange value is the result of the interaction between 
productive activity (supply) and the preferences of individual buyers 
(demand), constrained by the range of income and choice. However, it was 
explained in the previous section that for some resources, markets do not 
always function perfectly, in which case the price for which the resource is 
traded does not reflect the exchange value. In some cases, goods and 
services (including many environmental goods and services) are not even 
traded in the market place and thus have no market price; as was explained 
in the previous section, these are called externalities. When decisions are 
made that affect these externalities, however, decision-makers need to 
know what the total value of these externalities is to society. With respect to 
environmental goods and services, this total value may consist of an 
ecological value, a socio-esthetical value, an intrinsic value, and an 
economic value. Economic values are therefore only one aspect of total 
resource value.  
 
Economic values are monetary measures for benefits or costs of 
environmental change (Wills, 1997). They are based on estimates of 
people’s willingness to pay for that environmental change or willingness to accept 
compensation for that change. Although there is still considerable 
disagreement regarding the classification of economic values, one common 
approach is to distinguish between use values and non-use values (Turner 
et al., 1994) (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2 Total Economic Value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The use value of an environment comprises both direct use of the 
environment, such as the consumption of fish, trees and water, and indirect 
use of the environment, like use of retention capacity of wetlands and 
oxygen production of forests. Furthermore, option value is distinguished as 
a use value. Option value is defined as the value to humans to preserve an 
environment as a potential benefit for themselves in the future. It arises 
from retaining an option to a good or service for which future demand or 
supply is uncertain: if people are uncertain about their future preferences or 
the future availability of the good, people might be willing to pay a price to 
keep the option for future use open (Perman et al., 1996: 277)13. The non-
use value of an environment refers to the non-instrumental value, not 
associated with use. This includes existence value, a recognition of the value 
of the very existence of ecosystems. It is based on a sympathy with or 
concern for the welfare of non-human beings – a desire that ecosystems or 
species should have a right to exist. Bequest value is both a use and a non-use 
value. It is related to option value, but it is the willingness to pay for the 
preservation of an environment for the benefit of one’s descendants. This 
                                                 
13 Option value arises when people are risk averse: it is the amount an individual would be 
willing to pay today for the right to consume the good tomorrow. In the case of no risk 
aversion, however, people may still attach value to a resource in the case of uncertainty: an 
individual might be willing to pay for maintaining options for future use of some resource. 
This is called quasi option value and is based on expectations about future technological 
advances and development of knowledge. An example is the value individuals might attach 
to the protection of the rainforests as a potential source for medicinal remedies in the 
future. (Perman et al., 1996: 277) 
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benefit incorporates both use and non-use of the environment (Turner et 
al., 1994)14.  
 
Economic value must not be confused with total ecosystem value. The 
aggregate ecosystem possesses a primary and a secondary value, together 
which comprises the total value of an ecosystem (Turner at. al., 1994). The 
primary value is the value of a healthy ecosystem that contributes to the 
aggregate life support, the value of ecosystems as a basis for life on earth. 
This value is necessary before the range of use and non-use values, the 
secondary ecosystem value, can be utilized by humans. Economic value only 
captures secondary value – the primary value is not encompassed by total 
economic value. Moreover, it must be recognized that other types of 
ecosystem value exist, such as ecological value, socio-cultural value and 
intrinsic value, which also cannot be fully captured by economic value (de 
Groot, 1992). Intrinsic value is the value that resides in the environmental 
asset itself (Turner et al., 1994). It is unlike existence value, which is a value 
humans attach to ecosystems; it is the value intrinsically residing in 
ecosystems themselves.  This value cannot not captured by total economic 
value. Hence, economic value is purely based on people's explicit 
willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept estimates for ecosystems goods 
or services - those goods and services for which humans are not willing to 
pay or accept are not captured and must be estimated through other means.  
 
2.3.3 Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept  
 
Economic valuation of ecosystem functions measures consumer 
willingness to pay or willing to accept compensation for changes in the 
environment. This is based on economic consumer theory, where consumers 
are expected to maximize their utility, or satisfaction derived from 
consumption, subject to their income. Utility maximization results in a 
Marshallian demand curve, which is represented in Figure 3. If the 
environmental good or service is provided at price P0, all consumers must 
pay P0. Total expenditure, then, is equal to price times quantity, or area B. 
However, some consumers are willing to pay more for this good – the fact 
that they pay less results in a consumer surplus, the area under the demand 
curve and above P0, or area A in the graph. This is the maximum gain an 
individual can obtain from the environmental product at price P0. The 
                                                 
14 Option, existence and bequest values are also known as ‘preservation benefits’, and are a 
major component of total economic value: a study by Walsh (1984) showed that the 
incorporation of preservation benefits in the consumer surplus of wilderness preservation 
increased the annual benefits by sixty percent. 
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economic value, or the total willingness to pay by consumers for the 
environmental good, is equal to the sum of area A and B, or the area under 
the demand curve (Pearce and Turner, 1990). Since P0 can be directly 
observed in the market, area B, or total expenditure, is usually the first 
approximation of economic value. However, since this omits consumer 
surplus, economic value, or total willingness to pay, is more than what we 
observe from market prices.  
 
Figure 3 Consumer Surplus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An important objection to using a Marshallian demand curve for measures 
of consumer surplus is that it assumes money income15 is constant (Nas, 
1996). In other words, it is assumed that an increase in the price of good X 
will result in a decrease in the quantity demanded of good X.  This is called 
the substitution effect: as the price of good X increases, the quantity demanded 
of good X decreases and people switch to a substitute, good Y. However, 
an increase in the price of good X simultaneously means a decrease in real 
income16, or purchasing power, which is an additional affect on the 
demand of good X. This effect is known as the income effect: as the price of 
good X increases, real income decreases and the demand for good X 
decreases. The total change in quantity demanded as a result of price 
changes that is measured by consumer surplus, therefore, consists of both a 
substitution and an income effect. In order to determine the economic 
value of a good it is important to know how much people are willing to pay 
for a certain good if their real income is held constant. In other words, if 
real income remains the same, how much would the consumer be willing to 
pay for the price change? 
 
                                                 
15 Money income is income stated at current prices, not adjusted for inflation. 
16 Real income is income adjusted for inflation, or purchasing power. 
 A 
B 
quantity 
price 
Marshallian 
demand curveP 0 
Economic Valuation of Ecosystems in Perspective 
 35
The Hicksian compensated demand curve accounts for the income effect (see 
Figure 4). Assume a price decrease from price P0 to price P1. According to 
the Marshallian demand curve, the increase in consumer surplus as a result 
of this price change is equal to area AB. However, introducing the fact that 
real income changes as a result of the price change results in the 
introduction of a compensated demand curve D1. All along the Marshallian 
demand curve are different compensated demand curves, relating to each 
constant level of real income (Cullis and Jones, 1992). A decrease in price 
from P0 to P1 , while holding real income constant (at D1) results in a 
consumer surplus of area A. This area is called price-compensating variation, 
and is smaller than the Marshallian consumer surplus. This is the maximum 
amount an individual would be willing to pay for the price change (if it is a 
favorable price change), or the maximum amount an individual would be 
willing to accept to forego the price change (if it is an unfavorable price 
change) (Cullis and Jones, 1992).  
 
Figure 4 Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cullis and Jones, 1992 
 
Another option is to ask the consumer how much he would need to receive 
so as to make him as well off as if the price decrease occurred (Cullis and 
Jones, 1992). If the price had decreased, the individual would be at price P1 
and demand curve D2. The starting point is therefore curve D2 at price P1. 
The amount that would need to be given to the individual that would make 
him as well off as if the price had fallen to P1 is area ABC. This measure of 
consumer surplus is called price-equivalent variation, and is larger than the 
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forego the change in price (in the case of an unfavorable price change) 
(Cullis and Jones, 1992). 
 
Compensating variation and equivalent variation are not equal, however 
both measure willingness to pay and willingness to accept. Willingness to 
pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) are both technically correct 
measures for economic value (Pearce and Turner, 1990). According to 
economic theory, WTP and WTA should be equal. In practice, however, 
measures of WTP are often less than measures of WTA. Hoevenagel 
(1994) gives four possible reasons for this discrepancy. First of all, people 
are not willing to accept deterioration in environmental quality as they feel 
nobody has the right to pollute. Therefore, they may demand a higher 
compensation. Secondly, many respondents are careful and insecure, which 
results in stating a lower WTP and a higher WTA. A third reason is that 
people may find preventing a welfare loss is more important than gaining a 
welfare profit. Fourthly, the number of available substitutes influences 
valuation – the more substitutes or alternatives of behavior are available, 
the smaller the discrepancy between WTP and WTA. The difference 
between WTP and WTA is still unresolved in economic literature.  
 
2.3.4 Economic Valuation Methods 
 
Economic theory distinguishes several valuation methods to obtain 
economic values. For those goods and services that are traded in the 
market place and whose prices are not distorted due to market 
imperfections or government policy, market prices can be applied to derive 
economic values. However, many goods and services of the environment 
do not have market prices and many who do often have prices that are 
distorted due to for example government subsidies. In such cases, it is 
necessary to apply Shadow Pricing techniques. Shadow pricing implies 
directly adjusting for the distortions of financial prices or applying non-
market pricing methods to derive economic values.  
 
One typology of non-market pricing methods is to distinguish between 
demand curve approaches and non-demand curve approaches. Demand curve 
approaches use Marshallian or Hicksian demand curves to obtain economic 
values. These approaches are Contingent Valuation, Travel Cost and 
Hedonic Pricing. The most well-known demand-curve method is called 
Contingent Valuation (CV). This method directly obtains consumers’ WTP 
(or WTA) for a change in the level of an environmental good, based on a 
hypothetical market (Hanley and Spash, 1993). It attempts to reveal 
individuals’ stated preferences and is based on the Hicksian demand curve, 
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in which real income is held constant. The most common method is to 
state a hypothetical market for an environmental good, and ask consumers 
(through surveys, questionnaires or experimental techniques) to state their 
maximum WTP to realize an improvement in the quality of that 
environmental good, or their minimum WTA compensation for 
deterioration in the quality of the environmental good (Pearce and Turner, 
1990). A major advantage of the CV method is its technical capacity to 
estimate non-use values, for which it is widely used (Pearce and Turner, 
1990). Technically speaking, it is applicable to all circumstances and is 
therefore often the only technique to measure benefits. However, it also 
receives much criticism that is mainly directed at the accuracy of CV 
estimations (Hanley and Spash, 1993): 
 
a) Strategic bias: respondents may understate their bid for an environmental 
good if they believe the bid is actually going to be collected from them 
b) Design bias: the way the information is presented to the respondents may 
bias the outcome 
c) Mental account bias: a fixed amount will be allocated by individuals on 
specific environmental assets, while this amount may change once other 
assets enter the picture; a person’s entire income may be spent on the 
protection of the rainforest while he may also care about protecting whales, 
which is not one of the options 
d) Hypothetical market error: responses of individuals are based on a 
hypothetical market, while the responses in a true market situation may be 
completely different; a hypothetical market lacks the opportunity for 
individuals to discuss with each other or to learn by doing 
 
One of the most extensive researches on the scope and validity of the CV 
method is Hoevenagel (1994). He concludes that the current CV method is 
useful to improve governmental decisions, but still too crude to actually 
base governmental decisions upon. The method leads to the most valid 
results for small, short-term and reversible effects; in the case of insecure, 
long-term, irreversible, international and difficult to observe environmental 
changes, the method is less valid. 
 
Research has, however, been performed to improve data obtained from CV 
studies. For example, much research has focussed on ways to limit the bias 
in these studies for the transfer of economic values to other studies. The 
work done by Brouwer (2000), for example, discusses among others the 
influence of the perception of the interviewed and study design on 
outcomes of economic valuation studies and ways to deal with these 
influences. Other research has discussed the use of citizen juries in CV 
studies to come to a collective conclusion about what it is worth to 
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preserve an environmental good (Ward, 1999). The group has the chance 
to discuss, debate, call for additional information from witnesses, and vote. 
In this way, participants are better informed, measurement errors are less 
likely to occur and distributional aspects are limited. The problem with this 
approach, however, is that citizen juries are very expensive to run, so only 
large government-sponsored projects are potential candidates. The CV 
method is also known as a "stated preference method" because it attempts 
to obtain consumer's preferences by directly asking their willingness to pay 
or accept. Other stated preference methods are contingent ranking and 
participatory methods.  
 
The Travel Cost (TC) method is the oldest non-market pricing valuation 
method that is widely used. This method measures consumer surplus and is 
therefore based on a Marshallian demand curve. Since it relies on individual 
valuations of environmental goods that are revealed in the travel costs 
made by consumers to obtain the environmental good, this method is 
known as a "revealed preference technique"17 (Turner et al., 1994). Travel 
costs consist of distance costs per kilometer traveled, time costs of the 
individual, and the entrance fee of the particular environmental good 
(Hanley and Spash, 1993). These estimates are included in a trip generating 
function, which also includes factors like income, education and age, to 
estimate the amount consumers value the environmental good (Hanley and 
Spash, 1993). A problem with the TC method is the fact that some people 
have multipurpose trips, so the amount of money they spend on a trip is 
not entirely dedicated to the environmental good. Other problems concern 
calculations of travel costs, namely how to calculate the value of travel 
time. 
 
The Hedonic Pricing (HP) method also measures consumer surplus from the 
Marshallian demand curve, and is also known as a "revealed preference 
technique"18. It relies on valuations of environmental goods that are 
revealed in their purchases of market priced goods (Turner et al., 1994). 
The method utilizes statistical techniques, such as multiple regression, to 
find a relationship between, for example, the level of pollution in a specific 
area and the prices of houses in the same area. The HP method attempts to 
(i) identify how much of a property differential is due to a particular 
environmental difference between two properties, and; (ii) infer how much 
people are willing to pay for an improvement in environmental quality that 
                                                 
17 Another categorization for the TC method is as a "surrogate market" approach.   
18 Like the TC method, the HP method is also categorized as a "surrogate market" 
approach. 
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they face (Turner et al., 1994). Problems with the HP method concern the 
fact that housing prices are, for example, not only related to actual 
environmental quality, but also expected quality levels. Not taking account 
of expectations will bias the outcome. Another problem concerns the effect 
of market segmentation: housing markets are segregated on basis of 
ethnicity or income group, which significantly influences the outcome 
(Hanley and Spash, 1993). 
 
The non-demand curve approaches are Dose-Response, Replacement Cost, 
Mitigation Behavior and Opportunity Cost and do not measure economic 
value via a demand curve for the environmental good. These methods, 
therefore, do not provide ‘true’ measures of value, however, the 
information they provide is useful to policy makers (Turner, et al., 1994). 
Dose-Response, also known as the production-function approach or input-
output approach, is based on the relationship between an environmental 
good and a marketed good. The costs of air pollution can be derived from, 
for example, the effects on agricultural crop production – an increase in 
pollution causes a decrease in crop quality and therefore constitutes a 
decrease in benefits for farmers. It will, however, be difficult to find perfect 
relationships between environmental and marketed goods (Hanley and 
Spash, 1993). The Replacement Cost approach looks at the cost of replacing 
or restoring a damaged natural asset, which is used as a measure of the 
benefit of restoring that natural asset. For example, the replacement of 
wetlands (through wetland restoration elsewhere in a region, wetland 
relocation, or new wetland creation) can be used to value the economic 
benefits of wetland conservation (Turner etal., 1994). The valuation 
method Mitigation Behavior, also known as ‘averting expenditure’, is based on 
the relationship between an environmental good and its perfect substitute. 
For example, the benefits of water cleaning capacity of wetlands can be 
estimated by the avoidance of expenditure on drinking water cleaning 
facilities. The difficulty with both Replacement Cost and Mitigation 
Behavior approaches arises with how to find perfect substitutes (Hanley 
and Spash, 1993). In the Opportunity Cost approach, environmental benefits 
are not directly valued; instead, the benefits of the activity that causes the 
environmental degradation are estimated to indicate what the benefits of 
the environment would have to be for the activity not to take place (Turner 
et al., 1994). For example, the value of agricultural output after wetland 
reclamation is an estimation of the minimum value the wetland would have 
to represent for the reclamation not to take place. Replacement Cost, 
Mitigation Behavior and Opportunity Cost methods are also known as 
"cost-based approaches". 
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Not every valuation method can be applied to obtain specific economic 
values. Although consensus has not been reached on which methods are 
most appropriate to obtain specific economic values, certain types of 
classifications do exist. For example, Barbier (1997) gives an overview of 
the types of valuation methods that may be applied to obtain different 
types of wetland economic values. Direct use values may be calculated 
using a wide variety of valuation methods, including Market Pricing, 
Production Function, Travel Cost, Hedonic Pricing, Contingent Valuation 
and Replacement Cost methods. The same goes for indirect use values, 
which may be valued with, for example, Production Function, Replacement 
Cost, Mitigation Behavior, Contingent Valuation and Travel Cost methods. 
The non-use values are, however, more complicated: it is generally accepted 
that Option, Existence and Bequest values can only be valued with the 
application of Contingent Valuation. 
 
2.4 Practical Application of Economic Valuation 
 
2.4.1 Economic Value and Decision making Tools 
 
There are several approaches towards the application of economic 
valuation of ecosystems. Pearce (2001) identifies three approaches: green 
accounting, proper pricing of biological resources and cost-benefit analysis. 
First, economic valuation allows the expansion of gross national product 
(GNP) measures. Economic valuation can be used to measure the 
depreciation of environmental assets, which together with depreciation of 
other assets can be subtracted from GNP to derive net national product 
(NNP). According to Pearce, NNP comes closest to measuring goods and 
services available for individual consumption. Secondly, economic 
valuation can be used to properly price biological resources. Such 
valuations allow for the incorporation of biological resources in the market 
place so that demand for these resources may be compared to demand for 
alternatives. Third, economic valuation may be applied within a cost-
benefit analysis framework to incorporate environmental effects of policies 
in such analyses.  
 
Cost-benefit analysis is part of a wider range of decision making tools. 
Economic valuations may be carried out as part of such tools to obtain 
quantitative values for environmental effects that allows these effects to be 
compared or balanced with other effects. In water management in the 
Netherlands in general, a wide variety of such decision making tools in 
which economic valuation is applied can be distinguished, but four 
instruments are the most common.   
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The first of these economic instruments is the Cost-Benefit Analysis. Cost-
benefit analysis is a formal procedure for evaluating private or public 
actions (Wills, 1997). It involves the identification, quantification and 
weighing of costs and benefits associated with a certain action to determine 
the efficiency of this action. This indicates that cost-benefit analysis is not 
concerned with distributional or intertemporal efficiency and equity. For a 
project to be accepted in line with cost-benefit analysis, therefore, requires 
the present value of benefits to exceed the present value of costs, 
independent of who reaps the benefits and who must bear the costs. The 
potential Pareto criterion of welfare economics is translated to cost-benefit 
analysis into the Net Present Value criterion19. This states that a project 
should be accepted when the discounted stream of benefits is larger than 
the discounted stream of costs (Hanley and Spash, 1993). Furthermore, the 
maximum Net Present Value criterion suggests that resources should be 
allocated to that project maximizing the Net Present Value of benefits20. 
This is explained in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5 Cost-Benefit Analysis and Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tietenberg, 1992 
 
The most efficient allocation is at quantity a where total benefits exceed 
total costs by the maximum amount. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Net Present Value (NPV) = The flow of net benefits (benefits - costs) accruing to a 
project over a certain time period discounted into present values. 
20 Other criteria also exist (Nas, 1996), such as the positive NPV criterion (an activity 
should be carried out when the NPV is greater than zero); the benefit/cost criterion (a 
project is accepted when the ratio of the PV of benefits to the PV of costs is larger than 
one); and the internal rate of return (use of a specific discount rate that results in a zero 
NPV). Only the maximum NPV criterion leads to efficiency. 
a 
quantity 
price 
total benefit 
total cost 
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According to Hanley and Spash (1993), a cost-benefit analysis involves the 
following steps or stages: 
 
1) Definition of a Project 
This includes:   
- definition of the reallocation of resources being proposed; 
- definition of the population of gainers and losers to be considered. 
2) Identification of Project Impacts 
Identification of all impacts resulting from the implementation of the 
project. 
3) Which Impacts are Economically Relevant 
This includes both costs and benefits. The benefits to be considered are 
those positive impacts that increase the quantity or quality of goods that 
generate positive utility or reduce price at which they are supplied. Costs are 
those negative impacts that decrease the quality or quantity of such goods or 
increase their price. Environmental impacts count so long as:  
- they cause a person to be more or less happy; 
- they change the level or quality of output of some positively valued 
commodity. 
4) Physical Quantification of Relevant Impacts 
Determine the physical amounts of costs and benefits. 
5) Monetary Valuation of Relevant Effects 
The physical impacts are valued in common units, often money. 
Furthermore, the price value flows extending into the future need to be 
predicted and the market prices need to be corrected where necessary. 
Lastly, prices need to be calculated where market prices don’t exist.  Section 
2.3.4 explained the different valuation methods that exist in the literature. 
6) Discounting 
Flows of future costs and benefits are converted into present value terms. 
7) Apply NPV Test 
This test asks whether the sum of the discounted gains exceed the sum of 
the discounted costs. Or, in other words: is the net present value larger than 
zero? Alternative tests may also be used, including the Internal Rate of 
Return and Benefit-Cost Ratio. 
8) Sensitivity Analysis 
This requires the changing of certain data to see what happens to the net 
present value. The following key parameters may be changed: 
- discount rate; 
- physical quantities and qualities of inputs and outputs; 
- shadow prices of inputs and outputs; 
- project life span. 
 
There are different types of cost-benefit analyses. A financial cost-benefit 
analysis evaluates these actions from the point of view of the individual (for 
example a company), while the social cost-benefit analysis evaluates actions 
from the point of view of society (Eijgenraam et al., 2000). If the effects of 
a project on the environment are incorporated in the cost-benefit analysis, 
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a specific type of social cost-benefit analysis is sometimes distinguished 
which some call the eco-cost-benefit analysis or ecosystem-oriented cost-
benefit analysis (Bouma and Saeijs, 2000). Through applying economic 
valuation techniques to the project’s environmental effects, these effects 
can be quantified and weighed against other effects.  
 
A second instrument that is sometimes depicted as a form of cost-benefit 
analysis is the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis. Cost-effectiveness analysis aims at 
finding the lowest cost means of accomplishing an objective (Tietenberg, 
1992). Unlike cost-benefit analysis, it is only concerned with effectiveness 
and not with efficiency - efficiency is only attained when the objective itself 
is efficient. Economic valuation may be incorporated in a Cost-
effectiveness analysis when it is desired that the environmental costs of 
accomplishing an objective be included in the analysis.  
 
Impact Analysis is a third instrument that attempts to quantify the effects of 
various actions on the environment (Tietenberg, 1992). It does not 
necessarily attempt to convert all effects into a one-dimensional figure and 
it does not attempt to optimize. Impact analysis places a large load of 
information at the disposal of the policy maker; it is up to the policy maker 
to act accordingly. Economic valuation may be part of an impact analysis, 
for example, to assess the damage inflicted on a specific nature area or 
ecosystem. 
 
Lastly, an instrument that is not necessarily an economic instrument is 
Multicriteria Analysis. Unlike a cost-benefit analysis, multicriteria analysis is 
generally not based on monetary valuation alone but on a weighing system 
of multiple criteria presented in their own dimensions (Nijkamp, 1977). 
These dimensions may be quantitative and qualitative, monetary and non-
monetary. A common method of multi-criteria analysis is concordance 
analysis (Nijkamp, 1977). This is based on ranking techniques for the 
outcomes of decision criteria related to a set of alternative plans. The 
central aim of this analysis is to select an optimal plan from these 
alternatives as can be done with a cost-benefit analysis. The difference is 
that in a multi-criteria analysis the outcomes of the different plans are 
measured in any unit, while for a cost-benefit analysis it is measured in 
monetary units per se. Economic values may thus be incorporated in a 
multicriteria analysis as one set of effects in combination with other effects 
that are expressed in other units of measure.  
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2.4.2 Perspectives on Economic Valuation  
 
The concept of economic value has been much debated in the literature. 
The debate within neoclassical economics has been largely about technical 
and methodological issues, while outside neoclassical economics, both the 
rational economic man and normative role of individualism have been 
drawn into the debate (Turner, 1993). Similar to the debate among different 
schools of economic thought, discussed in section 2.2.2, a large portion of 
this debate is based on ethical and implicit value judgements or attitudes on 
sustainability and the relationship between humans and nature. These 
attitudes can be summed under anthropocentric and ecocentric worldviews. 
Anthropocentrism  is based on the assumption that there is a moral division 
between human and non-human nature (Vellinga et al., 1996). Humans are 
the only source of value in the world (Achterberg, 1994) and things only 
have a value when humans can derive satisfaction from it. The ecocentric 
worldview recognizes that natural entities have the freedom to develop and 
function separate from human interventions (Achterberg, 1994). All 
organisms have an intrinsic value, whether humans derive satisfaction from 
them or not. Although in practice views are never as black and white, 
certain groups of people will lean towards a more anthropocentric 
perspective and others towards a more ecocentric perspective towards the 
relationship between humans and nature. Economic valuation is generally 
rooted in anthropocentrism, which has implications for its approach 
towards value – value is limited to value to man and something has 
economic value only when man derives utility from it. Economic values 
will, therefore, always depend on the type of ecosystem functions that are 
perceived as valuable to society – what people perceive as having of value 
to them (Turner et al., 2000). Hence, not all functions have an economic 
value. Only functions that provide goods and services that satisfy human 
wants directly or indirectly have an economic value.  
 
Due to these different perspectives on key concepts in which economic 
value is rooted, groups emerge ranging from those that completely oppose 
economic valuation to those fully supporting it. The debate covers a wide 
range of topics, and in the remaining paragraphs some of the key 
discussions will be summarized. 
 
A significant part of the debate on economic valuation of ecosystems 
concerns the role of economic valuation in decision making. Proponents of 
economic valuation argue that it has significant added value in the decision 
making process as part of information tools like cost-benefit analysis 
(Common, 1996; Nas, 1996). Economic valuation allows for the 
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identification, quantification and weighing of environmental effects of 
decisions such that clear and comprehensive information is available to the 
decision-maker. Other groups, however, argue that economic valuation, 
especially when applied in such decision making tools like cost-benefit 
analysis, does not take account of sustainability and distributional aspects. 
Daily (1997) distinguishes three goals of community, society and culture 
regarding the environment:  
 
- Ecological sustainability 
- Fair distribution of resources and property rights  
- Efficient allocation of resources 
 
Economic valuation only deals with the last goal of economic efficiency 
and is therefore not sufficient in answering the question of which decision 
or policy is the preferred alternative – such decisions need to be based on 
all three goals. Furthermore, it is argued that many environmental effects 
are irreversible; a cost-benefit analysis incorporates benefits of nature that 
are lost for a certain period of time, while in reality these benefits are lost 
forever (Hanley and Spash, 1993). Economic valuation, therefore, cannot 
guide decision making in the appropriate directions. 
 
Other groups state that through economic valuation a monetary value is 
placed on the environment that helps create an awareness of the value of 
the world’s ecosystems (Pearce and Turner, 1990; Costanza, 1997). It helps 
create the ‘…effectiveness of environmental arguments and thereby 
influence environmental policy’ (Norgaard, 1998).  Heal (2000) states three 
methods for obtaining conservation:  
 
- Regulation: society instructs people to conserve 
- Environmental activism: conservation is a matter of principle 
- Economic incentives: conservation is in people’s economic interest 
 
Heal explains that the last method is probably the most appealing to 
people. Ideally, we would like people to conserve as a matter of principle, 
but historically, this has not worked. The valuation of ecosystem services 
itself is something we do implicitly when a choice concerning the 
environment has to be made (Costanza et al., 1998); monetization helps 
making these values more explicit and recognizable. Furthermore, using 
money for estimating the values is convenient because this is the way 
humans value all goods and services: ‘…for those who only hear dollars, let 
us scream now and then in dollars!’ (Daly, 1998). Other groups argue that 
people’s decisions for protecting a commodity may be motivated by 
altruism and ethical considerations, that may not be quantifiable in prices 
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(Stevens, 1991). Therefore, using money as a tool for environmental 
protection is not adequate since this is only attained by affecting people’s 
principles. Furthermore, pricing can also have the opposite effect: if the 
benefits of a natural resource are less than the benefits of project 
development in a cost-benefit analysis, decisions based on cost-benefit 
analyses may result in the destruction of this natural resource. 
 
Advocates of economic valuation often argue that the concept places 
ecosystem goods and services automatically in the market (Pearce and 
Turner, 1990; Costanza, 1997), which allows for an efficient allocation of 
these resources. According to economic theory, the calculation of a price 
on environmental goods implies that the environmental good is scarce. 
This means that prices rise as scarcity of the good rises, which must be 
perceived as a cost of economic growth (Serafy, 1998). Omission of 
environmental goods from the market leads to a zero price on these goods 
and results in ignorance and under-valuation of the earth’s ecosystems that 
in turn results in errors of constructing projects when their costs actually 
outweigh their benefits (Costanza et al., 1997). In other words, ‘some 
valuation…is better that none, because none can mean some implicit 
valuation shrouded from public scrutiny.’ (Turner, et al., 1994). However, 
others argue that the market is not the appropriate basis for dealing with 
the allocation of scarce environmental resources. Markets do not 
automatically lead to sustainable outcomes; market systems cannot show 
whether a system is approaching its limits and fails to see the context of or 
the interconnections between species as well as resource quality (Gowdy, 
1995). Instead, a system of democracy should be utilized to allocate natural 
resources, as part of the legislative process (Sagoff, 1988).  
 
Risk and uncertainty also surround the process of economic valuation of 
the environment. Ecosystems are very complex systems, which makes 
modeling of ecological processes very difficult (Hanley and Spash, 1993). 
Interactions within and between systems are so complex that it is difficult 
to incorporate all feedback effects in an analysis (van den Bergh and 
Baaijens, 1997). Related to this aspect is that forecasting such ecosystem 
effects into the future, as is often done in valuation studies, is surrounded 
with uncertainty. Future states of the world are very difficult to assess, 
making valuation of the environment into the future a very ambiguous 
process (Tietenberg, 1992).  
 
Economic valuation implies that all environmental goods are valued into 
monetary terms based on their usefulness to humans. Thus, natural 
resources are valued once they enter human utility functions. However, it is 
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argued that many people are not willing to pay for species as they believe 
they have an inherent right to life independent of their value to humans 
(Hanley and Spash, 1993). Some people are motivated by altruism and 
ethical considerations, which do not show up in a quantifiable pricing 
system (Stevens et al., 1991). As Nijkamp (1977) argues: ‘one may question 
whether ecological functions are evaluated or whether the output for man 
is evaluated’. Instead, monetary values should be replaced by multiple 
(qualitative and quantitative) values (Munda, 1993). 
 
In economic valuation, prices are utilized to determine values of 
ecosystems. Sagoff (1988) argues that we are acting immorally by pricing 
environmental goods. Although certain things in life are of immense value, 
they cannot be given a price: love is priceless, but nobody would ever think 
of paying for it (Sagoff, 1988). A typical example of the discrepancy 
between price and value concerns the price of water and of diamonds: 
although water is of immense value to all life on earth and diamonds are 
not, the price of diamonds is much higher than the price of water. 
Martinez-Alier (1987) criticizes economists for their claim that market 
prices are decisive elements in explaining the allocation of resources. When 
dealing with environmental goods, most potential buyers cannot come to 
the market – future generations cannot make their preferences felt in 
today’s market for environmental goods (Martinez-Alier, 1987). 
 
Lastly, a significant part of the debate deals with the practice of discounting 
and the choice of the discount rate. Hanley and Spash (1993) state that the 
practice of discounting makes actions responsible for long-term losses 
attractive. Effects of projects that take place in the future are given less 
weight when they are being discounted with a positive discount rate. 
Furthermore, environmental effects often arise after a long period of time, 
so that discounting gives these effects less weight in the decision making 
process. Hence, discounting discriminates against future generations. The 
choice of the discount rate is also a source for debate since it biases 
outcomes: policymakers may act in their selfish short-term interest in order 
to maximize their votes, which leads them to prefer a higher discount rate 
such that benefits accruing today are increased (Wills, 1997). The choice of 
the discount rate is therefore prone to manipulation for the benefit of 
policy-makers, not the environment. On the other side, Pearce and Turner 
(1990) dispute the fact that discounting leads to environmental degradation. 
They argue that there is no unique relationship between discount rates and 
environmental deterioration; research has shown positive discount rates 
can result in diverging effects on the environment. Furthermore, research 
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by Cropper and Portney (1992) has shown that the public is generally very 
present oriented, which justifies the use of positive as opposed to zero or 
even negative discount rates.  
 
2.4.3 Applicability and Restrictions 
 
The previous section has shown that economic valuation is not undisputed 
and, as a result, application of economic valuation in practice must be done 
with care. Nevertheless, economic valuation does have an important added 
value. First, economic valuation is important to highlight the relative 
(economic) importance of different economic activities that depend on 
ecosystem functions. In this way, it can make important contributions to 
management plans of ecosystems21. Secondly, economic valuation may be 
useful in supporting arguments on ecosystem conservation. Putting a 
monetary value on activities can highlight the significance of ecosystems 
for people and thus provide strong arguments for the conservation of 
ecosystem lands and water as opposed to reclamation or diversion. In both 
cases, monetary valuation is an important complementary assessment to 
other, qualitative assessments on ecosystem functions that cannot be 
monetarized. 
 
An important role for economic valuation lies in integrated ecological-
economic modeling. Turner et al. (2000) suggest an integrated research 
framework, which combines economic valuation, integrated modeling, 
stakeholder analysis, and multi-criteria evaluation22. It is the combination of 
social and natural sciences that “…can help in part to solve the information 
failure to achieve the required consistency across various government 
policies” (Turner et al., 2000: 7). Integrated ecological-economic models are 
analytical, numerical or statistical and describe either steady state or 
dynamic change. Aerial photography and satellite imaging can be integrated 
through GIS-systems to add spatial dimensions. As a result, integrated 
models may provide important information about eco-hydrological 
consequences and the associated costs and benefits of land-use policies 
(Turner, et al., 2000). Economic valuation plays an important role in these 
models by providing data on the economic costs and benefits related to 
environmental change resulting from these policies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See Schuijt, 2002 for an overview of economic valuation studies in the management of  
African wetlands. 
22 See also van den Bergh, 1996 for ecological-economic modeling applications. 
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2.5 Economic Valuation as a Process  
 
2.5.1 The Importance of Actors in the Process 
 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a process as “a series of actions or 
operations conducing to an end” (Merriam-Webster, 2002). The process 
perspective on economic valuation taken in this thesis, therefore, indicates 
that economic valuation involves a series of actions, within which actors 
make choices with the aim of pursuing "an end" (or ends). The key to 
understanding this process is understanding the set of actors and their 
choices that have a stake in the outcome of the study. These stakeholders 
range from people that are interviewed to obtain the data for the value 
calculations to those that are involved in the execution of the study itself. 
These stakeholders shape the valuation process and hence the outcome of 
the study towards "an end". The understanding of the economic valuation 
process therefore requires an understanding of how choices are made by 
the stakeholders of the economic valuation process and for what end or 
purpose. For this analysis, it is first necessary to derive an actor perspective, 
which is developed in the following sections. 
 
2.5.2 Choices in Neoclassical Economics 
 
Different views of actor behavior can be found both between different 
sciences as well as within these sciences that are at the basis of explanations 
of certain phenomena. For example, in political science Homo Politicus is a 
“…human being who tries to consider what is best for society…” (Faber et 
al., 2002). The individual is a citizen that is concerned with public interest 
and the community, and its main characteristic is to strive for political 
justice. In sociology, Homo Sociologicus is an individual that is connected 
to other actors in a variety of ways and embedded in society in general – 
the actor is a social one (Swedberg, 1987). Man is not viewed only as 
rational, but as having a variety of behavior. Economic valuation of 
ecosystems is based on an actor perspective known as the neoclassical 
theory of consumer behavior. The consumer is Homo Oeconomicus, an 
“…autonomous rational consumer [who] allocates his/her income at the 
margin among an array of consumer goods.” (Gowdy and Mayumi, 2001). 
Economists attempt to explain and discover patterns of behavior as to why 
people make certain choices under scarcity. In these choices, the 
motivation of homo oeconomicus is self-interest - choice is a problem of 
optimization, known as utility or welfare maximization. Although 
rationality is the common denominator in all neoclassical analyses, different 
approaches towards rationality do exist. For example, the principle of 
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bounded rationality is sometimes used, where humans are viewed as having a 
very small capacity to formulate and solve complex problems compared to 
the size of the problems for which a solution is needed in line with rational 
behavior (van den Bergh, 2000). The fundament of this principle is 
satisficing, where humans pursue acceptable levels of welfare, profit or other 
indicators as opposed to the neo-classical assumptions of welfare or utility 
maximization (van den Bergh, 2000).  
 
An important characteristic of neoclassical economic analysis is that a 
boundary is drawn around the consumer, thereby ignoring the influence of 
social and ecological contexts on the choices actors make. This is also 
known as methodological individualism, where “…all explanations of social 
phenomena start from descriptions of individuals” (van den Bergh, 2000: 
48). Choices are made based on a rational balancing of costs and benefits, 
where individuals make choices that maximize their utility and firms make 
choices that maximize profits - the motives for these choices are exogenous 
to the analysis. Neoclassical economic theory can therefore not be applied 
to understand why actors make different choices in different contexts.  
 
2.5.3 The Role of Power 
 
As was explained in the previous section, the perspective of the actor in 
neoclassical economics is based on rational action. Other approaches have 
different perspectives as to why actors make certain choices in the 
economic valuation process, and one approach that is particularly 
interesting for answering the research questions of this thesis allows for the 
integration of motivations associated with power into choices made in 
economic valuation processes.  
 
Self (1975), for example, questions the objectivity of economic instruments 
like cost-benefit analysis based on the perspective that the information 
presented by a cost-benefit analysis is compromised by both policy and 
organizational bias on the part of the analyst, as well as an intellectual bias 
that his techniques introduce. Although Self recognizes that such 
statements are true for any expert advice and information, he states that the 
objectivity of cost-benefit analysis is more dependent on value judgements 
incorporated in the analysis than is true for most other types of 
information. Cost-benefit analysis lends itself easily for subjective positions 
– “Every slight variation in the methods of analysis and calculation will 
affect the results of the analysis…” (p. 11), also without intentional bias. 
Self continues that cost-benefit analysis is therefore easily structured 
deliberately “…to show costs and benefits in relation to a series of 
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specified goals…” (p. 6), where different ways of construction reflect 
different kinds of policy judgements and often different sets of political 
and social values. Such activities have been observed in the United States, 
where cost-benefit analysis “...has been easily assimilated as one weapon to 
be employed in the pluralistic conflict of interests.” (p.11). He concludes 
that social values determine choice and thereby prices. When the processes 
of evaluation are studied more holistically, Self says, we may find the 
possible explanations as to why a different price is attached to one decision 
than to another decision that looks quite similar. 
 
Goodstein (1995) presents a speculative scenario on political influence in 
cost-benefit analyses. Although the options for political influence are 
somewhat constrained by the accepted range of valuation methods, 
numbers used in cost-benefit analyses often reflect the analyst's viewpoint, 
Goodstein states. He continues with an analysis that speculates about the 
political influence in a cost-benefit analysis study of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States on the siting, construction 
and maintenance of municipal landfills. Since the analysis was also carried 
out by the EPA, some pressure on the analysts from their superiors must 
have been felt, Goodstein argues. Public resistance to landfill siting 
probably further pressured the analysts. Two ways politics may have had 
influence on the outcome is by boosting the benefits of one of the landfill 
options that best suited the will of the general public, and through the 
timing of the analysis - putting off the cost-benefit analysis until the 
political decision had already been made. 
 
Spash and Carter (2001) also refer to the aspect of power in choices of 
actors involved in economic instruments. They state that cost-benefit 
analysis is often a justification for a decision already made: “Environmental 
values which are commonly expressed, say, through economic models, 
become institutionalized justifications for policy.” (p. 11).  Economic 
values are often handled by a political process that is left outside the 
analysis and no reference is made to the “…institutions which lie beyond 
the economic analysis.” (p. 12). These different institutions result in values 
being expressed, and therefore, can only be understood as being embedded 
in a political and social structure. They continue that valuation is a process 
in which “…multiple values, multiple perspectives and the role of 
institutional arrangements…” (p. 13) are central. Recognition that valuation 
is a process implies it is a process of expression within society, where 
“…values can be purposefully  lost…”, and where “…humans choose 
those bits of the world to value and those bits to throw away.” (p.13). They 
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conclude that motives behind behavior in economics have been largely 
neglected, but that an interdisciplinary perspective on valuation is required 
to provide a more dynamic theory.  
 
The discussion in this section shows the importance of recognizing the role 
of power in economic valuation processes. Different stakeholders are 
involved in the valuation process and it is likely that each stakeholder will 
impose their personal values on the process. In order to understand the 
role of power in valuation processes, theories must be applied that 
explicitly identify and explain the roles of power and subjective values in 
valuation processes. Such a perspective is provided by institutional theory. 
 
2.5.4 Towards an Institutional Theory Perspective 
 
An institutional perspective on the economic valuation process implies that 
how stakeholders make choices in this process and for what purpose 
matters and can be explained by analyzing the institutional context in which 
these choices are made. Institutions in this thesis are defined as informal 
and formal institutions (North, 1992). Informal institutions are part of the 
culture of society where they provide order, and include: 
 
- Extensions of formal rules: rules that are fully recognized by society, but 
are not officially recorded as rules 
- Norms of behavior: a principle of correctness that is binding upon 
members of a certain group 
- Internally enforced standards of conduct: include ideas, ideologies and 
choice 
 
Formal institutions complement the effectiveness of informal constraints, and 
North distinguishes three types of formal constraints:  
 
- Political Rules: enforcement of agreements about co-operation by political  
decision making 
- Economic Rules: construction of property rights, implemented when the 
costs allow implementation 
- Contracts: binding agreements between people or groups of people  
 
Institutions exist wherever individuals live and work – they establish the 
framework in which social interactions take place.  
 
An institutional analysis can be applied to answer different types of 
questions (Knight, 1992). Institutional analysis can be used from an 
explanatory perspective, where explanations of institutional development and 
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change can be used to understand, for example,  the history of society and 
its current events. From a critical perspective, institutional analysis may be 
applied to determine whether existing institutions pursue the goals for 
which they were developed. Alternatively, from a normative perspective 
institutional analysis helps us to understand the development of 
institutions, which may give us a direction as to how to reform them. Other 
applications exist, but it is clear that institutional analysis can be applied to 
study many different aspects of social and economic life.  
 
The key to any institutional analysis is social interaction – institutions 
determine human behavior. It is therefore a very useful perspective for 
answering the research question of this thesis, which asks what factors 
influence the choices of stakeholders in the process of economic valuation. 
According to institutional theory, these factors must be sought in the 
institutional context in which these stakeholders are situated. The next 
chapter will elaborate on this perspective, in which the focus is on choices, 
stakeholders and their institutional context. 
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Chapter 3 An Institutional 
Perspective on 
 Economic Valuation 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, the field of the concept of economic value was explained that 
ended with the introduction of a perspective that views economic valuation 
as a process. In this perspective, the actors of the valuation process and 
their contexts play a key role. In the last section (section 2.5) it was 
explained how understanding stakeholders and stakeholder behavior in 
valuation processes requires theories other than economic theory, and 
institutional theory was introduced as one theory that specifically 
incorporates the importance of actor behavior in relation to their context. 
This institutional theory perspective will be further developed in this 
chapter and states that the context in which the economic valuation 
process is carried out determines the choices made within this process.  
 
The goal of this chapter is to provide a basis for analysis of economic 
valuation processes in water management that will be carried out in the 
next chapters. Section 3.2 discusses the types of choices made in these 
processes, based mainly on economic theory. These choices are made by 
actors that are stakeholders of the valuation process, who will be discussed 
in section 3.3. In section 3.4, institutional theory is applied to discuss the 
influences on the choices of these stakeholders in the valuation process. 
The chapter will finish in section 3.5 with a comprehensive discussion that 
explains the perspective on the valuation process in water management that 
is taken in the following chapters. 
 
3.2 Choices in the Economic Valuation Process  
 
3.2.1 Formal Stages  
 
In theory, the economic valuation process involves several stages. 
Distinguishing these stages in economic valuation is useful to discern the 
different types of choices that need to be made by actors in the valuation 
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process. Barbier et al. (1997), for example, identify three stages of analysis 
in an economic valuation process:  
 
- Stage 1: Defining the problem and choosing the correct economic 
assessment approach 
- Stage 2: Defining the scope and limits of the analysis and the information 
required for the chosen assessment approach 
- Stage 3: Defining data collection methods and valuation techniques 
required for the economic appraisal, including any analysis of distributional 
impacts 
 
The first stage determines the assessment approach for the particular area, 
while during the second stage it is decided which information is needed to 
carry out the assessment. In stage three, the appropriate appraisal methods 
and valuation techniques are determined. In practice however, these three 
stages are not necessarily sequential – a different order of choices within 
these stages is possible and feedback to previous stages is often necessary.  
 
Another useful approach to distinguish stages in an economic valuation 
process is to focus on the stages of an economic instrument of which the 
economic valuation is part. For example, Hanley and Spash (1993) 
distinguish 8 stages in a cost-benefit analysis that can be directly applied to 
the economic valuation process when it is applied as part of a cost-benefit 
analysis (see section 2.3.1): (1) a clear definition of the project; (2) 
identification of project impacts; (3) determination of which impacts are 
economically relevant; (4) quantifying the relevant impacts into physical 
terms; (5) quantifying the relevant impacts into monetary terms; (6) 
discounting costs and benefits into present value terms; (7) applying the net 
present value test; (8) sensitivity analysis.  
 
The distinction of stages in an economic valuation process is a useful 
framework for extracting the different types of choices that need to be 
made by actors within the stages of the economic valuation process. These 
choices will be explained in the next section. 
 
3.2.2 Choices  
 
Within the broader stages defined in the previous section, actors involved 
in the economic valuation process need to make several choices. An 
important initial choice is to define the phenomenon that is being studied, 
which can range from a dam construction to a wetland reclamation. This is 
a very important choice that will guide the choices during the rest of the 
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economic valuation process. After the phenomenon is defined, the project 
alternative needs to be selected. Eijgenraam et al. (2000) specifically bring 
the attention to the importance of this specific choice in a cost-benefit 
analysis. The project alternative, or "zero-alternative" as the authors call it, 
is the alternative with which the project will be compared with in a cost-
benefit analysis. This is the best alternative to the project, and is not equal 
to “doing nothing” or “existing policy”. Instead, it is a combination of the 
best alternative allocation of the available investment sources and the best 
alternative solutions to the problem that is the focus of the project. The 
actors also need to decide on who will be the gainers and losers of the 
activities and which resources are being reallocated. Furthermore, an 
important choice may be to define the geographical boundaries of the area 
that is being assessed. This may already have been decided by the context 
of the study, but is not always apparent and important decisions need to be 
made to delineate these boundaries (Barbier et al., 1997). For example, the 
object can be studied at several system levels (van Ast en Geerlings, 1995): 
(i) at the level of ecological systems, or ecosystems - a space where a 
collection of living organisms and non-living material exchange material 
and energy and thereby function as a self-sustaining unit; (ii) at the level of 
environmental compartments, the major pillars of the environment – water, 
air, soil, and organisms; and (iii) at the level of factors - specific physical or 
chemical components such as molecules and biological elements. Each of 
these system levels can furthermore be studied at different spatial scales. 
This scale can be (i) global; (ii) national; (iii) regional; or (iv) fluvial. The 
latter refers to the aquatic ecosystems of rivers, which may be studied at the 
scale of the river basin. Thus, the actor also needs to make a choice about 
the scale at which the impacts will be studied.  
 
Other decisions need to be made concerning the attributes of the object 
under study to take into account. In Chapter 2, four environmental 
functions were identified: regulation, carrier, production and information 
functions. It needs to be decided which of these functions need to be 
incorporated in the study and valued. Barbier et al. (1997) suggest first 
ranking or prioritizing these functions in order of importance, with the aim 
to value at least the most important functions. The last choice before the 
actual assessment takes place concerns the linking of these functions to the 
type of economic value - use values or non-use values.  
 
Once such choices are made, the actual economic assessment can take 
place, and at this stage more choices need to be made. An important 
decision concerns the valuation method that actors will utilize to derive the 
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economic values. When environmental functions consist of goods and 
services that are traded in the market place and whose prices are not 
distorted, market prices can be used as indicators for economic values. 
Often, however, goods and services do not have a market price and/or are 
distorted. In these cases, shadow-pricing techniques must be applied. One 
approach is to adjust financial prices to correct for market and policy 
distortions. Another approach is to apply non-market pricing. Economic 
theory distinguishes several non-market economic valuation methods, 
including demand curve approaches like Contingent Valuation, Travel Cost 
and Hedonic Pricing, and non-demand curve approaches, such as Dose-
Response, Replacement Cost, Mitigation Behavior and Opportunity Cost. 
These approaches were explained in section 2.2.5. 
 
Another element of the economic valuation process that requires important 
choices in the assessment stage is the discounting of economic values. 
Economic values that are calculated are typically estimated as monthly of 
annual values – most of these values, however, do not accrue in only one 
specific time period, but over a number of years. These annual values must 
then be added over a longer time period. The annual values that accrue to 
the environmental good over this entire time period are usually expressed 
in present value terms, which is the current value of a discounted stream of 
values into the future. The reason that economic values into the future are 
not simply aggregated is twofold (Pearce and Turner, 1990). First, it is 
argued that people have a positive rate of time preference or Social Time 
Preference Rate (STPR), which implies that people value income received 
today higher than income received tomorrow. Secondly, capital is 
productive; if it is received today, it may be invested (for example in a bank 
account) to yield profits in the future. This is also called the Social 
Opportunity cost of Capital (SOC). Thus, economic values into the future 
are given less importance and weight than current values, a process that is 
called discounting. Through the application of a discount rate, future 
economic values are discounted into present values by the following 
formula:   
 
                     Bt 
    Σt  
                (1+r)t 
 
Economic values, or benefits Bt are discounted with a discount rate r over 
time period t. Within this discounting process, two elements require 
important choices by actors that significantly influences the outcome of the 
process. First of all, the height of the discount rate r needs to be 
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determined. The sources for the discount rate come from either the SOC 
or the STPR. In perfectly functioning capital markets and no taxes, both 
rates are equal (Pearce and Turner, 1990). In practice, however, markets are 
not perfect and choices need to be made as to which of the two sources to 
use. In both theory and practice, there is little agreement on which of the 
two sources to apply. In practice, the choice of the discount rate is often 
left to decision-makers including politicians, civil servants and corporate 
planning divisions (Pearce and Nash, 1981). This choice often requires a 
moral judgement on intertemporal distribution (Hanley and Spash, 1993): 
 
- Infinite discount rate: no moral obligations beyond the immediate future 
exist 
- Discount rate greater than zero, but less than infinity: moral obligations 
towards the future exist, but are given less weight than the present 
- Zero discount rate: the right and interests of future generations are equal 
to those of current generations 
- Negative discount rate: moral obligations to the future exist and are given 
more weight than the present 
 
Due to the positive rate of time preference, discount rates are usually 
positive over a wide range. The practice of discounting and the choice of 
the discount rate are subject to many debates, which was briefly discussed 
in section 2.3.3.  
 
A second choice in the discounting process is the choice of time horizon, t. 
When the economic valuation is carried out for a specific project, t is 
usually equal to the project’s life span. The time horizon, however, is 
limited by the height of the discount rate. The higher the discount rate, the 
shorter the time period over which the economic values can be discounted. 
For example, with a discount rate of 4%, the time period is limited to 
around 50 years; after this period, all economic values approach zero. This 
often poses a serious problem and is a major source for debate in projects 
that affect the environment since many environmental effects are likely to 
take more than fifty years to become noticed. 
 
Many choices made in the economic valuation process are based on 
assumptions about future states of the world. To deal with the uncertainty 
that necessarily surrounds these assumptions, it is necessary to perform a 
sensitivity analysis. In the sensitivity analysis, key assumptions of the 
economic valuation study over which uncertainty exists are changed to test 
their relative effects on the outcome of the valuation process. Hence, 
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choices need to be made about which parameters to test. The most 
common parameters in this respect are (Hanley and Spash, 1992): 
 
- Discount rate 
- Physical quantities and qualities of inputs and outputs 
- Shadow prices of inputs and outputs 
- Project life span 
 
The different choices involved in the economic valuation process as 
explained in the previous section are made by the different stakeholders of 
the economic valuation process. These stakeholders, their relationships and 
their relative influence in the economic valuation process are explained in 
the next section. 
 
3.3 Stakeholders in the Economic Valuation Process 
 
3.3.1 Types of Stakeholders  
 
The perspective of economic valuation as a process implies that different 
actors play a role in this process. These actors all have a stake in the 
valuation process, albeit in different degrees. In this respect, it is important 
to distinguish two groups of stakeholders: stakeholders actively involved in 
the valuation process and stakeholders not actively involved in the process. 
Those stakeholders involved in the process itself often includes a principal, 
a contracting party, a committee that guides the economic valuation 
process, interviewed and consulted persons, and perhaps a peer review 
group. A principal gives the assignment for the valuation study. These 
principals can be government departments whose policies affect the 
environment; governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
that deal with the environment; financial institutions that finance projects 
that affect the environment; scientific institutions as part of their scientific 
research; and companies whose decisions affect the environment. These 
principals give the assignment for the economic valuation study to one or 
more contracting parties - usually research institutes specialized in economic 
or in environmental research. In the economic valuation process, the 
contracting party may be advised or steered by a separate committee that may 
consist of experts in the field for which the economic valuation study is 
carried out. The committee’s role is usually to safeguard the process and 
give advice or structure to certain aspects of the process. Other important 
stakeholders in the valuation process are those people that are interviewed 
and consulted by the contracting party for information that is utilized as input 
for the valuation calculations. Once the economic valuation study has been 
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drafted, it is often presented to a peer review group that reads the report and 
gives their final comments and advice.  
 
A second group of stakeholders of the economic valuation process are 
those stakeholders not directly involved in the process itself, but who may 
influence the process from the outside through pressure and lobbying. A 
wide variety of stakeholders may be identified, depending on the subject 
under study. One may think of nature organizations, tourists, people living 
in the vicinity of the project, political parties, government departments, 
industry, farmers, and so on.  
 
The two broad groups of direct and indirect stakeholders influence the 
choices made in the economic valuation process. The stakeholders directly 
involved in the valuation process influence the process directly through the 
choices they make and relationships they maintain with other stakeholders. 
The second group of stakeholders that are outside the valuation process 
itself influences the choices of the valuation process through exerting 
pressure on the direct stakeholders and their relationships. 
 
3.3.2 Stakeholder Relationships 
 
Numerous relationships emerge between various stakeholders in the 
economic valuation process, which differ between each valuation study 
carried out. One relationship that is central in the economic valuation 
process, for example, is between the principal and the contracting party. A 
useful perspective on this is provided by In 't Veld (2000). In ‘t Veld (2000: 
117-119) distinguishes between knowledge suppliers on the one hand and 
actors in policy arenas on the other. Policy-makers demand knowledge 
from knowledge institutes, sustain hierarchical relationships with these 
institutes and simultaneously give them assignments. In this process, 
knowledge institutes often form coalitions with the actors in policy arenas 
in the form of, for example, a personal affiliation with certain thoughts or 
goals of policy makers. According to In 't Veld, this means that no 
knowledge institute is value-free in its research and that politicians will try 
to influence the struggle in knowledge arenas to pursue their own goals. 
This perspective on policy-makers may be extended to any other principal 
of a valuation process that demands information from knowledge 
institutes. 
 
Numerous relationship characterizations between the different stakeholders 
in the economic valuation process can be distinguished, building on the 
coalition-building perspective introduced in the previous paragraph. For 
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this, the theory of coalitions and interest group politics of Bacharach and 
Lawler (1980) provides a useful approach. This theory views organizations 
as networks of individuals with goals that may form interest groups both 
within their organization and with individuals from other organizations. 
These interest groups must decide whether to pursue their political goals in 
isolation or to form a coalition with other interest groups in the pursuit of a 
common goal. This perspective is based on subjective-expected utility 
theory, which assumes that (i) in any relationship, parties will attempt to 
maximize their gain, and; (ii) parties will subjectively attach utility to 
different courses of action. Interest groups will generally form a coalition 
when the expected outcome as part of the coalition multiplied by the 
probability of achieving this outcome as a coalition exceeds the expected 
outcome multiplied by the probability of outcome as part of a single 
interest group.  
 
The convergence of interests is an important stimulus for forming a 
coalition. These interests consist of a normative framework, the ideology or 
set of political and social beliefs that the parties have in common, as well as 
the functional goals - the pragmatic result pursued by the groups. If both 
the ideology and the functional goals of interest groups converge, a 
coalition will form; on the other hand if these interests are non-convergent, 
interest group politics will prevail. If either the ideology or the functional 
goal differ, however, whether the groups will form a coalition or engage in 
interest group politics depends on the issue at hand. When this is the case, 
Bacharach and Lawler (1980: 94) distinguish two characteristics of the issue 
that must be considered to evaluate whether the groups are likely to form a 
coalition. The first characteristic is the scope of the study: the more specific 
the issues at stake, the greater the likelihood that a temporary coalition will 
form. Second, the longer the time period between emergence of an issue 
and the point at which final action is necessary, the greater the likelihood of 
a coalition. In this respect, if the ideological differences are large between 
the two actors and the time period is too short to overcome these 
differences, it is unlikely that the actors will form a coalition.  
 
Bacharach and Lawler analyze the politics of coalitions through an analysis 
of the power relations among the actors between and within such groups. 
Power is a function of one actor’s dependence on another actor: the greater 
the dependence, the greater the power of the other actor in the 
relationship. In addition, Bacharach and Lawler identify sanctioning as an 
element of power, which refers to the “…changes actors can and do make 
in each other’s outcomes.” (p. 23). It is the potential or actual direct 
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manipulation of the other’s outcomes, including manipulation of rewards, 
punishments or both.  
 
In economic valuation processes, it is possible that several coalitions will 
form among different stakeholders. Which specific coalitions are formed 
depends on the valuation process. Furthermore, if the respective goals and 
perspectives of these different coalitions diverge, they are likely to compete 
with each other in interest group politics. For example, differing functional 
goals, such as organizational goals, may exist between coalitions. These 
differences can be along the lines of the organization's mission (the general 
goal that represents the incentive of the organization and the function that 
the organization fulfills), the organizational goal (a goal for the entire 
organization that often expresses expectations - financial or non-financial - 
of the organization over a certain period of time), or the operational goal 
(related to the sub-functions of an organization, such as certain 
departments, and expresses concrete activities of the organization) (Kunst, 
1991). 
 
It is also possible that the ideology may diverge among stakeholder 
coalitions in the valuation process. First, there may be differences in 
stakeholders’ support of a specific economic paradigm. In Chapter 2 these 
different paradigms within economics and towards economic valuation 
were explained. Support of a certain perspective may have consequences 
for the choices made in the valuation process - for example, support of a 
more neoclassical economic paradigm may result in valuing all possible 
environmental functions, whereas support of the ecological economics 
paradigm may place limits on the possibility of quantification of certain 
environmental functions.  
 
Second, the perspective towards nature may differ among coalitions. The 
perspectives of people towards their relationship with nature is “…one of 
the most important aspects of any strategy for human development, though 
they are often implicit.” (Colby, 1990: 5). Although a variety of 
classifications exist, one is to distinguish between three views (Ruijgrok, 
1999): 
 
a) Conservation view 
b) Functionality view 
c) Coevolution view 
 
Stakeholders supporting a conservation view believe that nature is valuable 
regardless of human use. Nature should be conserved and restored at all 
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costs. Those supporting a functionality view, on the other hand, believe 
that nature derives its values from the functions it performs for society. 
Endless substitution between natural and capital is possible and nature has 
value only to man. Lastly, the coevolution view chooses a middle road in 
that they believe that nature has both an ecological and socio-economic 
value. Ecosystems have both an intrinsic value and a functional value to 
man and both interests need to be balanced.  
 
Third, stakeholders may have different ideologies towards water 
management issues. Hoekstra (1998) uses cultural theory to provide four 
different perspectives on water: 
 
a) Hierarchist 
b) Egalitarian 
c) Individualist 
d) Fatalist 
 
The hierarchists regard water scarcity as a supply problem and they look for 
solutions for how to increase supply to meet demand. Demand is a given 
need; groundwater should be exploited and dams may need to be 
constructed to meet these demands. The egalitarian perspective views, 
however, water scarcity as a problem caused by a growing demand and 
pollution. They look for ways to manage human needs through, for 
example, policy incentives and changes in social customs and preferences. 
Hence, demand for water needs to be altered as opposed to exploiting 
water systems to meet the demands. The individualist perspective, on the 
other hand, perceives water as an economic good that should be managed 
as such. All options to increase water supply to meet demand are realistic as 
long as they are cost-effective. They support a mixture of demand and 
supply management to solve the problems of water scarcity. Lastly, the 
fatalist perspective views water scarcity as a problem of individuals: water is 
always given to the rich, and it is a matter of individual luck if you are born 
rich and thus receive enough clean water. Their strategy is to do nothing 
and try to cope with whatever situation evolves. 
 
The discussion in this section has shown that different functional goals and 
perspectives of stakeholders on issues like economics and nature result in 
different stakeholder relationships. Stakeholders in coalitions may form 
interest groups to pursue their specific goals and perspectives and compete 
with other interest groups that have different goals and perspectives. In this 
process, stakeholders are likely to apply specific tools such as economic 
valuation that aid them in this pursuit.  
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3.4 Influences on Choices in Economic Valuation Processes 
 
3.4.1 An Institutional Theory Perspective 
 
Institutional theory explains on how actors behave and what factors in the 
institutional context of these actors influence their behavior. Taking an 
institutional theory perspective on valuation processes recognizes that 
actors and their contexts play a key role in these processes. It therefore 
makes the context that is implicit to the choices in the valuation process 
more explicit.  
 
Institutions play an important role in economics. In neoclassical 
economics, the institutions of the market are designed to provide actors 
with complete information so that efficient outcomes are achieved. The 
primary institutions facilitating exchange are private ownership and legally 
enforceable contracts (Tool, 1995): ownership is transferred by agreed-
upon exchange, which is stipulated in contracts. These institutions of the 
market play a major role in many economic analyses. For example, to 
Adam Smith and his classical followers, the market system was perceived as 
being guided by an “invisible hand”, a combination of invisible institutions 
that forces the market automatically into an equilibrium (Nelson and 
Sampat, 2001). Furthermore, in environmental economics, the lack of 
institutions labeled “property rights” play an important role in the 
misallocation of environmental goods that may result in exploitation and 
degradation of these environmental goods. However, in most economic 
analyses institutions are regarded as given and play no independent role in 
economic performance (North, 1990); the effects of changing institutions 
on the allocation of resources are largely left out of economic analysis. 
Markets themselves remain unspecified; the effects of behavior, roles and 
customs, the patterns and criteria of choice-making are all largely ignored 
(Tool, 1995). 
 
Institutionalist schools in economics believe that the understanding of the 
influence of the institutional structure on economic behavior is necessary in 
order to better understand the performance of firms, markets, agents, and 
economies in different settings (Groenewegen et al, 1995). However, as 
Nabli and Nugent (1989: 7) state “The consensus on the centrality of 
institutions to development has not been matched by one on its 
definition”. The approaches towards institutional thinking and the 
underlying definitions of institutions have been different. De Vries (1992) 
gives an overview of some of the different definitions and accents in 
institutional thinking by referring to different authors. Matthews (1986: 
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904), for example, states that each definition of institutions defines a 
certain problem area that is to be studied by institutional economics. In this 
respect he defines three areas: institutions as property rights, as contracts, 
and as conventions or norms of economic behavior. Nabli and Nugent 
(1989) provide a second, additional dimension to Matthews’ explanations, 
namely institutions as behavior of governments, based on theories of 
collective action and interest groups. Yet another explanation is given by 
Künneke (1991), who explains how different perspectives exist even within 
the property-rights approach. 
 
Although many streams of institutional economic thought exist, two major 
schools of thought can be distinguished: Old Institutionalist Economics 
(OIE) and New Institutionalist Economics (NIE). Both schools grew out 
of the critique on neoclassical economics for their lack of consideration 
given to institutions in their analyses. The old institutionalist school of 
thought reached its peak in the 1920s and 1930s, and among its most well 
known members are Ayres, Commons, Veblen, and Mitchell. The new 
institutionalists are more recent and among its most prominent advocates 
are Williamson and North. Both schools recognize that the structure and 
performance of the economy is a consequence of institutions and can only 
be fully understood if economic analysis is complemented with institutional 
analysis. The most significant difference between the two schools is their 
view on the individual: OIE abandons the rational actor completely in 
favor of human behavior as a product of culture, while NEI bases its 
analysis on the neoclassical rational actor that needs to be extended 
(Rutherford, 1995). 
 
Old institutionalism views mankind as a cultural product, where norms and 
ideologies are important influences on behavior: institutions depend on 
choices of individuals and individuals are ‘molded’ by institutions 
(Hodgson, 2000). The critique of old institutionalists on economics is 
directed at the core assumptions of neoclassical economics (Hodgson, 
1994). These assumptions are as follows: 
 
- Rational choice and stable preferences: a rational, maximizing behavior 
by agents with given, stable preferences 
- Equilibrium structures: a focus on attained, or a movement towards, 
equilibrium states 
- Perfect information: the absence of chronic information problems 
 
According to old institutionalists, individuals are influenced by institutions; 
these institutions create and reinforce habits of action and thought. 
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Preferences and beliefs are therefore not given but created and transformed 
by institutions. Furthermore, the economy is viewed as an open system that 
receives impulses from social, political and physical systems. The formation 
of an equilibrium, therefore, relies on positive and negative feedback and 
depends on disturbances and exogenous shocks. Lastly, old institutionalists 
recognize the severe information problems that exist in economic systems.  
 
New institutionalism focuses on explaining institutions in standard economic 
theory: the individual is a rational actor who affects institutions in the 
economy (Groenewegen et al., 1995). Although new institutionalism 
consists of a diverse collection of views, it perceives the performance of the 
economy as being affected by institutions that arise out of the complexity 
of problems to be solved and information to be processed to simplify these 
processes (North, 1990). The institutional framework that arises thereby 
limits the set of choices to the actor. The consequences of institutions for 
economic analysis are as follows (North, 1990): 
 
- Economic models are institutional specific and sensitive to altered 
institutional constraints 
- Institutional theory can enrich economic theory by creating an awareness of 
human motivation 
- Ideas and ideologies matter in economic theory 
- The polity and the economy are interlinked, affected by institutional 
constraints 
 
The new institutional perspective can therefore be perceived as an 
enrichment of (mainstream) economic theory. It complements economic 
theory with perspectives on human behavior. 
 
Although composed of a variety of different opinions, institutional 
economics in general recognizes that institutions are the key element of any 
economy and therefore a major aspect that needs to be studied. As a result, 
the economy (and all its facets) is an open and evolving system that is 
situated in a broader environment. This environment is in turn embedded 
in a broader set of social, cultural, political and power relationships 
(Hodgson, 2000). Any analysis of the economic system, therefore, must 
start with the institutional environment in which the economic system is 
embedded (Groenewegen, 1995). 
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3.4.2 The Role of Institutions in Valuation Processes 
 
In explaining the influence of institutions on the economic valuation 
process, a useful theoretical perspective is the institutional theory 
perspective of Douglas North. North (1990) states that the total of formal 
and informal institutions (see section 2.4.4) influence actor behavior by 
determining the costs of transacting. In the neoclassical economics 
situation these transaction costs are zero all welfare effects are internalized 
and prices reflect prevailing scarcity relationships. In many situations, 
however, as is the case with public goods and common pool resources, 
welfare effects are not fully internalized and external effects emerge. 
Property rights are not completely specified and enforced, which results in 
transaction costs, such as information problems, measurement and 
enforcement costs. In order to limit uncertainty in the exchange of these 
goods, institutions are developed that affect the economy through affecting 
the transaction costs. Institutions impose constraints on individual choices 
– they provide a framework of constraints, where some individuals are 
permitted to undertake certain activities (North, 1990: 4). Greater 
uncertainty in transactions leads to higher transaction costs and an increase 
in the development of institutions. 
 
North (1990: 73-82) explains that the institutional framework of a society 
provides incentives that will shape the direction of the development of 
skills and knowledge. In other words, understanding the institutional 
context will allow us to understand what kind of demand for knowledge 
and skills exists. This perspective is based on adaptive efficiency, which is 
concerned with the kinds of rules that shape the way the economy evolves 
over time. Adaptive efficiency provides incentives for societies to maximize 
efforts in the exploration of alternative ways of problem solving, resulting 
in decision making processes that are different from existing ones.  
 
The perspective provided by North gives an important dimension to the 
economic valuation process, namely that in order to understand why 
stakeholders use and apply economic valuation, the institutional structure 
surrounding this process must be understood. In this structure, incentives 
can be found that direct stakeholders towards the application of economic 
valuation. However, North's perspective says little about incentives of the 
stakeholders themselves that guide them to use economic valuation and 
make certain choices in the valuation process. Although the institutional 
context as defined by North is very important for understanding the 
influence of the context of stakeholders on the valuation process, a better 
understanding of the behavioral aspects of these stakeholders may 
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contribute to an improved explanation of their choices. It is therefore 
important to consult other institutional theories that may enrich our 
current understanding of the economic valuation process.  
 
While North explains institutions as formal and informal institutions, 
alternative definitions of institutions exist. For example, institutions may be 
perceived as contracts that specify the terms of exchange. A useful theory 
along these lines is provided by Tool (1995), who views prices as 
institutions. Tool (1995: 73) states that price setting is an ‘exercise of 
institutional creation and implementation’. Agents in the market determine 
prices based on their individual choice or judgment. These agents acquire 
and exercise the power to determine prices to whatever extent. Thus, prices 
are ratios of exchange that specify the terms of exchange, defined by 
people according to rules, schedules and patterns that support such pricing 
judgments. Pricing activities are therefore characterized as purposive, 
deliberate acts by persons that are situated in institutional contexts.  
 
A similar perspective may be applied to economic values. Economic values 
are influenced deliberately by people to lower the transaction costs 
involved in the ‘exchange’ of natural resources. Therefore, economic values 
are institutions that specify the terms of exchange of natural resources.  
 
3.4.3 Institutions and Behavior 
 
An interesting perspective on the behavior of actors is given by Knight 
(1992) and is based on the theory of strategic behavior. According to 
Knight, rational agents with competing interests are involved in a conflict, 
and in this conflict institutions are developed as a by-product to gain a 
strategic advantage over other agents involved in the conflict of interests. 
The resulting institutions may be efficient or inefficient, but all institutions 
are developed to produce benefits in the pursuit of individual gain. These 
benefits result in a strategic advantage of certain agents over others, 
characterized by power asymmetries. Applying this perspective to 
economic valuation as an institution (defined in section 3.4.2) results in the 
view that economic valuation is developed and utilized as a by-product in a 
conflict of interest among different stakeholders in order to provide these 
stakeholders with a strategic advantage over others. In this process, 
whether economic valuation or economic values result in efficient 
outcomes (as is the perspective in neoclassical economics) is irrelevant, as 
long as they provide the stakeholders with a strategic advantage.  
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Institutions like economic valuation provide actors with a strategic 
advantage because they constrain the actions of other actors, thereby 
securing the actor’s preferred alternative. This is what Knight calls ‘power’: 
to exercise power over a person is to affect the alternatives available to that 
person. Through the mechanisms of information about the choices of 
other actors or the threat of sanctions in the event of non-compliance, 
institutions formulate agents’ expectations so that strategic action becomes 
possible - without institutions, strategic action would not be possible 
because all behavior is surrounded by uncertainty. Institutions thus 
establish expectations by providing information or sanctions from which 
agents learn the information that formulates their expectations about the 
actions of those with whom they interact. In this respect, institutions like 
economic valuation aid stakeholders particularly in the provision of 
information about behavior. Economic values, just like prices, convey 
information about the scarcity of the environment, which affects the 
expectations of stakeholders' behavior concerning the environment. For 
example, low economic values form expectations that the environment is 
relatively abundant which may support behavior of stakeholders who aim 
to intervene in ecosystems; high economic values, on the other hand, form 
the expectation that the environment is relatively scarce and thereby 
support behavior of stakeholders who oppose interventions in ecosystems. 
The specific institutional arrangement of economic valuation (the functions 
valued, the valuation method employed, the height of the discount rate, 
and so on) that is chosen by a stakeholder affects the expectations of other 
stakeholders in such a way as to produce outcomes that give them a 
distributional advantage over other stakeholders they interact with.  
 
The next question that arises is why stakeholders apply economic valuation 
as part of their strategic behavior, and how strategic behavior affects the 
choices they make in the valuation process. In this respect, an important 
starting point is to recognize that these choices are related to two other 
activities, for which the theory of Callon (1998) is very useful. First of all, 
the choices of actors are related to their demand for a certain type of 
knowledge and information. A key determinant in this demand is that 
information helps shape a reality on which actors base their decisions. 
According to Callon (1998), the process of collecting, comparing and 
generalizing information actually creates the reality that calculative actors 
take into account when making decisions. In other words, calculating tools 
like economic valuation shape the reality that they measure (Callon, 1998). 
A similar perspective is also shared by North (1990; p. 76), who views the 
relationship between perceptions of reality and knowledge as a two-way 
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relationship: “…the way knowledge develops shapes our perceptions of the 
world around us and in turn those perceptions shape the search for 
knowledge”. In this way, whatever environmental functions are valued into 
monetary measures through the process of economic valuation in fact 
constitute the reality of the environment for the decisions of those 
stakeholders that utilize the concept. In this process, the stakeholders’ 
understanding of the environment develops; increasingly more ecological 
effects are discovered, which leads to an increased demand for measuring 
these additional environmental aspects so as to incorporate them in 
calculative decisions.  
 
Second, the choices stakeholders make are related to specific actions so 
that economic valuation becomes a ‘calculating tool’ that allows for the 
framing of actions. Callon (1998) identifies the process of framing as the 
internalization of overflows. Rational, calculating agents create a boundary 
within which interactions take place independent of their context. Frames 
contain a list of entities, states of the world, possible actions of agents and 
the outcomes of those actions, which the agent will take into account in his 
calculations. However, not all externalities can be placed within this frame, 
and agents are constantly tracking down the overflows in order to place 
them within the frame so as to become part of the agent’s calculations. 
More importantly, if externalities are framed, they need to be measured; 
calculativeness of agents cannot exist without measurement tools. 
Therefore, institutions are created to track these overflows and express 
them in a common language. These institutions constitute equipment and 
devices like accounting and marketing tools, and economic valuation can 
also be perceived as such a framing device. Economic valuation aids 
stakeholders in tracking down the external environmental effects 
(overflows) of their actions, and allows them to be expressed in common 
units so that the decisions of these stakeholders are more informed and 
calculative. It thereby facilitates the process of framing. Miller (1998) 
continues that whatever practices we observe in these measurement 
concepts, including discounting and costing practices, are ‘produced’. Tools 
are a continuous target for criticism and in this process, new calculating 
practices are brought within the boundaries of these tools. The 
transformation of these tools takes place within and through a historical 
ensemble of relations between actors, agencies, calculative devices and 
mechanisms. For example, before 1974 economic valuation techniques 
were aimed mostly at use values; since then, techniques have been 
developed that allow for the possibility of valuing also non-use values, such 
as existence value. Furthermore, it has been noted that calculating tools are 
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constantly reconfigured to take more information into account – as a result, 
decisions become increasingly more calculated and rational (Callon, 1998). 
There is, therefore, no ‘core’ to economic valuation – it is adapted to the 
materials that are available, and what is not included in the process of 
valuation today may be a common practice tomorrow.  
 
The availability and quality of calculating devices is, however, not equally 
distributed among different actors. The quality of an instrument is higher 
the more externalities or overflows it can take into account; possession of 
higher quality instruments thus lead to more successful actions. Agents that 
have higher quality measurement instruments can create an asymmetry 
between themselves and other agents, thereby endowing them with more 
‘calculating power’ (Callon, 1998). Power can be defined as ‘the possibility 
of imposing one’s will upon the behavior of other persons’ (Weber, M., in: 
Galbraith, 1983), or in other words, the ‘capacity to communicate views 
and opinions and to persuade those who think differently’ (Hisschemöller 
et al., 1998). The reason that actors in environmental management demand 
this power in the first place is because transactions and trade in a market 
are characterized by competition over scarce natural resources, where 
actors compete to secure dominant positions. In this process, calculating 
power allows agents to impose certain events, actions and relations that 
other, less powerful actors in other interest groups, have to take into 
account. The imposition of calculating tools like economic valuation that 
incorporate rules that guide decisions is therefore an important starting 
point in domination on the market.  
 
3.4.4 Formal and Informal Institutions 
 
The previous section has developed an actor perspective based on strategic 
behavior. Actors are stakeholders of valuation processes that apply 
valuation studies as tools in their pursuit for a strategic advantage over 
other stakeholders. This strategic advantage is often related to power. 
These stakeholders, however, are embedded within a broader institutional 
context, consisting of informal and formal institutions, which also exert 
influences on the choices made in valuation processes. This will be further 
discussed in this section. 
 
According to North (1992), informal institutions include ideas, ideologies and 
principles. When ideas become somehow organized, one can speak of 
paradigms. In this thesis, two types of paradigms are distinguished as being 
of influence on the choices in the economic valuation process: scientific 
paradigms and policy paradigms. 
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Scientific paradigms are defined by Kuhn (1962, 1970: 8) as “…universally 
recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems 
and solutions to a community of practitioners.” As long as a certain 
paradigm allows researchers to find answers to these social questions, we 
speak of a ‘ruling paradigm’. When, on the other hand, social questions 
change such that science cannot find the answers with the ruling 
paradigms, scientists search for new theories and methods until a new 
paradigm is found (Dietz and van der Straaten, 1994). In Chapter 2 (section 
2.2.1), several scientific paradigms towards the environment within the 
economics discipline were distinguished. It was explained how adherence 
to a specific economic paradigm determines the way the environment is 
treated in economic theories. This in turn may be of influence on the types 
of choices that are made in economic instruments applied to the 
environment like economic valuation.  
 
A policy paradigm “…provides policy-makers with the terminology and a set 
of taken-for-granted assumptions about the way they communicate and 
think about a policy area.” (Carter, 2001: 169). Policy paradigms change 
throughout history and different ruling paradigms may be dominant at 
various stages. For example, policy paradigms towards the environment 
may be dominated by more anthropocentric or ecocentric approaches, 
which in turn influence which choices are made regarding the environment. 
These choices may include the choices made in policy instruments in 
environmental decision making, including economic valuation. An aspect 
of policy paradigms that is particularly relevant for economic valuation of 
the environment is the way the environment is generally perceived. In 
Chapters 1 and 2, it was explained how environmental awareness has 
increased and changed in most western societies. People have come to 
place a higher importance on environmental issues and a shift has taken 
place from an emphasis on the economy as a closed system, separate from 
the environment, to the economy and environment as two interrelated and 
interdependent systems. Such changing general perceptions towards the 
relationship between man and the environment determines policy 
paradigms concerning the environment and, in turn, choices humans make 
with respect to the environment, including those choices in the economic 
valuation process.  
 
North (1992) defines formal institutions as rules and regulations. These rules 
must be perceived as covering general rules regarding the environment and 
the economy as well as more specific rules or guidelines regarding the 
process of economic valuation. Both the prevalence as well as the absence 
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of formal institutions can directly influence choices made in economic 
valuation processes.  
 
3.4.5 Characteristics of the Economic Instrument 
 
In addition to the elements in the formal and informal institutional 
structure, a very important element in the context of the valuation process 
is the set of characteristics of the economic instrument in which the 
economic valuation process is used. In this context, three aspects are of 
particular importance in influencing the choices actors make in the 
valuation process: (1) the use type of economic valuation; (2) the goal of 
the economic instrument; and (3) the time and budget constraints imposed 
on the economic instrument. Each of these aspects will be discussed below. 
 
Economic valuation of ecosystems may be applied for different types of 
uses. Navrud and Pruckner (1997: 3) distinguish five use types of economic 
valuation:  
 
- Project Evaluation 
- Regulatory Review 
- Natural Resource Damage Assessment 
- Environmental Costing 
- Environmental Accounting 
 
First, when the effects of projects on the environment need to be 
evaluated, economic valuation may be applied as part of an economic 
instrument like cost-benefit analysis. In the USA and in Europe, economic 
valuation has been mostly used at the project level. Second, new regulations 
might need to be evaluated and in the United States economic valuation as 
part of a cost-benefit analysis has been applied for this purpose. A third 
type of use is the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA). The 
specific objective of NRDA is to estimate the value of the damages to an 
injured resource. Reasons for doing this may be either to convince the 
general public of the value of natural ecosystems or in order to determine 
the amounts to be recovered from parties held liable by the courts 
(Cangelosi et al., 2001). The process includes three steps: (i) injury 
determination; (ii) quantification of service effects; and (iii) damage 
determination (Cangelosi et al., 2001). Economic valuation plays an 
important role in the third step, where the damage to the natural resource is  
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expressed in monetary terms23. A fourth use type of economic valuation is 
environmental costing, which can be used to influence decisions about 
investments and operation in the presence of externalities (Navrud and 
Pruckner, 1997). Economic valuation may be applied to derive the costs of 
the decision on the environment so that prices may reflect both the 
marginal private cost of production and the marginal social cost on the 
environment. The last use type is environmental accounting, where 
economic valuation may be utilized to convey the environmental costs in 
an accounting framework. Each type of use results in a different demand 
for information and hence different types of environmental functions 
valued.  
 
Second, the goal for which an economic valuation study itself is carried out 
may also differ among studies (Navrud, 1992). In some studies, the 
economic valuation process is conducted to create public awareness for 
environmental damage or environmental benefit. In other studies, the goal 
is to identify decisions by establishing a priority ranking between different 
potential actions. It is also possible to influence decisions through using 
economic valuations, to justify decisions, either ex ante or ex post, or to 
justify the existence of a particular program by pointing at the positive side 
effects of its activities on the environment. In this way, different goals exist 
for economic valuation studies that may influence the choices in the 
valuation process. While a study aimed at influencing public awareness on 
the value of the environment may motivate actors to value as many 
environmental functions with the highest value as possible, a study aimed 
at justifying the decision of a dam construction may want to underestimate 
the effects of the dam on the environment. Therefore, different choices 
result from different goals. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 For example, in 1988, the barge Nestucca ruptured off the coast of Washington state, 
where oil spills killed birds and soiled beaches (Navrud, 1992). Both Washington state and 
the Canadian government conducted a Contingent Valuation study at the end of 1990 to 
measure the damages to be used in a law suit. Another example is the estimation of natural 
resource damage of the Exxon Valdez tanker, which ran into a reef in Prince William 
Sound, Alaska, in 1989. The tanker spilled eleven million gallons of crude oil in the water 
(Navrud, 1992), the largest oil spill ever in United States history. The state and federal 
governments sewed Exxon, and in 1991 it was announced that state and federal 
governments settled with Exxon for fines of $900 million in natural resource damages. 
This fine was estimated by environmental economists through the application of contingent 
valuation. 
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3.5 Influences on the Economic Valuation Process  
 
At the basis of the perspective developed in this chapter is that economic 
valuation processes consist of different stakeholders and their contexts 
who make choices in the valuation process. Examples of direct 
stakeholders are a principal and contracting party, a steering or advisory 
committee, a peer review group, and interviewed and consulted persons. 
Indirect stakeholders were identified as those actors that influence the 
process through pressure and lobby activities and can include politicians, 
tourists and recreationists. Some of these stakeholders need to make 
choices on, for example, the phenomenon to be studied, which parties are 
affected by the activities for which the economic valuation study is carried 
out, which economic valuation method to apply and which discount rate to 
apply for the discounting process. An institutional theory perspective was 
developed to understand the behavior of these different stakeholders in 
relation to such choices. 
 
The actor perspective developed from institutional theory is one of 
strategic behavior. Stakeholders are strategic individuals that apply 
economic valuation studies to pursue advantages over other stakeholders. 
These advantages are often related to power. At the same time, these 
stakeholders are situated within a broader institutional context consisting of 
informal and formal institutions. These institutions also exert influence on 
the choices stakeholders make in valuation processes. Policy paradigms, 
scientific paradigms and paradigms in environmental thinking were 
identified as key informal institutions, while the prevalence or absence of 
rules, regulations and guidelines regarding the environment and the 
valuation process were identified as important  formal institutions. In 
addition to these institutions, it was noted that the characteristics of the 
economic instrument of which the valuation process is part are also 
important determinants of the choices of stakeholders in the valuation 
process. In this respect, the specific use type of the valuation process, the 
goal of the economic instrument of which the valuation process is part as 
well as time and budget constraints were identified as important 
determinants of the choices in the valuation process. This theoretical 
perspective has been developed over the last three chapters and will be 
specifically applied to valuation processes in Dutch water management in 
the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4 Application of 
Economic Valuation  
in Dutch Water 
Management 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, a theoretical perspective on the economic 
valuation process has been developed. This perspective is based on 
institutional theory. First, an actor perspective was developed in which 
stakeholders behave strategically and apply economic valuation in the 
pursuit of a strategic advantage over other stakeholders. Second, these 
stakeholders are situated in a context of formal and informal institutions 
that influence their behavior. These strategic actors within their 
institutional context of rules, regulations, scientific and policy paradigms 
determine the choices in valuation processes.  
 
The goal of this chapter is to apply this perspective to Dutch water 
management. First, a general discussion of economic valuation in water 
management is held in section 4.2,  with a focus on the institutional context 
of informal and formal institutions. In this context, scientific paradigms, 
policy paradigms and rules and regulations are distinguished. The next 
section of this chapter, section 4.3,  describes the results of a participant 
observation in two valuation processes in Dutch water management from 
which observations on choices and stakeholders involved in these 
processes are made. These observations and the discussion on the 
institutional context discussion will form the basis of the analytical model 
of section 4.4. This model focuses on: (1) the choices of the economic 
valuation process, and; (2) the context in which these choices are made. 
This model therefore is an integration of theory and practice. This 
analytical model will be applied to three case studies of valuation processes 
in Dutch water management in subsequent chapters. The methodological 
approach and key research questions addressed in these cases will be 
presented in section 4.5.  
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4.2 The Context of the Economic Valuation Process in Dutch Water 
Management  
 
4.2.1 Short Historical Overview 
 
Economic valuation of the environment in the Netherlands can be traced 
back to around 1973, at which time several valuation studies were being 
carried out. However, in these early times the usefulness of economic 
valuation for public-policy making was doubted, mainly due to 
methodological weaknesses of the available valuation methods and a lack 
of reliable data (Opschoor and Turner, 1987). An important stimulus for 
economic valuation, however, came from the United States in 1981, when 
President Reagan’s executive order 12291 made it mandatory for the 
Environmental Protection Agency to perform social cost-benefit analyses 
for its major regulations (Navrud, 1992). This stimulated interest for 
valuation in the Netherlands, but the studies still lacked both completeness 
and comprehensiveness (Kuik et al., 1991). At the end of the 1980s, 
government application of monetary valuation slowly diminished. Over the 
last years, however, economic valuation seems to be back on the agenda. 
After the success of tools like multi-criteria analysis, social cost-benefit 
analyses that include economic values of environmental effects are now 
increasingly being applied in different policy-making contexts, including 
water management24.  
 
4.2.2 Scientific Paradigms25 
 
Before the 1960s, environmental economics in the Netherlands was still 
part of welfare economics, and actually grew out of regional economics, 
which was a popular economic sub-discipline at the time. In regional 
economics, environmental problems like pollution were playing an 
increasingly important role and thus were progressively integrated in its 
models. During the 1960s and 1970s, environmental economics gradually 
developed into a discipline of its own, and was adjusted over time with, for 
example, increased incorporation of life-cycles in economic models and 
decreased substitution possibilities between different sorts of capital in 
                                                 
24 See, for example, the cost-benefit analyses carried out for the expansion of the 
Rotterdam port (CPB/NEI/RIVM, 2001), and the creation of 750 hectares of new nature 
and recreation area (NEI/RIVM, 2001). 
25 The image in this section is created primarily from Navrud (1992) and interviews with 
six selected environmental economists in the Netherlands that are active in analyzing and 
informing environmental policy analysis: Hans Opschoor, Henk Folmer, Wim Hafkamp, 
Jeroen van den Bergh, Frank Dietz, and Harmen Verbruggen. 
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their theories. Interest in the environment generally subsided in the 1980s 
and there was little focus on environmental issues in scientific research 
throughout the most part of this decade. In December 1988, however, the 
National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) 
published the report “Zorgen voor Morgen”, that made headlines in the 
media due to its alarming character. It had an important influence on the 
environmental awareness in the Netherlands and acted as a catalyst in 
environmental discussions in science.  
 
The first major economic valuation study that was carried out in the 
Netherlands was in 1973 by Jansen and Opschoor (Jansen and Opschoor, 
1973). This study was based on a survey of home owners in Dutch cities in 
order to measure the social costs of aircraft noise. After that, other major 
valuation studies followed, such as the valuation of the vitality of Dutch 
forests by van de Linden and Oosterhuis  (1987) and valuing a clean 
environment by Hoevenagel and Verbruggen (1989). However, not many 
additional  studies followed and application of economic valuation 
remained relatively limited. A major motivation for this lack of interest was 
the limited demand for these studies from policy makers in the Netherlands 
(Navrud, 1992), mainly due to a lack of confidence in willingness-to-pay 
estimates, and in particular in the Contingent Valuation approach.  
 
Only towards the end of the 1980s interest resurfaced with the study on the 
Contingent Valuation method by Ruud Hoevenagel at the Institute of 
Environmental Studies (IVM) of the Free University of Amsterdam (see 
Hoevenagel, 1994). This study was financed by the Netherlands Institute 
for Science (NWO) and provided recommendations for minimizing the 
various biases surrounding this valuation method. A number of valuation 
studies were carried out in this period, however many lacked completeness 
and comprehensiveness – studies were carried out with extreme 
cautiousness and only use values were included in the analyses. Little use 
was made of valuation methods like Hedonic Pricing and Travel Cost, 
while Contingent Valuation was only occasionally applied. In the beginning 
of the 1990s application still remained limited, and it is only since the last 
two years that economic valuation is playing an increasingly important role 
in the Netherlands.  
 
A major reason for the increased popularity of valuation is the rising 
demand for it in policy making (see the previous section). Science often 
follows the developments in policy making. Furthermore, the relative 
success of economic valuation in the United States results in increasing 
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numbers of proponents that want to take part in this success in the 
Netherlands. Consequently, a number of valuation studies have been 
carried out at different scientific institutes in the Netherlands in the last 
years in which attention also focused on the valuation of non-use values26. 
Another important development for the application of valuation is that the 
ecological economics paradigm is becoming increasingly popular in 
environmental valuation. Within this paradigm, economic valuation of the 
environment is often accepted as an input for broader models, such as 
ecological-economic models (see for example van den Bergh, 1996 and 
Turner et al., 2000). However, the neoclassical environmental economics 
paradigm still also has many adherents, so development in economic 
valuation in scientific institutes takes place in different scientific paradigms.  
 
4.2.3 Policy Paradigms  
 
The policy paradigms that are specific to water management in the 
Netherlands, are directly linked to the changing perception of 
environmental issues at a more general level. This change is along two lines: 
(1) institutionalization of environmental problems, and; (2) rationalization 
of society. First, since the 1960s, environmental problems have become 
institutionalized in most Western countries as important social problems. 
Leroy and de Geest (1985) state that this was influenced by three other 
related processes. One was the framing of environmental problems in a 
broader, more general context and meaning – environmental problems 
were presented not as incidents but as structural, global problems of all 
societies. A large number of scientific and popular papers were published 
that described environmental problems in a very dramatic and alarming 
voice (Leroy and de Geest, 1985). A prominent example is ‘Silent Spring’ 
by R. Carson (1962), which focused the attention on the negative effects of 
the use of DDT and pesticides in general. In 1972, the environment was 
officially put on the agenda for the first time when the Club of Rome 
published its ‘Limits to Growth’ report (Hajer, 1995). This report stated 
that the depletion of the world’s natural resources in the foreseeable future 
would result in a substantial decrease in industrial growth. This conclusion 
was substantiated by the report ‘Blueprint for Survival’ in 1973: sooner or 
later, industrial society would come to an end unless a radical change would 
take place. The only solution was to recognize the limits to economic and 
population growth. Second, major awareness campaigns were undertaken 
                                                 
26 However, critics say that major economic valuation studies are still scarce. This is due to 
a limited amount of resources and time which these studies get in the Netherlands.  
 
Application of Economic Valuation in Dutch Water Management 
 81
by the environmental movement, government and other organizations that 
led to a broad social interest, awareness and concern for the environment 
(Leroy and de Geest, 1985). On 22 April 1972, the then largest 
environmental demonstration in history was held, called ‘Earth Day’ 
(MacCormick, 1995). Approximately 300,000 Americans gathered, both 
houses of Congress recessed, and cars were banned from New York’s Fifth 
Avenue. For Time magazine, the environment was the major issue of 1970, 
and Life magazine stated it was a movement that would dominate the new 
decade (MacCormick, 1995). A third process that can be distinguished is 
that the environment, once framed as a social problem, became a political 
problem when it passed the ‘political filter and selection mechanism’ (Leroy 
and de Geest, 1985; p. 16). At a certain point, the environment was 
perceived significant enough to receive political attention and treatment. 
The most prominent example of this is the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, during which 
political, economic and social problems of the environment were discussed 
for the first time at an inter-governmental forum (MacCormick, 1995). The 
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) was created at this 
conference, which marked a transition from the “…naive 
environmentalism of the 1960s to the more rational, political and global 
perspective of the 1970s.” (MacCormick, 1995; p. 107). A very important 
conclusion of this conference was that a new emphasis was placed on the 
human environment: a rational and global perspective highlighting the 
understanding of the nature of environmental problems as well as the 
development of  agreements.  
 
A major result of the Stockholm conference was that numerous 
government policies on the environment were developed. McCormick 
(1995) explains that between 1956 and 1960, four major pieces of 
legislation were passed in OECD member states; ten were passed in the 
period 1961-65; eighteen between 1966 and 1970; and a total of thirty-one 
in the early seventies. By the 1980s, environmental awareness was as big as 
it was in the 1960s, but had transformed into a more public policy oriented 
perspective on environmental problems. In 1987, the World Commission 
on the Environment and Development (WCED) published a report called 
‘Our Common Future’, also known as the Brundtland report. The main 
focus of this report was the relationship between the environment and 
economic development. Its conclusion was that economic policy needed to 
be concerned with sustainable management of natural resources and the 
environment (Geerlings/van Ast, 1995). All economic sectors needed to 
focus on sustainable development.  
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In addition to the institutionalization of environmental problems, the 
environmental movement has witnessed a second major change, namely a 
serious change in attitude. While the 1960s and 1970s were dominated by 
romantic and esthetical motives for environmental protection, the 1980s 
were characterized by a more pragmatic focus on environmental problems, 
based on the concepts of scientific ecology (Leroy and de Geest, 1985). 
Scientific foundations of protection and management of ecosystems were 
more important, a process known in the literature as ‘scientification of 
nature protection’ (Leroy and de Geest, 1985; p. 32). In the 1990s, a further 
shift in the environmental movement was witnessed, in which the lifestyle 
in Western countries had moved towards increased green consumerism, 
and the introduction of new techniques that allowed firms to integrate the 
environment into their overall cost-benefit calculations (MacCormick, 
1995). By today, much more information has been collected on the state of 
the environment, on the nature and scope of the consequences of human 
action, and on the nature of environmental protection. As a result, 
environmental awareness has evolved into a pragmatic, problem-oriented 
perspective, in which solutions to environmental problems are increasingly 
being perceived as part of a positive-sum solution in which environmental 
protection and economic development go hand in hand. 
 
The shift in environmental thinking can be linked to a broader process 
witnessed in western societies, namely the rationalization of society. The 
concept of rationality has different meanings, and van Doorn (1989) 
provides several explanations. In the first place, rationality can be related to 
a reasonable creature, with cerebral and sedate actions. Rational action 
shows self-constraint and civilized appearance. Secondly, van Doorn 
distinguishes rationality in which behavior is calculative, disciplined and 
pacified. A third definition, which is often adhered by supporters of the 
Enlightenment, is the belief that the world must be perceived as a rational 
construction and therefore can only be understood through mere cerebral 
means. This relates to a strong belief in the superiority of science, which 
embodies rational thought of reality, also known as ‘scientism’. Another 
explanation of rationality is that rational action is selective and purposive. 
The rational human being knows his interests and pursues these interests, is 
perfectly informed about the possibilities and means, which he consciously 
applies in order to attain his selected goals. This is a definition that is 
supported by utilitarianism, which lies at the basis of neoclassical 
economics. 
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The roots of modern thinking on rationality lie in the work of the German 
sociologist Max Weber. In his work, Weber distinguishes different types of 
rationality, such as wertrationalität and zweckrationalität (in: Zandstra-Andela, 
1982). Wertrationalität prevails when actions are influenced by values, and 
the direct consequences of these actions are surpassed (van Doorn, 1989). 
Zweckrationalität, on the other hand, is related to actions that pursue a 
balanced goal with certain means, and thus a direct causal relationship 
exists between means and goals (Zandstra-Andela, 1982). The use of action 
lies therefore not in the action itself, but in a specific goal, also known as 
instrumental, functional or strategic action (van Doorn, 1989). While 
wertrationalität can lead to a certain life-orientation, zweckrationalität results in 
limited, methodic combinations of practical goals and adequate means (van 
Doorn, 1989). According to Weber, the Western world had developed a 
specific type of rationality called formal rationality: the search by people for 
an optimum means to a given end that is shaped by rules and regulations 
(Ritzer, 1996). In this respect, bureaucracy is the ultimate paradigm for 
formal rationality. Its formal structure, according to Weber, allows for 
greater efficiency, and the institutionalized rules result in its users choosing 
the best means to arrive at their ends (Ritzer, 1996). 
 
Rationality encompasses not only the actions of human beings, but also of 
systems. System rationality refers to rational actions of such systems like 
markets and organizations (van Doorn, 1989). Both are rational 
mechanisms that reduce reality to manageable processes. A market, for 
example, reduces the reality of scarcity - scarcity is institutionalized in the 
market in a comprehensive and controllable way through trade. Market 
processes are made calculable through the use of a similar unit of exchange 
for all transactions (money), allowing universal comparison.  
 
Van Doorn (1989) explains that there is a tendency towards a process of 
rationalization of society. While cultural, moral, political and ideological 
values and goals disappear to the background, organizational, bureaucratic, 
technocratic and formalistic orientations are becoming more pronounced 
(van Doorn, 1989; p. 139). This tendency is also observed by the 
‘McDonaldization thesis’ of Ritzer (1996), which is based on Weber’s 
theory on rationality. McDonaldization is “…the process by which 
principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and 
more sectors of American society as well as of the rest of the world.” 
(Ritzer, 1996). While Weber used bureaucracy as a paradigm for 
rationalization, Ritzer applies McDonald’s as the major example of a 
rational entity. Ritzer (1996; p. 174) states that “…society and the world are 
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growing progressively rationalized…”, and that rationalization is 
characterized by an emphasis on the following four dimensions (Ritzer, 
1996):  
 
- Efficiency: the optimum method for getting from one point to another 
- Calculability: an emphasis on quantitative aspects 
- Predictability: the assurance that products and services are the same 
everywhere 
- Control: especially through a substitution of non-human for human 
technologies 
 
These four dimensions of a rational system are becoming more and more 
dominant in all aspects of society; as a result America, Europe and the rest 
of the world together are moving towards a business and cultural world 
dominated by these dimensions. The first dimension, efficiency, refers to 
optimum methods for satisfying many needs. Rules and regulations often 
help ensure highly efficient work in organizations, for example. 
Calculability is an emphasis on aspects that can be calculated, counted and 
quantified (Ritzer, 1996). Calculability makes it easier to determine 
efficiency, and products and processes become more predictable. This 
increasing emphasis on calculability and numbers is also stressed by 
Jennings (2001), who states that modern life is permeated by a fascination 
with numbers, measurement and quantification. Therefore, the process of 
rationalization, which is felt throughout society, results in more emphasis 
on information that is presented in quantitative terms. The third 
dimension, predictability, results in a world in which there are few 
surprises. For example, with the aid of rules, people behave in a highly 
predictable way in what they say and what they do. Lastly, control results in 
an increasing substitution of human technology (which is controlled by 
people) by non-human technology (which controls people). Technologies 
in a corporation increase its control over its workers and ensure that 
production and service will be consistent. 
 
The combination of the two processes discussed so far - institutionalization 
of environmental problems and rationalization of society - influences 
specific policy paradigms, including paradigms in water management. An 
increasing environmental awareness calls for increased integration of 
environmental effects in decision making processes, while rationalization 
introduces concepts that make environmental issues calculable so that they 
can be integrated in existing institutions. New techniques are necessary that 
allow organizations to integrate environmental policies into their cost-
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benefit calculations. This is reflected in a belief that hard data lead to hard 
facts and thus to a higher validity of these facts (in ‘t Veld, 2000).  
 
The policy paradigm that dominated water management in the Netherlands 
in the period after the great flood in 1953 may be characterized as a 
technocentric approach, based on the scientific and technological optimism 
that humans can deal with water problems. Since then, however, the 
approach towards water management has shifted towards a water system 
approach, an integrated approach that puts the entire water system at the 
center and balances the demands of society against the functioning of water 
systems (MinV&W, 1985). This concept, which seeks to achieve a safe and 
liveable country with healthy and sustainable water systems, has been 
developed in several policy documents on water (see for example Nota 
Waterhuishouding 3 (MinV&W, 1989) and Nota Waterhuishouding 4 
(MinV&W, 1998)). A further development of the concept on a European-
wide level was made explicit in the European Water Framework Directive 
in 2000, which also seeks to establish an integrated water management 
approach at the level of river basins, to ensure a sustainable water 
management throughout Europe. At the end of the 1990s, several parts of 
the Netherlands experienced severe floods and the social and political 
question furthermore arose whether the country is actually sufficiently 
prepared for the challenges of the twenty-first century, including climate 
change, availability of space and land use. These events stimulated the 
move towards a more ecosystem approach to water management, aimed at 
giving water systems more space and letting ecosystem functions play an 
important role in flood management - a process that had already been 
initiated through the introduction of the concept of integrated water 
management.  
 
An interesting discussion about the change in perspective towards water 
management issues in the Netherlands over the past centuries is presented 
by Saeijs et al. (1999), who discuss the changing approaches in Dutch water 
management issues in terms of the development of different (policy) 
paradigms. Although these paradigms emerged in different periods, all still 
somehow prevail in current water management issues in the Netherlands. 
The first paradigm arose more than ten thousand years ago when farmers 
took simple measures to manage the high water levels on their lands and 
large swampy areas were drained for agriculture. In other, higher areas in 
the Netherlands, however, water shortage was forming a major problem 
and, as a result, farmland was irrigated in areas of water shortage and 
drained in areas of water surplus – the ruling paradigm was “an adjustable 
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water system”. In approximately 1000 A.D., the first flood-protection 
measures were taken by settlements that lived along rivers and by the sea. 
Rich farmers constructed dikes around their farmlands, and the paradigm 
in this time was “protect humans from water”. The first land reclamations 
from lakes and the sea in the Netherlands started around four hundred 
years ago when lakes were drained using windmills. Paradigms of such 
reclamations were associated with other paradigms that still prevail, such as 
“pump or drown” – a paradigm associated with the subsidence in land that 
results from land reclamation. In the twentieth century, the developments 
were somewhat faster. In the 1960s, a large part of the Delta plan was 
realized, which closed most of the large sea arms of the delta in the South-
West of the Netherlands as an answer to disastrous flooding in this part of 
the Netherlands in 1953. The paradigm becomes “safety above all”, which 
is still the major starting-point in water management today. At the end of 
the 1960s, the environmental aspects of water management were suddenly 
noticed. The effects of water systems as cheap waste deposits became 
apparent in terms of pollution, and another paradigm entered the field, 
namely “protect water from humans”. In the 1980s, it became clear from 
the Deltaworks project and the closing of the Zuiderzee that the 
construction of dams may also have disastrous environmental effects. To 
an increasing degree, water managers realized the importance of the 
functioning of entire water systems, and the new paradigm became “water 
system approach”. The developments in lake Grevelingen in the Dutch 
delta furthermore showed that a water system approach towards water 
management could no longer be limited to one single interest, but that 
ecological, economic and social interests are closely related. The latest 
paradigm in Dutch water management is therefore called “integrated water 
system approach”.  
 
Processes outside the context of the Netherlands have also had a major 
influence on the way policy in water management is being perceived. With 
a global population now exceeding 6 billion and growing at a rate of 1.2% 
per year, there is an increasing pressure on the world’s water resources. At 
the same time, the increase in consumption patterns results in a rising 
demand for land and water. Although the world has an abundant supply of 
water, only 3% of the total volume is fresh water, most of which is stored 
in glaciers and polar caps (Daily, 1997). Four major problems concerning 
fresh water may be defined as (Saeijs and van Berkel, 1994):  
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- A shortage of renewable fresh water supplies 
- Unequal distribution of fresh water supplies 
- Problems of water quality and health 
- Negative effects of unrestrained fresh water ecosystem developments 
 
These issues have resulted in increasing global attention for topics 
concerning water pricing, flood management, dam construction and 
wetland reclamation. An emphasis on the importance of involving 
stakeholders in decision making processes in water management has been 
introduced with the concept of integrated water management, a system 
approach with a focus upon the long-term survival of the entire water 
system (van Ast, 2000). 
 
At the Dublin Conference on Water and the Environment in 1992, water 
was termed an ‘economic good’ for the first time and the concept of 
‘Integrated Water Resources Management’ was introduced. The following 
four principles were developed (ICWE, 1992): 
 
- Water is a finite, vulnerable and essential resource, which should be 
managed in an integrated manner. 
- Water resources development and management should be based on a 
participatory approach, involving all relevant stakeholders. 
- Women play a central role in the provision, management and safeguarding 
of water. 
- Water has an economic value and should be recognized as an economic 
good, taking into account affordability and equity criteria. 
 
Although the notion of water as an economic good has been generally 
accepted since the conference, the interpretation of this concept is under 
dispute. In this respect, Van der Zaag and Savenije (2000; 51) distinguish 
two schools of thought. One school believes that water should be priced at 
its economic value, so that the market will ensure water is allocated to its 
best use. A second school maintains that ‘water as an economic good’ 
refers to the process of integrated decision making on the allocation of 
scarce resources, which may not necessarily involve financial transactions. 
Instead, decisions on water allocation and use should be based on multi-
sectoral, multi-interest and multi-objective analysis.  
 
In March 1997, the World Water Council received its mandate to develop a 
Vision for Water, Life and the Environment during the First World Water 
Forum in Marrakech. This common Vision was seen as a necessary first 
step towards solving the global water crisis, and was debated during the 
Second World Water Forum in The Hague in 2000. The Vision provides a 
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thorough diagnosis of water resources and the steps that need to be taken 
to relieve the pressure on these resources. During this Second World Water 
Forum, people from all over the world participated in debates on major 
water-related issues, including 'water for food', 'water and economics', 
'water and health', 'water and gender', and 'water and ethics'. 
 
In the year 2000, the debate on dams reached its climax with the 
publication of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) report, ‘Dams and 
Development – A New Framework for Decision Making’. The WCD was 
established in 1997 by the IUCN - The World Conservation Union and 
World Bank to discuss the complex and controversial issues surrounding 
large dams. The report discussed social, environmental and safety aspects 
of large dams, and recommended that the core values on which any 
decision on water and energy development should be based are equity, 
efficiency, participatory decision making, sustainability and accountability 
(WCD, 2000).  
 
Each of the reports and conferences described, shows that water has 
become a hot issue on the global agenda. Water is no longer seen as the 
abundant resource it once seemed to be, and it becomes increasingly 
important to meet the different interests in water. At the same time, 
however, the general perspective towards water management and 
environmental issues has shifted towards a pragmatic, problem-oriented 
perspective in which current institutions are perceived as capable to deal 
with most environmental issues. This is part of what Hajer (1995) and 
Tatenhove (2000) call ecological modernization. Ecological modernization has 
its roots in the work of Joseph Huber, a German social scientist who 
observed that policy-makers in Germany and the Netherlands in particular 
started applying a “…more strategic and preventive approach to 
environmental problems.” (Carter, 2001: 211). 
 
Ecological modernization is a policy-oriented process that started in the 
Netherlands and many other Western countries in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Tatenhove (2000: 3) defines ecological modernization as an “…ecological 
transformation of the industrialization process towards a direction in which 
the maintenance of the ‘sustenance base of society’ can be guaranteed, 
while also reconciling economic growth and the ecological imperative”. 
Tatenhove (2000) links this to a broader process observed in Europe, 
which he calls political modernization, the processes of transformation 
within the political domain of society. Ecological modernization recognizes 
the structural character of the environmental problems but assumes that 
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current political, economic and social institutions can deal with these 
environmental issues. A key characteristic of ecological modernization is 
that it “…introduces concepts that make issues of environmental 
degradation calculable.” (Hajer, 1995: 26). The market plays a central role 
in environmental management, where calculability of environmental effects 
is the key to internalization of environmental costs. 
 
Economic valuation is a key issue in current policy paradigms dominated 
by ecological modernization, because it makes the environment more 
calculable and in fact aims to integrate environmental effects in current 
decision making institutions, including cost-benefit analyses. It provides a 
common denominator through which costs and benefits of environmental 
degradation can be taken into account (Hajer, 1995). The environment is 
therewith portrayed as a management problem and a positive-sum game. In 
‘t Veld (2000) also shares the point of view that in the demand for 
environmental knowledge, emphasis is placed on quantifiable norms. 
Stakeholders of projects prefer quantitative information - the environment, 
nature and economics are treated as objective entities and the more 
numbers and mathematical formulae are used, the stronger the facts. This 
demand is based on the belief that such information has absolute value, is 
objective and lowers the insecurities in decision making. In ‘t Veld calls this 
an ‘engineering-knowledge paradigm’, which dominates all decision making 
processes, including decision making in water management. 
 
Policy paradigms in water management, dominated by a combination of a 
growing environmental awareness and ecological modernization, may 
influence choices stakeholders make in the economic valuation process. 
Growing environmental awareness may lead to an increase in the number 
of environmental functions that need to be incorporated in decision 
making and decision making tools. Similarly, it may influence the way 
geographical boundaries of ecosystems are drawn, and the parties that are 
affected. Moreover, ecological modernization may affect choices in the 
economic valuation process as it calls for increasing calculability of aspects, 
including environmental effects of decisions. Hence, it may stimulate 
quantification of environmental effects, which can result in an increased 
amount of environmental functions that are deemed quantifiable and 
included in economic instruments.  
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4.2.4  Rules and Regulations 
 
According to the institutional theory of North, the development of 
informal institutions influences the development of formal institutions like 
rules and regulations. In this dissertation, informal institutions were defined 
as paradigms, which were discussed in the previous two sections. Following 
from North, therefore, these paradigms – policy paradigms and scientific 
paradigms – have contributed to the range of policy documents that have 
been developed in the past years in integrated water management in the 
Netherlands. These documents enhance the importance of the ecosystem 
approach in water management and the integration of environmental 
effects in water management issues.  
 
Rules and regulations regarding economic instruments and, more 
specifically, the economic valuation process are important elements in the 
formal institutional context. A major impetus to the use of economic 
valuation in the Netherlands seems to have been the publication of the 
NEI/CPB “OEEI” report in the year 2000 (see Eijgenraam et al., 2000). 
This report recommends the application of a social cost-benefit analysis as 
an evaluation of government investments for large infrastructural projects. 
A social cost-benefit analysis evaluates costs and benefits of actions from 
the point of view of society, which may incorporate external effects. Since 
many natural resources are subject to external effects, a social cost-benefit 
analysis may call for the application of economic valuation to measure the 
effects of an action that causes external environmental effects.  Since the 
publication of the report, several social cost-benefit analyses have been 
carried out by the different government departments in the Netherlands for 
major projects, such as the expansion of the Rotterdam port and the 
construction of sea sluices at IJsselstijn. Although still met with skepticism 
by many, general government interests for economic valuation as a method 
to incorporate environmental information in decision making among 
several government departments seems to have been on the rise since this 
report. 
 
The OEEI report, however, does not provide a guideline to economic 
valuation. In fact, no such guidelines exist in the Netherlands. The result is 
that although economic valuation is increasingly applied by different actors 
in water management due to the developments in the informal institutional 
structure as explained in the previous sections, there are no standardized 
procedures or guidelines on how to structure the economic valuation 
process. No guidelines exist as to which choices actors need to make 
concerning, for example, which environmental functions to incorporate, 
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which valuation method to apply, which  variables to include in a sensitivity 
analysis, and so on. This seriously affects the choices of actors in the 
economic valuation process as, in principle, actors are free to choose 
whatever seems right or appropriate. Hence, a general lack of rules and 
guidelines regarding the economic valuation process in the Netherlands 
may play an important role in the choices of stakeholders in the valuation 
process. 
 
Other important formal institutions include rules and regulations regarding 
the environment. Here, one must think of national and European-wide 
regulations that affect projects concerning the environment. An example is 
the EU Water Framework Directive. Such regulations may influence the 
choices in economic valuation processes that are carried out for such 
environmental projects. 
 
4.2.5 Summarizing the Institutional Context 
 
The previous three sections have discussed the key elements in the 
informal and formal institutional context of economic valuation processes. 
These elements are summarized in Figure 6.  In the informal institutional 
context, the first element that was abstracted from theory was scientific 
paradigms. In the Netherlands, a first scientific paradigm is the increasing 
popularity of economic valuation. This was attributed to an increased 
demand in the policy-making field and a high success of valuation studies 
in other countries like the United States. Furthermore, it was discovered 
that the scientific paradigms within economics in the Netherlands are 
dominated by a combination of neoclassical and ecological economics. 
Both scientific paradigms may influence choices in valuation processes. 
The second element distinguished in the informal institutional context of 
valuation processes was policy paradigms. In this context, several elements 
were noted. First, a process of institutionalization of environmental 
problems has taken place, often based on an increase in environmental 
awareness due to an increase in knowledge and information about the 
environment. Second, policy paradigms are dominated by ecological 
modernization, in which the environment is approached in a pragmatic, 
problem-oriented way in which rational solutions and arguments play an 
important role. Third, water management is approached from an ecosystem 
perspective in which ecosystems play a central role. The last policy 
paradigm is that water (in all its facets) is increasingly recognized as a scarce 
resource. 
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Figure 6 Institutional Context of the Economic Valuation Process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the formal institutional context of valuation processes in the 
Netherlands two key aspects were distinguished. First, rules and regulations 
concerning economic instruments in general are important influences on 
valuation choices, like the OEEI report that calls for the execution of social 
cost-benefit analyses for large infrastructural projects. The report, however, 
says little about economic valuation of ecosystems, which brings us to the 
second element in the formal institutional context, namely rules and 
regulations for the economic valuation process. Lastly, it was explained that 
rules and regulations concerning the environment may be of importance to 
the economic valuation process of environmental issues. 
 
4.3 Choices in the Valuation Process in Dutch Water Management 
 
4.3.1 Participant Observation 
 
Now that the context of economic valuation processes in Dutch water 
management has been discussed, it is necessary to analyze the valuation 
process within this context. For this reason, participant observation was 
carried out in two economic valuation processes in Dutch water 
management that involved two different principals. The first study was 
called "The Economic Value of Lost Natural Functions of the Rhine River 
Basin" and was carried out for a Dutch non-governmental organization 
(see Schuijt, 2001a). The second study was called "Costs and Benefits of an 
Alternative Safety Concept", which was carried out for a Dutch 
government department (see Schuijt, 2001b). Through conducting these 
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two economic valuation studies, it was possible to observe the economic 
valuation process, particularly focussing on the types of choices that need 
to be made, as well as the role of different stakeholders in the valuation 
process and their relationships. The focus of the observations, therefore, 
was on the process of structuring and application. In addition to inside 
information due to direct participation in the process, an important aspect 
of the participant observation was the ethnographic interview, which 
attempts to obtain information from the stakeholders on the subject 
through conversations and spontaneous interviews. The following section 
summarizes the main observations of these economic valuation processes. 
 
4.3.2  Observations on the Economic Valuation Processes 
 
The participation in the two economic valuation processes led to several 
observations relevant for this research. These observations all focus on the 
choices made in the valuation processes and the role of the stakeholders in 
the development of these choices.  
 
The first observation concerns the types of choices that need to be made in 
the valuation processes. It was observed that the choices as identified in 
theory could be structured according to those choices that need to be made 
before the actual assessment takes place (pre-assessment choices) and 
choices which are part of the assessment itself (assessment choices). In line 
with this, the range of choices that needed to be made in both valuation 
processes is presented in Figure  7. 
 
Figure 7 Choices in the Economic Valuation Process 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Assessment 
Choices: 
 
a) the phenomenon 
which is studied;
b) project 
alternative; 
c) the parties that 
are affected; 
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impacts; 
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Assessment Choices: 
 
a) quantification of 
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b) discounting; 
c) sensitivity analysis. 
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The second observation concerns the role of the principal in the choices of 
the valuation processes. In both studies, the definition of the phenomenon 
to be studied was done by the principal. Hence, the first choice that guides 
the remaining choices throughout the valuation process is defined by one 
set of stakeholders. Furthermore, in one valuation process, the remaining 
choices were also directed by the principals of the study. It was observed 
that in these choices, suggestions were made to guide the outcome of the 
process in a direction that would benefit the principal. This substantiates 
the observation made from theory in Chapter 3, namely that stakeholders 
behave strategically and apply economic valuation to gain a strategic 
advantage over other stakeholders. 
 
The third observation concerns the strong influence of time and budget 
constraints on choices made in both valuation processes. In both 
processes, a limited time and a limited to no budget was available for the 
studies. It was observed, however that (1) the collection of data necessary 
to carry out the valuations was very time-consuming, and (2) certain 
valuations could not take place with the preferred methods suggested by 
theory. For example, in the valuation process on the Rhine River basin, it 
was necessary to calculate the economic value of "existence value of 
nature", and theory only provides Contingent Valuation method to 
calculate this. However, the Contingent Valuation method is both relatively 
time consuming and expensive due to the process of interviewing 
consumers to obtain their willingness-to-pay estimates. Since both time and 
money were not available, however, it was not possible to perform a 
Contingent Valuation study and instead other approaches were sought to 
value the existence value of nature. Hence, time and budget constraints 
must be added as a key influence on the choices made in the valuation 
process. 
 
The fourth and last observation concerns the participation of different 
stakeholders in the valuation process. In general, there are different ways of 
integrating stakeholders in valuation processes, and the two most common 
approaches are through a steering committee and through a peer review 
group (see Chapter 3). Both should preferably consist of a wide range of 
stakeholders that give input into the valuation process. In both valuation 
processes, however, there was no steering or guidance committee 
consisting of external stakeholders. Interestingly, in one of the processes 
the principals gave guidance themselves. As a result, in both valuation 
processes the principal and contracting party made the relevant choices 
with no input from other stakeholders during the process. As for the 
second approach to stakeholder integration, in one of the valuation 
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processes a peer review of external stakeholders was executed while this 
was not done in the other study. It was observed that a peer review 
significantly altered some of the choices made in the valuation process and 
in general improved the substantiation of the calculations. This observation 
supports the need to analyze the types of stakeholders involved in the 
valuation process and their respective influences on the choices.  
 
In conclusion, the participant observation observed the following four 
aspects: 
 
1) The valuation process can be divided into six pre-assessment choices and 
three assessment choices; 
2) Stakeholders of valuation processes and the principal in particular behave 
strategically when making choices; 
3) Time and budget constraints imposed on valuation processes influence 
choices; 
4) Participation of all relevant stakeholders is important in the types of choices 
made in valuation processes. 
 
These observations will be combined with the observations from theory to 
develop the analytical model. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
4.4 Analytical Model 
 
The combination of observations on the application of the economic 
valuation process in Dutch water management with the observations 
derived from theory leads to the analytical framework of this dissertation. 
The framework is therefore a combination of observations from theory 
and practice.  
 
The analytical model is presented in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8 The Context of the Economic Valuation Process in Water Management 
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As can be seen, it is divided into two main parts. On the bottom are the 
choices of the economic valuation process, which are directly taken from 
Figure 7. This list of choices is based on a combination of the theory of 
Hanley and Spash (1993), Barbier (1997) and Eijgenraam et al. (2000) and 
participant observation. The top part of the model represents the context 
in which these choices are made. This is also based on a combination of 
the theoretical discussions of the previous chapter and practical 
observations about economic valuation processes in Dutch water 
management of section 4.2 in this chapter. An important aspect of the 
participant observation in the previous section is the influence of time and 
budget constraints on choices in the valuation process, and therefore it is 
added to the framework as a characteristic of the economic instrument.  
 
An important part of the framework however consists of the arrows that 
flow from top to bottom. These arrows show that the context of 
institutions, actors and characteristics of the economic instrument influence 
the choices of valuation process.  
 
The framework of Figure 8 will serve as a basis for further empirical 
analysis in the next chapters, the goal of which is to understand how 
choices in the economic valuation process are made within the context of 
Dutch water management. For this reason, the analytical model will be 
applied to three case studies: a cost-benefit analysis of gas extraction in the 
Wadden Sea and two cost-benefit analyses for the port development in 
Rotterdam. The identification of the variables in the analytical model 
involves the filling in of the analytical model for each case. This raises the 
following research questions: 
 
1) In which formal and informal institutional context at project level is the 
valuation process carried out? 
2) What are the characteristics of the economic instrument (cost-benefit 
analysis) of which the valuation process is part? 
3) Who are the stakeholders of the valuation process and what are their 
relationships? 
4) What do the valuation process and choices within this process look like? 
5) Which relationships can be depicted between the valuation process and its 
context? 
 
Each case study will be structured along these research questions. In Figure 
8, the research questions are represented by the numbers in brackets. 
 
In terms of the analytical model, two aspects are left out of the analysis in 
the next chapters that nevertheless deserve brief attention. First, the 
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interrelationships between the elements in the context of the economic 
valuation process are not studied. For example, relationships could perhaps 
be found in which elements in the formal and informal institutional context 
influence the stakeholders and their relationships or the characteristics of 
the economic instrument. Conversely, the stakeholder context may 
influence the characteristics of the economic instrument. However, these 
interrelationships among elements in the context will not be studied in the 
case studies because this thesis is only interested in the factors that 
influence the choices in the valuation process.  
 
Secondly, feedback loops are not analyzed. The choices that are made in 
the valuation process may influence behavior in society, including decisions 
or actions that affect the environment. Through the reactions that 
economic valuations provoke, new calculating strategies emerge that may 
lead to a changing of goals (Callon, 1998: 24). Changing behavior, in turn, 
influences the context of the economic valuation variables. The 
contribution of the valuation process to the behavior in society will 
determine what choices are made in the variables of this process over time. 
For example, if an economic valuation study succeeds in influencing a 
decision on the construction of a dam in such a way that the dam is not 
constructed, the position of the stakeholders who carried out this economic 
valuation study becomes stronger relative to the position of the 
construction companies. Furthermore, such a study may also stimulate 
environmental awareness in society and influence scientific research on 
economic valuation in support of current scientific paradigms. This 
influence of behavior on the context of economic valuation variables, or 
feedback, however, is not incorporated in the analysis of the next chapters, 
where the focus lies on the one-way effects of the context on the choices in 
the economic valuation process. 
 
The methodology that will be applied in the following chapters is discussed 
in the next section. 
 
4.5 Methodological Approach 
 
4.5.1 Case Study Analysis 
 
The next two chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) will provide the empirical 
analysis, where the methodological approach is a qualitative research 
approach. The units of analysis are behavioral aspects, such as interests, 
relationships and influences that are of a qualitative nature. The goal is to 
explore the economic valuation process and to find relationships and 
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patterns between the characteristics of the valuation process and its 
context. Since the nature of these relationships is unknown and these 
characteristics are not always quantifiable, qualitative analysis is a more 
appropriate form of exploratory analysis for this research. 
 
The method that will be applied in this analysis is case-study analysis. Yin 
(1994:13) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that: 
 
- investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when 
- the boundaries between a phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident. 
 
In other words, case studies specifically include the context of the 
phenomenon that is being studied, which makes this strategy particularly 
suitable for this research in which the context of the studies plays a key 
role. Case studies rely on multiple sources of data, including interviews and 
document analysis, and benefit from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 1994: 13). 
Therefore, it is a comprehensive research strategy that allows for an 
integrated analysis and explanation of the complex factors in the context of 
the valuation process. 
 
The case-study analysis in each of the following chapters will be applied to 
pursue a combination of the following two goals: 
 
1) Explore the economic valuation process and the context in which it is 
carried out 
2) Explain possible relationships between the valuation process and its 
context 
 
Both goals contain activities that are guided by the theory developed in the 
previous two chapters. In this theory, the economic valuation process 
consists of stakeholders that make specific choices, so the activity in the 
first goal, therefore, is to explore how this process is carried out in practice. 
Additionally, theory explained the importance of the context in which the 
valuation process is carried out. Hence, the second and third activities in 
the case-study analysis are therefore to explore this context and to explain 
its relations with the choices in the valuation process.  
 
A selection is made of multiple case studies of valuation processes in the 
Netherlands. The first criterion for selection of a case is that it involves an 
economic instrument in which the effects of the project on nature are 
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included through economic valuation. Secondly, they must be carried out in 
the Netherlands and involve water management issues. The reason for the 
choice of the Netherlands is that the effects of differences in contexts 
between countries on the valuation process are not studied. This would 
make the study too complex for the time period available for this study. 
The context is further specified to water management in the Netherlands. 
The reason for the choice of one specific policy field is that it isolates 
factors that are of importance to this study; for example, studies in an 
entirely different policy field such as healthcare would imply that the 
choices made in the valuation studies differ not only because of their 
context of actors, project and informal and formal institutions, but also 
because the subject under study calls for different choices in the valuation 
process. The choice for water management has been made because this 
sector has been subject to major developments in the Netherlands and the 
interest in economic valuation studies in this sector is growing, allowing for 
a sufficient availability of case studies. As a result, the following three case 
studies of valuation processes in the Netherlands were selected:  
 
a) Cost-benefit analysis for the extraction of gas in the Wadden Sea 
b) Cost-benefit analysis land reclamation for the expansion of the Rotterdam 
port 
c) Cost-benefit analysis 750 hectares nature and recreation area as a result of 
the expansion of the Rotterdam port 
 
The first case study will be presented in Chapter 5, while the second and 
third case studies will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
The sources of evidence to obtain answers to the research questions are a 
combination of interviews and document analysis. The document analysis 
focuses on an analysis of administrative documents, newspaper articles, 
internet sites and formal studies concerning the case studies. This will 
attempt to obtain information on all elements in the context of the 
valuation processes, but focuses particularly on the formal and informal 
institutional context. Additionally, the interviews focus more specifically on 
the stakeholders, their choices in the valuation process and their 
relationships, and are directed at key persons involved in the economic 
valuation process. These people are direct stakeholders or representatives 
of direct stakeholders of the economic valuation processes: principal (s), 
contracting party/parties, steering committee, interviewed and consulted 
persons and peer review group. In some cases, it is also necessary to 
interview indirect stakeholders like companies or government officials.  
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The interviews are structured as semi-standardized interviews. In semi-
standardized interviews, open-ended questions on facts of matter and 
opinions or insights are combined with theory-driven questions based on 
theoretical propositions (Flick, 1998: 84). Such interviews are suitable in 
situations where the interviewee has a complex stock of knowledge at his 
disposal about the topic, including both assumptions that can be answered 
spontaneously in open-ended questions as well as implicit assumptions, 
which may be articulated through the more theory-driven questions (Flick, 
1998: 82). It is therefore a very suitable interview technique for the 
questions posed in this research: the exploratory questions will be 
researched through open-ended questions while the explanatory questions 
will be researched through the theory-driven questions.  
 
The process of interviewing in the case study analysis consists of the 
following elements. The starting point for the interviews is the cost-benefit 
analysis. Each study is analyzed and key persons who carried out the study 
as well as those who gave the assignment for the study will be interviewed. 
At the end of each interview, the person will be asked whether he or she 
could recommend other people to talk to that may be able to present 
additional information. This process will continue until no new 
implications for theory can be made. After the interview, an interview 
report will be written and sent to the interviewed persons for a check - 
comments and corrections are processed. 
 
Once the cases have been analyzed in Chapter five and six, the three cases 
will be compared and contrasted. For this cross-case analysis, Yin (1994: 
46) explains the importance of the careful selection of case studies so that 
they either (a) predict similar results (literal replication) or (b) produce 
contrasting results but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication). In 
this respect, the first two case studies on the extraction of gas and 
expansion of the Rotterdam port were selected for theoretical replication. 
Both cost-benefit analyses were carried out in different contexts – a 
completely different project with different actors and in a different time 
period. It is therefore expected that the contextual influences on choices 
made in the economic valuation processes differ between the two case 
studies. The third case study on the creation of 750 hectares nature and 
recreation area was chosen for comparison with case study two on the 
expansion of the Rotterdam port, and hence selected for literal replication.  
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These two cases seem to have similar contexts: the analyses were carried 
out within a similar larger project (expansion of the Rotterdam port) and 
within the same time period, by the same contracting parties and for a 
similar principal27. Hence, it is expected that similar influences on valuation 
choices can be found. The major similarities and differences between the 
cases and their consequences for the economic valuation process will be 
discussed in Chapter seven.  
 
 
                                                 
27 The two cost-benefit analyses are part of two sub-projects that both fall under the same 
larger project – Rotterdam Mainport Development (PMR). The two analyses were 
separated in the PMR project because within this project a double-objective existed: one 
aimed at extending the Rotterdam port and another aimed at improving the quality of the 
social environment in the Rotterdam area. Hence, each cost-benefit analysis deals with one 
of these objectives, under the PMR. Furthermore, the principals are similar in the sense 
that in both cases the principal was PMR, but in the second cost-benefit analysis on the 750 
hectares of nature and recreation area, this leadership was delegated to the Province of 
South-Holland. The contracting parties are similar because in the first case study, three 
parties carried out the analyses together, while in the second case study, two out of these 
three parties carried out the analysis. 
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Chapter 5 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
of Gas Extraction in 
the Wadden Sea 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will build on the perspective that was developed in the 
previous chapters. In this perspective, the context in which the economic 
valuation process is carried out influences the choices made within this 
process. This perspective was the basis for the analytical model in section 
4.4. In this model, key influences on the choices were the formal and 
informal institutional context, the characteristics of the economic 
instrument and the stakeholders' context. Understanding this context in 
which the valuation process is carried out is important in understanding the 
choices that are made in the process of economic valuation that may lead 
to inconsistent outcomes.  
 
In the underlying chapter, the analytical model will be applied to one case 
study: a cost-benefit analysis of gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. The aim 
of this case study analysis is to map both the choices within the valuation 
process and the context of institutions, economic instrument and 
stakeholders in which the process is carried out. An introduction to this 
context was already given in the previous chapter, where the formal and 
informal institutions of water management in the Netherlands were 
discussed at a more general level. This case study will focus on the context 
at project level. 
 
5.2 Formal and Informal Institutional Context 
 
5.2.1 Emergence of Formal and Informal Institutions 
 
In September 1999, AIDEnvironment published their report called “The 
Shadow-Side of Wadden Sea Gas” (De Schaduwkant van Waddengas), 
which it had carried out on assignment of Greenpeace Netherlands 
(Wetten at. al., 1999).  In this report, a social cost-benefit analysis was 
carried out on gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. These gas extraction are 
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carried out by the Netherlands Petroleum Company (NAM), a company 
consisting of two shareholders Shell and Esso who carry out explorations 
and extraction for oil and gas in the Netherlands. The study was published 
within a complex political and economic context, in which formal 
institutions (rules and regulations) and informal institutions (policy and 
scientific paradigms) can be distinguished. In order to understand this 
context, it is necessary to go back in time and explain the emergence of 
institutions concerning gas extraction in the Wadden Sea in the 
Netherlands. This discussion will be held according to the time line 
presented in Table 1.  
 
The Wadden Sea is situated in the North Sea between Den Helder (the 
Netherlands) and Esbjerg (Denmark). The area is a wetland that falls 
periodically dry at low tide and then gets flooded again, and is the world’s 
largest coherent habitat of its kind. It is home to a diversity of animals, 
including mussels and cockles, birds of passage like the barnacle goose and 
the knot, many kinds of fish like the plaice and the sole, and the common 
seal, the shore crab and the oyster catcher. The Wadden Sea also houses an 
estimated 70 to 170 billion cubic meters of gas (NAM, 2001) and over the 
past forty years approximately sixty drills have been carried out in the area. 
As a result, the Wadden Sea has been subject to numerous debates over the 
past fifty to sixty years dominated by conflicting interests. Already in the 
1960s, for example, plans were investigated for the possibilities of 
reclaiming the Wadden Sea and to connect one of the Wadden Sea islands, 
Ameland, with the mainland through the construction of two dams. Also at 
this time, however, a diversity of  activities were taking place in the Wadden 
Sea, including tourism and recreation, military activities and extraction of 
natural resources, and as a result diverging opinions often confronted each 
other in these discussions (Zwiep, 1988).  
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Table 1 Time Line Gas Extraction Wadden Sea 
1947 1965 1969 1974 
➜ Foundation of 
NAM 
➜ Dam plan of 
Ameland 
➜ Everlasting 
concession Wadden sea 
gas NAM 
➜ Mazure report 
1976 1980 1984 1994 
➜ Waddenzee bill: 
decision to follow a 
PKB 
➜ PKB is laid down ➜ Agreement NAM and 
2nd chamber on 10-year 
moratorium on gas 
extraction 
➜ Expiry moratorium NAM 
gas extraction 
➜ Revision PKB Upper and 
Lower House 
➜ 12 nature organizations 
submit petition with EU for 
more research on gas 
extraction 
➜ Obligation EIA (MER) 
before test drills 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
➜ Wadden 
association calls 
against PKB revision
➜ Wadden 
association calls for 
suspension PKB 
revision 
➜ Creation Wadden 
Advisory Board 
➜ Elections and new 
cabinet 
➜ Answer from State 
Council to Wadden 
association on call for 
suspension PKB: no 
➜ Report Ministry of 
Economic Affairs to 
court in Leeuwarden 
with argumentation 
favoring test drills 
➜ Counter-arguments Prof. 
Heertje and Wadden 
association to court in 
Leeuwarden against test 
drills 
➜ Agreement 2nd chamber 
with expansion PKB 
➜ Study NAM on the 
effects of test drills on the 
bottom of the Wadden Sea 
1999 2000 2002 
➜ Agreement cabinet 
& mining corp. ends  
➜ Conflict Jorritsma 
and Pronk 
➜ Minister Jorritsma 
grants allowance for 
test drills at 
Laauwersoog under 
protest from other 
political parties 
➜ AIDEnivronment 
report presented at 
press conference of 
nature 
organizations 
➜ Cabinet requests 
NAM to postpone test 
drills to decide on 
decision of minister 
Jorritsma 
➜ Compromise 
Prime minister Kok 
fails 
➜ Hiring 7 experts: 
no uniform 
agreement on 
environmental effects 
test drills 
➜ Motion Witteveen 
to stop test drills 
➜ Decision 
cabinet:no test drills, 
first more research 
➜ Study NAM: effects of 
test drills on the bottom 
of the Wadden Sea at 
Ameland  
➜ Ending of the Wadden 
Advisory Board; creation 
Board for Wadden Advise 
➜ Motion Witteveen ban on 
all activities in the Wadden 
Sea 
➜ Unanimous position 
Lower House: no test drills 
despite other research 
➜ NAM calls against Lower 
House decision, State 
Council rejects call 
➜ New cabinet: no 
agreement on Wadden Sea
 
 
In 1969, NAM, Mobil and Elf Petroland received an ‘everlasting 
concession’ to drill for gas in the Wadden Sea - the importance of gas for 
the Dutch economy was being recognized. Five years later however, in 
1974, the Mazure report was published in which a negative advice was 
given on all reclamation plans. Many arguments were based on the 
ecological value of the Wadden Sea and a call for protection of these 
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values. The government backed the report and with it recognized the 
Wadden Sea as a valuable ecosystem (Zwiep, 1988). In 1976, the Wadden 
Sea bill was accepted, which stated that the decision making procedures 
concerning the Wadden Sea would follow a Core Planning Decision 
Procedure (PKB). The result of a PKB procedure is a government decision 
that cannot be reversed – the concrete policy decisions are no longer liable 
for discussion at decision making processes of the national government or 
other governments. This PKB was eventually laid down in 1980. 
 
Since 1969, when NAM received an everlasting concession, the 
environment had come to play an increasingly important role in the 
Netherlands. The effects of human interventions in water systems 
throughout Dutch history began to be noticed in the form of water 
pollution, degradation of nature and landscape, desiccation, and pressures 
on use functions. As a result of these changing policy paradigms, 
discussions on the effects of gas drills on the environment grew and in 
1983 the government and NAM agreed on a moratorium on additional gas 
projects in the Wadden Sea until 1994.  
 
Ever since this moratorium expired, heated discussions on gas extraction in 
the Wadden Sea emerged. Towards the end of the moratorium, the Dutch 
government had to decide about the new status of gas explorations and 
extraction in the Wadden Sea in a revised PKB. NAM demanded its 
activities be resumed based on the terms of the contract on an everlasting 
concession. However, new environmental laws had since then been 
developed which were in contradiction to the extraction of gas in the area. 
For example, large parts of the Wadden Sea were by that time covered by 
both the EU Birds Directive and EU Habitat Directive, which call for an 
obligation to prevent any pollution or disturbance to birds in the area and 
prohibit any activities that may affect the protected area. Whether and to 
what extent gas extraction actually affect the environment of the Wadden 
Sea remained a point of dispute and a large number of Dutch nature and 
environmental organizations submitted a petition with the European Union 
for more research on gas extraction. The Lower House, however, decided 
with a small majority to allow gas extraction.  
 
By 1994, it had become compulsory in the Netherlands to perform an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (MER) for test-drills, and NAM and 
the government agreed that NAM would carry out a study on the possible 
environmental effects of gas extraction coming from a decrease in the 
bottom of the Wadden Sea (Marquenie and Gussinklo, 1998). This process 
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is a relative decrease of land to sea level, which partly takes place naturally, 
but can be enhanced by human interventions such as gas extraction. The 
question is what the effects of such a decrease will have on nature in the 
Wadden Sea. The study was carried out by several specialists of Dutch 
research institutes. In the meantime, NAM invested 700 million guilders to 
carry out several test drills in the Wadden Sea, which resulted in the 
discovery of 40 billion cubic meters of gas (NAM, 2001). 
 
In 1995, the Wadden Association together with eight nature and 
environmental organizations called against the PKB revision that allowed 
NAM to extract gas in the Wadden Sea. The Wadden Association 
(Waddenvereniging) is an organization that defends the Wadden Sea as a 
nature and recreation area. One of the aspects of the protest was their 
opinion that an Environmental Impact Assessment should be carried out 
for all gas extraction that take place in the Wadden Sea, as opposed to 
assessments for each separate location. The Wadden Association had not 
received an answer to their protest by 1996 and it pursued its goals further 
by calling for a suspension of the PKB revision with the State Council. The 
answer from the State Council finally came towards the end of 1996 – the 
Council supported the text of the original PKB revision. At the same time, 
discussions in the government were becoming quite intense and a Wadden 
Advisory Board was created at the end of 1996. The Board advised the 
government and the Upper and Lower Houses about issues of general 
importance for the Wadden Sea. 
  
Elections in May 1997 resulted in a new cabinet and the question on gas 
exploration and extraction in the Wadden Sea was once more put on the 
agenda for discussion within the government. After receiving the negative 
answer from the State Council, the Wadden Association decided instead to 
focus their protests on the provincial and municipal levels and it requested 
the court of Leeuwarden in the Province of Friesland (one of the provinces 
bordering the Wadden Sea) to end the concessions for test drills. The 
Court agreed on the basis of a lack of insight into the environmental effects 
and questions concerning the necessity for test drills for Dutch society. The 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, in favor of the test drills due to its positive 
effects on the economy as a source of income derived from the export of 
gas, wrote its reaction together with three other ministries to the Court’s 
sentence in a report ( MinEZ, LNV, VROM and VWS, 1997) accompanied 
by an independent auditor letter (Meijer and Witsen, 1997). The letter’s 
conclusions were that the report provided sufficient arguments for the 
necessity of test drills for society. This Court struggle continued into 1998, 
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when the Wadden Association asked Professor Heertje, a well-known 
Dutch economist, to respond to the report of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the accompanying auditor’s letter. He concluded among others 
that the potential harm to nature and the environment of the Wadden Sea 
must be included as negative effects of test drills on the entire economy. 
This could lead to different outcomes on the Dutch economy and hence a 
different decision. Some of these arguments were subsequently used by the 
Wadden Association in a letter to the Leeuwarden Court, in which it stated 
that the societal need for test drills were based entirely on the commercial 
interests of NAM and economic interests for the state. 
 
The revised PKB on the Wadden Sea would end in December 1998 and in 
November of the same year the Lower House agreed to extend the revised 
PKB. This was necessary since the agreement between the government and 
the mining corporations ended in January 1999 and the government still 
needed more time to decide on the follow-up of this agreement. In the 
meantime, the study of NAM on the environmental effects of gas 
extraction due to a decrease in the bottom of the Wadden Sea was 
published, which concluded that no measurable effects of gas extraction on 
nature in the Wadden Sea were to be expected (NAM, 1998).  
 
Major discussions erupted in the government at the start of 1999, 
dominated by a conflict between the Minister of Environment and the 
Minister of Economic Affairs28. While the former wanted to end the 
everlasting concession completely, the latter supported the concessions. 
Despite these disagreements, the Minister of Economic Affairs suddenly 
gave NAM permission to drill for gas near the island of Laauwersoog in 
April. This was met with enormous protests from most of the political 
parties. In June, the coalition of nature organizations held a press 
conference, during which they presented “innovative research”. This 
research was the report of AIDEnvironment (Wetten, et al., 1999), a Dutch 
consultancy firm, in which they conducted a social cost-benefit analysis on 
gas extraction in the Wadden Sea on assignment of Greenpeace 
Netherlands. The main result of the study was that the extraction of gas 
would lead to a net loss of ten to forty-two billion guilders for Dutch 
society. When the study was finished, Greenpeace widely distributed the 
report among all the major actors in the Lower House, right before the 
final discussions in the government.  
 
                                                 
28 At this time, the Environment Minister was Mr. Pronk and the Economic Affairs 
Minister was Ms. Jorritsma-Lebbink. 
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5.2.2  Institutional Context of the Economic Valuation Process 
 
In Section 3.4, it was explained how the set of formal and informal 
institutions in the context of the economic valuation process influence the 
choices of stakeholders in the economic valuation process. In this context, 
the following institutions were distinguished: scientific paradigms, policy 
paradigms and rules and regulations. This section will explain these 
institutions in the context of the economic valuation process for the gas 
extraction in the Wadden Sea. 
 
Policy paradigms of the political actors involved in the Wadden Sea 
discussions at this time were still generally dominated by rational and 
economic arguments. The Ministry of Economic Affairs especially kept 
firing with arguments favoring gas extraction based on the fact that the 
extraction would be beneficial for the Dutch economy through gas exports. 
Policies concerning gas extraction in the Wadden Sea were therefore 
dominated by ecological modernization. This paradigm was at the basis of 
the Greenpeace decision to perform a social cost-benefit analysis on gas 
extraction - Greenpeace was convinced the study would be successful in its 
campaign by coming up with rational economic counter-arguments. 
Towards the end, the debate on gas extraction shifted from rational to 
emotional discussions for the conservation of the Wadden Sea, one of the 
main reasons that the Greenpeace study eventually played a very limited 
role in the discussions and final decision to end gas extraction.   
 
Other policy paradigms also played an important role in the context of the 
economic valuation process. First, the environmental problems concerning 
the Wadden Sea were very much institutionalized at a broad level in Dutch 
society. The general public as well as government departments were aware 
of the ecological importance and vulnerability of the Wadden Sea. 
Secondly, government policy towards the management of the Wadden Sea 
was dominated by an integrated water management approach. The different 
functions and stakeholders of the Wadden Sea were being recognized, and 
the policy making process was very much oriented towards the ecological 
value and functioning of the Wadden Sea as opposed to a focus entirely on 
anthropocentric benefits. Third, the Wadden Sea was recognized as a 
scarce resource – it was being perceived as the Netherlands’ “last 
wilderness area”. 
 
The scientific paradigms regarding economics at the time of the Greenpeace 
report that were dominant in the context of the project were an interesting 
combination of both neoclassical and ecological economics paradigms. 
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Most of the key stakeholders that were directly involved in the economic 
valuation study, such as Greenpeace, AIDEnvironment and the Wadden 
Association (see section 5.4) believed in quantification of ecological 
functions in monetary terms, at the base of which is the neoclassical 
economics paradigm. However, their view of natural resource allocation 
was that markets should play a limited role while governments should be 
the institutions to make such allocation decisions. In other words, 
quantification of natural functions should only be done to raise public 
awareness, not for the allocation of natural resources. The neoclassical 
economics paradigm was supported only insofar as it supported their 
subjective opinions and interests. Beyond this, the stakeholders approached 
the ecological economics paradigm. Their scientific paradigm towards the 
environment was dominated by a hands-off approach, where human 
interventions in natural ecosystems like the Wadden Sea should be 
completely banned. 
 
Other stakeholders in the economic valuation process, like the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and NAM, supported a more neoclassical economic 
paradigm on gas extraction. In this perspective, the economy as opposed to 
ecosystems plays a key role. Their scientific paradigm towards the 
environment was dominated by economic motivations, where human 
interference in natural ecosystems like the Wadden Sea is accepted as long 
as economic benefits exceed the costs. 
 
Another important characteristic in scientific paradigms was the publication 
of several scientific studies. Although economic valuation was still not very 
popular in the policy field in the Netherlands, it was during this period that 
several scientific studies were published in international journals in which 
economic valuation of ecosystems were carried out. Probably the most 
famous study in this time was published by Costanza et al. (1997) in the 
well-read journal Nature. Costanza et al. attempted to place an economic 
value on the world’s ecosystems, and provided arguments based on 
conservation issues that support the use of economic valuation. The study 
triggered many discussions and received a lot of publicity, also in the 
Netherlands. Those that gave the assignment within Greenpeace stated 
their inspiration for the cost-benefit analysis came from reading such 
economic valuation studies that could possibly provide them with the right 
ammunition.  
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In the formal institutional context of the economic valuation process, no 
significant rules existed regarding economic instruments - the OEEI report, 
a guideline for social cost-benefit analysis, was not yet published. 
Furthermore, rules regarding the economic valuation process were also 
absent.  The absence of rules and regulations concerning the economic 
valuation process in the Netherlands played a major role in the choices of 
the economic valuation process itself. No guidelines and agreements 
existed for the contracting party who carried out the economic valuation 
study for Greenpeace. The only agreement that existed in the Netherlands 
concerned the discount rate, which was set at 4% for government projects. 
The fact that almost no economic valuation studies had been carried out in 
the Netherlands since the 1970s also gave little guidance to those wanting 
to carry out these type of studies. Rules and regulations concerning the 
environment, however, did exist. More specifically, the European Birds and 
Habitat Directives, which applied to the Wadden Sea, gave direction to the 
management of the Wadden Sea and may have influenced choices in the 
economic valuation process that concentrated on the Wadden Sea. 
 
5.2.3  Institutional Context Following the Economic Valuation Process 
 
The Greenpeace report was officially published in September 1999, after 
which it was subject to much debate. Unexpectedly for the contracting 
party, most of the critique came from biologists and ecologists, and not 
from economists. The economists seemed to understand the difficulties of 
such a study, while ecologists and biologists thought the study contained 
inconsistencies and often disagreed with the fundamental aspects of the 
study, namely putting a monetary value on nature. 
 
In the summer of 1999, NAM was asked to agree with a postponement of 
the decision by Ms. Jorritsma, which allowed NAM to extract gas near the 
island of Laauwersoog. The cabinet required three more months to make 
this decision. In November, discussions on gas extraction in the Wadden 
Sea within the government became intense. Interestingly, these discussions 
were dominated by emotional arguments. While former discussions were 
dominated by effects of gas extraction on a decrease in the bottom of the 
Wadden Sea, arguments were now based on  the Wadden Sea as the 
Netherlands’ last ‘wilderness area’ and therefore should be left untouched. 
The prime minister Premier Kok attempted a compromise that allowed gas 
extraction under very strict conditions from three places from the 
shoreline, an act that was labeled as being “…typical for the way the 
government deals with the opposition of economics and environment.” 
(NRC, 6 November 1999). His attempt at compromise failed. 
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At this time, the discussions in the government were fed by Ms. Tineke 
Witteveen of the Labor Party (PvdA), a long-time fervent opponent of gas 
extraction, who initiated a motion in November that called for the cabinet 
not to support new mining activities in the Wadden Sea (NRC, 11 
November 1999). All parties in the Lower House, except for the Liberal 
Party (VVD), supported the motion and thus voted against gas extraction. 
The Cabinet however still needed to decide on the matter. To make an 
informed decision, the cabinet assigned seven experts to study the effects 
of gas extraction on the decrease in the bottom of the Wadden Sea, and 
had extensive discussions with NAM. This research needed to be 
conducted in a very limited time period as the concessions for gas 
extraction were postponed until 8 December. On 7 December 1999, the 
cabinet decided not to provide NAM with a license for new test-drills for 
gas in the Wadden Sea. Essentially, the seven experts could not provide the 
cabinet with a clear answer on the effects of gas extraction on the 
environment, and the cabinet viewed the insecurities concerning these 
effects as too big. The cabinet proposed more research needed to be 
carried out that guaranteed gas extraction could be carried out without 
damaging effects on the environment (NRC, 7 December 1999).  
 
In the year 2000, a study was published on assignment of NAM on the 
effects of gas extraction on decreases in the bottom of the Wadden Sea 
(WL/Delft Hydraulics, Alterra, 2000). The effects were monitored over a 
period of thirteen years. The report stated that the maximum decrease over 
ten years of gas extraction would be approximately twenty-eight centimeter. 
The effects on nature would be limited and the value of nature would be 
protected. 
 
In 2002, the Council for Wadden Advice replaced the Wadden Advisory 
Board after their task ended and the functions of the Council were similar 
to those of the Board. In March, the discussions in the government once 
more erupted on the decision of the wording of the new PKB on the 
Wadden Sea. In the old decision, the possibilities for gas extraction were 
still open and four parties presented a motion, again initiated by Ms. Tineke 
Witteveen, to replace this text with a ban on all activities in the entire 
Wadden Sea area that may have a negative influence on the area (Financiele 
Dagblad, 28 Maart 2002). These activities included gas extraction, 
windmills, patrol airplanes and harbor expansions. The majority of the 
Lower House accepted the motion, which meant a blocking of the 1999 
cabinet decision to await the results of further research on the effects of gas 
extraction on nature. While former policy paradigms on the Wadden Sea 
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were led by a care for the environment on the one hand and support for 
economic growth on the other hand, in this period policy paradigms were 
led by insecurity but above all emotional aspects. Later that year, elections 
resulted in a new cabinet. As of today, the parties have not agreed on their 
position towards the Wadden Sea. 
 
5.3 Characteristics of the Cost-benefit analysis 
 
Section 3.4.5 explained how the characteristics of the economic instrument 
of which the economic valuation process is part are important influences 
on the choices in the economic valuation process. Important characteristics 
that were identified are: the use type of the economic instrument, its goal, 
and its time and budget constraints. This section will explain these 
characteristics for the cost-benefit analysis of gas extraction in the Wadden 
Sea, of which the economic valuation process was part. 
 
As part of their campaign, Greenpeace assigned AIDEnvironment to carry 
out a social cost-benefit analysis on the extraction of gas in the Wadden 
Sea. This cost-benefit analysis was to specifically include the expected 
damage of gas extraction on the natural functions of the Wadden Sea. The 
use type of the economic valuation process, therefore, was project 
evaluation. The project was the gas extraction by NAM in the Wadden Sea, 
which would be evaluated using a social cost-benefit analysis in which 
ecosystem functions played a key role. 
 
The goal of the study as stated in the report was to show that certain 
assumptions made in the NAM studies on the effects of gas extraction 
resulting in a decrease of the bottom of the Wadden Sea were disputable, 
and to make the exchange of different activities in the Wadden Sea 
quantitative. Any intervention in the Wadden Sea should rest on a social 
cost-benefit analysis that incorporates the effects of these interventions on 
the ecosystem. Quantification of these effects would allow for an integrated 
analysis that may result in a different outcome than NAM had stated in the 
results of their analyses (Wetten, et al., 1999: 2). Ultimately, however, the 
goal of the cost-benefit analysis was to influence political decision making. 
The study was published in a time when the debates on gas extraction 
within the governments were at its peak, and the study was assigned to be 
used as ammunition by Greenpeace in their political lobbying activities29.  
                                                 
29 The report was followed-up by a second separate report in which the support and 
opinions of Dutch economists for a social cost-benefit analysis was researched (Joordens et 
al., 2000).  
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Initially, the assignment was to carry out a long-term in-depth research on 
the Wadden Sea in which AIDEnvironment would act as a project leader. 
AIDEnvironment would co-operate with the Center for Energy-Saving and 
Clean Technology, CE (Centrum voor Energiebesparing en Schone 
Technologie), where CE would provide the economic expertise. The 
research was to be exhaustive (one to two years), the budget was extensive, 
and many different institutes were to be involved. However, a few weeks 
after the start of the research, the discussion on gas extraction in the 
Wadden Sea entered political debate and Greenpeace asked 
AIDEnvironment whether they would speed up the research and perform 
the research by themselves - CE was asked to peer review the draft report. 
AIDEnvironment accepted as they shared the sympathies of Greenpeace 
with the Wadden Sea, and the result was an economic valuation study 
performed in a relatively short time period (within half a year), based on 
quick estimates. The first draft, a first summary of the main report, was 
made under great time-pressure: a conflict was developing in the beginning of 
1999 in the Dutch cabinet when Minister Pronk stated he wanted to end 
the everlasting concession for gas extraction, and Greenpeace wanted the 
study results to play a role in the discussions that followed. The summary 
report was published in June 1999, and its conclusions were that the 
damage caused by gas extraction exceeded the benefits of gas extraction as 
calculated by NAM. The final report was published in September 1999. 
 
5.4 The Stakeholders Context 
 
5.4.1  Direct and Indirect Stakeholders 
 
In the discussion of the stakeholders' context of the economic valuation 
process in section 3.3.1, two groups were classified: (i) stakeholders directly 
involved in the economic valuation process; and (ii) stakeholders not 
directly involved in the economic valuation process. For the economic 
valuation process of the Wadden Sea, the following key direct stakeholders are 
distinguished: 
 
1. Principal: Greenpeace Netherlands 
2. Contracting party: AIDEnvironment 
3. Steering/Advisory Committee: van den Bergh (Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam), de Groot (Wageningen Universiteit) en van Gelder (Contrast 
Advies) 
4. Interviewed and Consulted Persons: miscellaneous 
5. Peer Review Group: Pen, Heertje, Brans (University of Amsterdam, 
Faculty of Law), and Davidson (Centrum voor Energiebesparing en 
Schonere Energie). 
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The principal of the cost-benefit analysis of which the economic valuation 
process is part is Greenpeace Netherlands. Since 1993, when the 
moratorium on gas extraction in the Wadden Sea was coming to an end, 
Greenpeace had been campaigning against gas extraction in the Wadden 
Sea as part of a coalition of 12 Dutch environmental organizations. Each 
organization approached the Wadden Sea dispute from its own strategic 
viewpoints. Greenpeace objects to any gas drills in the Wadden Sea and 
pursues a “…moratorium on the drilling and extraction of gas, also from 
land and the North Sea.” (Greenpeace, 1998). According to Greenpeace, 
gas extraction result in unacceptable risks in terms of accidents (such as 
blow-outs and accidents with ships running into drilling platforms) and a 
decrease in the bottom of the Wadden Sea that, in combination with a 
rising sea level, affects particularly the migratory birds that rest in the 
Wadden Sea twice a year. As the area is such a unique ecosystem, any 
human interventions that may affect the existence of this ecosystem should 
be prohibited. 
 
Greenpeace Netherlands was established in March 1978, initially as a 
support committee for Greenpeace International30. It is now one of the 
largest environmental organizations in the Netherlands. Greenpeace 
describes itself as an “ …international, independent environmental 
organization that challenges global environmental problems and extorts 
solutions that are essential for a healthy, ‘green’ future.” (Greenpeace, 
2002). The focus of Greenpeace used to be predominantly on oceans, seas 
and rivers, but has tackled other problems in the past years, including 
climate change and genetic manipulation. From Greenpeace, two people 
initiated the study of the Wadden Sea, and neither of the two had a 
background in economics. Both persons supported a belief that economic 
valuation could result in useful, additional arguments in their campaign 
against gas extraction in the Wadden Sea - as a strategic application.  
 
Greenpeace selected AIDEnvironment as their contracting party to carry out 
the cost-benefit analysis. AIDEnvironment was selected because they were 
perceived by Greenpeace to have similar viewpoints, and the line they 
intended to follow in their research seemed attractive to Greenpeace. 
AIDEnvironment is an “independent, non-profit research and consultancy 
company” that works on the “ …conservation and reparation of diversity 
                                                 
30 Greenpeace International was established in 1971 when the United States wanted to 
perform nuclear tests on the Island of Amchitka, Alaska. A group of Canadians decided to 
go to the island to direct the attention of the world on the activities of the United States on 
this island (Greenpeace website, March 2002). 
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and resilience of the natural environment.” (AIDEnvironment, March 
2002). Although it is a commercial organization, it pursues ideological 
goals. Its clients are Dutch ministries and provinces, non-governmental 
organizations, businesses, the European Commission, the United Nations 
and the World Bank. The assignment on the Wadden Sea was their first 
assignment for Greenpeace in the area of water management. Their key 
disciplines are ecology, biology, nature management and spatial 
arrangements.  
 
From AIDEnvironment, four people worked on the study of the Wadden 
Sea, of which one had an economics background, while the others had an 
ecological background. The expertise of AIDEnvironment therefore lay in 
the field of ecology and less in economics. In the initial plan, CE would 
provide the economic expertise, while AIDEnvironment would provide 
ecological advice. As was explained in the previous section, time 
constraints changed the situation and AIDEnvironment was asked to 
perform the study on their own, requiring them to obtain economic 
expertise elsewhere. For these reasons, AIDEnvironment consulted 
Professor van den Bergh of the Free University of Amsterdam for the 
theoretical background on economics, Dr. de Groot of Wageningen 
University for theoretical background on ecology, and Mr. van Gelder of 
Contrast Advies as a gas-expert. The three people together formed what 
was similar to a steering committee. The steering committee gave guidance on 
theory and basic understanding of economic principles, rather than guiding 
the calculations and assumptions. 
 
After Greenpeace had asked AIDEnvironment to speed up the research, 
time placed major constraints on the research activities. While the initial 
objective was to perform an extensive research on the economic values of 
the Wadden Sea, AIDEnvironment was suddenly faced with a situation in 
which numbers needed to be on the table within a very short time. There 
was no time to interview people and collect extensive data. Instead, the 
interviewed and consulted people consisted of anybody they could obtain relevant 
data from that would allow them to make their calculations. Most of these 
conversations were held by telephone.  
 
When the first summary report was published, it was proofread by a peer 
review group consisting of four experts: Professor Dr. Pen, Professor Dr. 
Heertje, Dr. E. Brans (University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Law), and Dr. 
Davidson (Centrum voor Energiebesparing en Schonere Energie). The 
reactions to the report were to be done in writing, and other than this no 
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contact was established between the experts and AIDEnvironment. 
According to Dr. Davidson, his comments were quite fundamental to the 
research and, seen the time limit and importance of the research in the 
Greenpeace campaign, therefore little of his comments were processed.  
 
In the second group of stakeholders, indirect stakeholders involved in the 
economic valuation process, the following key actors can be distinguished: 
 
1. Netherlands Petroleum Company (NAM) 
2. Tineke Witteveen 
3. Minister of Economic Affairs 
4. Minister of Environment 
5. Wadden Association 
 
One of the key indirect stakeholders in the economic valuation process was 
the Netherlands Petroleum Company (NAM). This is the company that 
wanted to extract gas in the Wadden Sea in the first place and against 
whom Greenpeace aimed their campaign in which the economic valuation 
was to play an important role. Its stake lay in the fact that it desired an 
outcome of the cost-benefit analysis of gas extraction in which economic 
benefits would exceed the costs (including environmental costs). NAM 
therefore disagreed with the negative outcome of the study, even more 
since their extensive and expensive studies by experts showed very limited 
environmental effects of gas extraction. These studies were immediately 
blown away by what NAM perceived to be a very quick-and dirty cost-
benefit analysis.  
 
NAM consists of two shareholders Shell and Esso that each own fifty 
percent of the stock. Its activities concentrate on the exploration and 
extraction of petroleum and gas in the Netherlands and in the Dutch part 
of the Continental Plate. It was formed in 1947 after a Shell company 
discovered the oil field Schoonebeek in 1943 and Esso and Shell decided to 
unite forces. It is now the largest producer of gas in the Netherlands. 
 
NAM’s interest in gas extraction in the Wadden Sea are commercial. After 
the extraction of gas, it sells this gas to the Netherlands Gas Union 
(Gasunie). It has been calculated that the Wadden Sea houses at least forty 
billion m³ of gas and NAM has already mobilized its equipment to extract 
this gas – it only needs to start the production from certain places on the 
mainland. According to NAM, gas extraction form no threat to the 
environment. Furthermore, the Netherlands needs gas and it may be even 
more environmentally friendly to extract it in the Netherlands under very 
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strict supervision and environmental laws then to import it from a country 
like Russia where such supervision and laws are often lacking.  Another 
argument concerns the “small-field policy” (kleine velden beleid) of the 
government in which the large gas field in Groningen is to be spared as 
much as possible. A ban on extraction in the Wadden Sea may require a 
breaking of this policy as gas continues to be in demand.  
 
A second important stakeholder in the economic valuation process was Ms. 
Tineke Witteveen. Tineke Witteveen was a member of the Labor Party 
(PvdA) in the Lower House, where she focussed on economic affairs, 
finances, water and nature management. In 2000 she became the official 
spokesperson in the debate about gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. She is 
known to oppose gas extraction in the Wadden Sea and has presented 
motions in the Lower House to stop gas extraction. She had close contact 
with Greenpeace and was aware of the cost-benefit analysis on gas 
extraction that AIDEnvironment was carrying out. Her stake in the 
economic valuation process was a positive outcome such that it would be 
applicable in her arguments in the government and as such use the study in 
the Lower House debates. 
 
From the government arena, two further stakeholders can be distinguished: 
the Minister of Economic Affairs (MinEZ) and the Minister of Environment 
(VROM). The mission of the MinEZ is the promote sustainable economic 
growth (MinEZ, 2002), and its minister (Ms. Jorritsma) has been a fervent 
supporter of gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. From a (narrow) economic 
perspective, gas extraction are profitable for the Dutch economy and, in 
the case of gas exports, for the state income. The mission of the Ministry 
of VROM, on the other hand, is care for a sustainable quality of living 
space (VROM, 2002). Its minister (Mr. Pronk)  has been opposing gas 
extraction in the Wadden Sea, and although officially opposed to the latest 
government decision to completely ban gas extraction, he claimed not to be 
unhappy with the decision either (Volkskrant, 2002).  Mr. Pronk was aware 
of the cost-benefit analysis of Greenpeace and like Tineke Witteveen had a 
stake in a positive outcome of the economic valuation process as an alibi in 
the Lower House debates in November 2002. 
 
The fifth key stakeholder in the economic valuation process is the Wadden 
Association. This association was established in 1965 as a result of the 
government plans to construct two dams from the Wadden Sea island of 
Ameland to the mainland. Its short-term goals are to pursue a ban on gas 
extraction, mussel seed fishery and on mechanical cockle fishery in the 
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Wadden Sea. In the long run, its goals are to create efficient national and 
international rules and regulations that protect the Wadden Sea 
(Waddenvereniging, 2002). It has approximately 50,000 members and 
receives its income from donations. The Wadden Association formed a 
coalition with Greenpeace and several other nature and environmental 
organizations against the gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. It was aware of 
the intentions of Greenpeace to assign AIDEnvironment the cost-benefit 
analysis on gas extraction, but played a limited role in the study itself. 
However, it had a similar stake in the outcome of the study as Greenpeace 
did in the sense that it desired a positive outcome that could be used in 
their collective campaign against gas extraction. The Wadden Association 
was also present during the official presentation of the study to the media, 
as were the other nature organizations of the coalition. 
 
5.4.2 Stakeholder Relationships 
 
In the previous section the key stakeholders in the economic valuation 
process were distinguished. This section will explain the most important 
relationships between these stakeholders in terms of the theoretical 
discussions of section 3.3.2. In this section, two types of relationships were 
distinguished -  coalitions and interest groups. The key relationship in any 
economic valuation study is between the principal and the contracting 
party. These stakeholders will generally form a coalition when the pay-off 
of forming a coalition exceeds the pay-off of engaging in interest group 
politics. The pay-off will be higher when interests between the two 
stakeholders converge, which is likely to happen when ideology or beliefs 
converge and when functional goals converge. It was explained that the 
principal and the contracting party have at least one functional goal in 
common, namely the execution of the economic valuation study; whether 
their ideology and beliefs converge depends on the valuation study and 
stakeholders involved.  
 
The relationships between other stakeholders in the economic valuation 
process may also be analyzed along the lines of coalitions and interest 
group politics. It is likely that different coalitions will form among the 
stakeholders, and that some of these coalitions will compete with other 
coalitions in interest group politics. Coalitions will form among 
stakeholders with converging functional goals and converging perspectives 
towards nature and economic issues. Conversely, coalitions will compete 
with other coalitions that have different goals and perspectives. 
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In the cost-benefit analysis process of gas extraction of which the 
economic valuation study was part, four coalitions can be distinguished. 
These coalitions are presented in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Coalitions in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Gas Extraction in the Wadden Sea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first coalition is formed between the two key stakeholders in the 
valuation process: the principal of the valuation study, Greenpeace, and the 
contracting party, AIDEnvironment. Recognizing that both parties have 
different subjective goals and objectives as organizations, they nevertheless 
share similar interests within the project. Their most important functional 
goal concerning this economic valuation process converged in the sense 
that both were interested in carrying out the economic valuation study and 
more importantly a positive outcome where costs of gas extraction would 
exceed the benefits. A more specific shared functional goal within the 
economic valuation process was that both parties were determined to show 
that certain assumptions made in the NAM studies on the effects of gas 
extraction were disputable.  
 
The ideology of AIDEnvironment and Greenpeace regarding the 
extraction of gas from the Wadden Sea also generally converged. First of 
all, their general viewpoint on the Wadden Sea was a hands-off approach: 
the area being a unique ecosystem in which any human interventions 
possible harming this ecosystem must be prohibited. Secondly, both 
Greenpeace and AIDEnvironment rejected fundamental assumptions 
regarding gas extraction made by NAM in their studies on the effects of gas 
extraction on the environment. Their criticism on NAM studies was based 
on the argument that NAM did not take account of the possibility of a total 
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collapse of the Wadden Sea. Both AIDEnvironment and Greenpeace view 
the Wadden Sea as a vulnerable, self-organizing and non-linear system that 
is already affected by natural forces such as winds that increase the 
possibility of a total ecosystem collapse. Human interventions may bring 
this point of collapse closer. The problem is that nobody knows exactly 
where this point is - once the system collapses, however, there is no point 
of return. Greenpeace and AIDEnvironment therefore believe that in view 
of the precautionary principle, even the slightest possibility of a total 
system collapse is reason enough to leave the Wadden Sea alone. One of 
the interviewed persons clearly stated that AIDEnvironment shared 
sympathies with the viewpoints of Greenpeace on this aspect. The 
distribution of power within this coalition among the principal and 
contracting party is relatively even – there was a common understanding 
that the goal to stop NAM from extracting gas in the Wadden Sea was 
important and both stakeholders pursued this goal together. 
 
Two other coalitions are formed between the principal and indirect 
stakeholders. The second coalition is between the principal (Greenpeace), 
Ms. Tineke Witteveen and the Minister of Environment, Mr. Pronk. First 
of all, Greenpeace, Mr. Pronk and particularly Ms. Tineke Witteveen shared 
the same ideology towards nature and economics – the Wadden Sea is a 
valuable and vulnerable nature area that should not be affected by human 
influences, no matter what the economic benefits. Therefore, gas extraction 
in the Wadden Sea should never be allowed. Secondly, their functional goal 
regarding the economic valuation process was equal: both were interested 
in the economic valuation study such that it may provide additional 
arguments and thus be of use in the debate on gas extraction. The power 
within this coalition lies with the politicians as they are the ones eventually 
making the decisions on gas extraction.  
 
The third coalition is formed between the principal (Greenpeace) and the 
Wadden Association. Their perspectives towards nature and economics 
converge in the sense that both demand a stop on gas extraction in the 
Wadden Sea due to the possible negative effects  it may have on nature and 
the environment, no matter how high the economic benefits may be. 
Furthermore, their functional goals in this economic valuation process also 
converged as both were interested in the outcome of the economic 
valuation study to be used as part of their campaign against gas extraction. 
The power within this coalition is relatively evenly distributed, although it 
tends slightly towards the Wadden Association as a stakeholder with a 
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stronger support group among the general public when it comes to the 
Wadden Sea. 
 
The fourth and last coalition in this economic valuation process is formed 
between two indirect stakeholders of the economic valuation process - 
NAM and the Minister of Economic Affairs, Ms. Jorritsma. Both parties 
have the same perspectives towards nature and economics - if it can be 
shown that the effects on the environment are limited, gas extraction can 
take place in the Wadden Sea based on economic motivations. Both NAM 
and the Minister of Economic Affairs would derive a substantial amount of 
income from the exports of gas extracted in the Wadden Sea, hence their 
arguments in support of gas extraction are entirely economic. Furthermore, 
their functional goals with respect to the economic valuation process also 
converge since both were not interested in the economic valuation study 
and its outcome. Instead, both parties were interested in the outcome of 
their own studies on gas extraction in the Wadden Sea that showed gas 
extraction could take place without risk to the environment. The power 
within this coalition is relatively evenly distributed – while the minister 
eventually makes the decision and therefore has political power, NAM has 
economic power by extracting and selling the gas, which the state then 
exports for income. 
 
Now that the different coalitions have been explained, it is interesting to 
see how the different coalitions act in terms of interest group politics. This 
is presented in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10 Interest Group Politics in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Gas Extraction  
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The four coalitions are engaged in interest group politics along one major line. 
Greenpeace  and its three different coalitions form one larger coalition, 
while the coalition between NAM and the Minister of Economic Affairs, 
forms the other. These two larger coalitions are engaged in interest group 
politics with each other. Both coalitions have diverging ideologies and 
functional goals. While the larger coalition formed by Greenpeace pursues 
protection of the Wadden Sea based on conservation arguments, no matter 
what the economic benefits, and have a common goal to carry out the 
economic valuation study, the coalition between NAM and the Minister of 
Economic Affairs desires to extract gas from the Wadden Sea based on 
economic arguments and are not interested in (a positive outcome of) the 
economic valuation study. During the entire study, neither Greenpeace nor 
AIDEnvironment contacted NAM concerning the assumptions and 
calculations in their previous studies, while NAM on the other hand never 
reacted to the Greenpeace study31.  
 
In this economic valuation process, the other stakeholders (Steering 
Committee, Interviewed and Consulted Persons and Peer Review Group) 
are less significant in the choices that were made. The Steering Committee 
played a role in providing the theoretical background and understanding, 
but had little input in the choices of the economic valuation process. The 
Peer Review Group was given the chance to give input into the choices 
that were made, but it became clear that little use was made of their 
comments32. Lastly, the Interviewed and Consulted Persons had input in 
the form of data input and in that sense had a major influence on the 
outcome of the valuation process, but less so on the actual choices made 
during the process itself. 
 
5.5 Choices in the Economic Valuation Process 
 
This section will discuss the characteristics of the economic valuation 
process based on the theory of section 3.2, where it was explained how the 
different formal stages in an economic valuation process can be 
summarized under pre-assessment choices and assessment choices. This 
                                                 
31 According to the interviewed of NAM, in the time period the report of AIDEnvironment 
was published NAM was a somewhat “closed” organization that basically had limited 
contact with other stakeholders. The result is that no stakeholders desired to discuss aspects 
on gas extraction with NAM.  
32 One of the interviewed that formed part of the Peer Review group stated that his 
comments were quite fundamental, so that the changes he recommended would have taken 
too long a time, which neither the principal nor the contracting party had. As a result, he 
stated, little was done with his comments. 
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section will not explain and account for the types of choices made in the 
economic valuation process as this will be the task of the next section. 
Hence, only a characterization of the choices in the economic valuation 
process will be given.  
 
In the pre-assessment choices, five decisions need to be made. A first decision 
concerns the definition of the phenomenon that is being studied, which is 
one of the key decisions in the economic valuation process as it completely 
influences the choices that follow. In the economic valuation study on gas 
extraction, the phenomenon is defined as gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. 
This decision was made by Greenpeace and was part of the assignment 
they gave to AIDEnvironment. Secondly, after the phenomenon is defined, 
the stakeholders need to decide on the project-alternative, the best 
alternative to the project. In this cost-benefit analysis, the project-
alternative is defined as doing nothing or current policy, which is compared 
to a scenario of a total blowout.   
 
Third, the stakeholders need to decide on the parties that are affected and 
hence to be included in the analysis. In this study, the selected economic 
instrument was a social cost-benefit analysis, and therefore parties bearing 
the costs as well as parties reaping the benefits of gas extraction are 
included. This choice was made by Greenpeace, who intended to apply the 
tool in order to create a more coherent image of the net benefits of gas 
extraction for the Dutch society (Wetten et al., 1999: 2). The ecological 
functions that could possibly be affected by gas extraction played a 
particularly significant role. According to AIDEnvironment and 
Greenpeace, ecological effects of gas extraction had largely been ignored in 
the calculations thus far carried out by the government and NAM, and 
hence an integrated analysis was necessary that particularly incorporated 
these effects. The fourth choice is where to draw the geographical 
boundaries of the area that will form the focus of the economic valuation 
process. In the valuation process, the Wadden Sea area is delineated 
according to “ecological functioning” (AIDEnvironment, 1999: 13). This is 
a delineation that describes the Wadden Sea in a broad sense33, and is based 
on ecological processes and functions. The total area of the Wadden Sea in 
the study is set at 662.451 hectares, compared to an area of 488.000 
hectares that was used in the government bill. AIDEnvironment made 
these choices, in consultation with Greenpeace. A fifth choice is to identify 
the impacts. In this economic valuation study, the choice was approached 
                                                 
33 As opposed to the delineation of the Wadden Sea according to the definition of the 
Ramsar Convention, which is smaller. 
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by first making an exhaustive inventory of all ecological functions in the 
Wadden Sea, and secondly making a selection of relevant functions to be 
quantified. The inventory of functions was made by AIDEnvironment, 
based both on the publication of de Groot’s (1992) publication “Functions 
of Nature” and on their own expertise.  This inventory was for a large part 
already presented as part of the initial quotation of AIDEnvironment. The 
sixth and last step in the formal pre-assessment choices is to identify the 
impacts to actually be valued. This selection was made from the inventory 
of functions in step four and was based on the following selection criteria: 
(1) the function contributes to the sustenance of the typical characteristics 
of the Wadden Sea; (2) the function is relevant in respect to the possible 
effects of gas extraction in the Wadden Sea; (3) the function and its related 
values can be monetarized; and (4) the function makes a significant 
contribution in monetary terms to the total economic value of the Wadden 
Sea. As a result, the following functions were selected and quantified: 
 
- CO2 storage 
- Flood protection 
- Mitigation of salt spray 
- Strategic drinking water stock 
- Purification of water 
- Pest control 
- Natural growth of land 
- Nature 
- Nursery mussel 
- Nursery plaice and sole 
- Nursery shrimp 
- Recreation and tourism 
- Production of mussels 
- Production of cockles 
- Production of worms 
- Production of shrimp  
 
Interestingly, not all of these quantified functions were actually destined to 
be part of the cost-benefit analysis. A second selection was made from the 
above list of functions to be included in the cost-benefit analysis. These are 
functions actually affected by the gas extraction of NAM in the Wadden 
Sea based on their own analysis. In other words, an additional step in this 
cost-benefit analysis was made – before the relevant functions for the cost-
benefit analysis were selected and monetarized, the entire Wadden Sea 
ecosystem was quantified. The selection of the effects of gas extraction to 
actually be included in the cost-benefit analysis resulted in the following 
functions: 
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1. Effects on dike safety 
2. Strategic drinking water stock 
3. Water purification 
4. Floods 
5. Loss of land 
6. Nature 
7. Nursery function 
8. Recreation and tourism 
9. Production function 
 
In the assessment choices, the first decision concerns how to quantify the 
functions into economic values. These choices were made by 
AIDEnvironment. For the quantification of all ecological functions of the 
Wadden Sea during the additional step of the cost-benefit analysis, different 
valuation methods were applied: 
 
- CO2 storage: Benefit Transfer 
- Flood protection: Mitigation Behavior 
- Mitigation of salt spray: Dose-Response 
- Strategic drinking water stock: Replacement Cost 
- Purification of water: Benefit Transfer 
- Pest control: Dose-Response 
- Natural growth of land: Replacement Cost 
- Nature: ‘Investment by Public Bodies’34 
- Nursery mussel: Market Pricing 
- Nursery plaice and sole: Market Pricing 
- Nursery shrimp: Market Pricing 
- Recreation and tourism: Market Pricing 
- Production of mussels: Market Pricing 
- Production of cockles: Market Pricing 
- Production of worms: Market Pricing 
- Production of shrimp: Market Pricing 
 
For the functions that were selected as effects of gas extraction on nature 
for the social cost-benefit analysis, an interesting distinction in functions 
was made before quantification. For the functions that are significantly 
dependent on beaches, dunes, gullies, tidal flats and mud flats, the 
economic value is calculated as being one-third of the value of the total 
value of the same environmental functions of the Wadden Sea. This 
fraction was chosen based on projections that approximately one-third of 
                                                 
34 Explained by AIDEnvironment as “…investments in ecosystem protection by public 
(government) institutions, which can be perceived as reflecting the aggregated individual 
Willingness to Pay…” (AIDEnvironment, 1999: 16). 
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the natural functions of the Wadden Sea (between Harlingen/West point 
of Terschelling and Pieterburen/East point of Schiermonnikoog) would 
disappear as a result of gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. The researchers 
expect that one-third of the following functions would be affected: 
 
1. Water purification 
2. Nature  
3. Nursery functions 
4. Recreation and tourism 
5. Production functions  
 
For the remaining effects of gas extraction, separate valuation methods 
were applied: 
 
6. Effects on dike safety: Market Pricing, based on NAM study 
7. Strategic drinking water stock: Replacement Cost 
8. Floods: Mitigation Behavior 
9. Loss of land: Dose-Response 
 
The second element in the assessment choices involves choices in the 
discounting process. In this valuation study, a time period of 50 years was 
taken with a discount rate of 4%. The third and last step is to select 
elements to be incorporated in the sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity 
analysis was carried out for both discount rate and time period: three 
different discount rates (2%, 4% and 6%) and three different time periods 
(30, 50, and 70 years) were analyzed. Furthermore, three different scenarios 
were tested - (i) complete damage one year after gas extraction; (ii) no 
damage 1-5 years after gas extraction and complete damage 6 years after 
gas extraction; (iii) no damage 1-5 years after gas extraction, 50% damage 6-
10 years after gas extraction and complete damage after 11 years of gas 
extraction. 
 
5.6 Relationship Between Choices and Their Context 
 
5.6.1 Influences of the Institutional Context 
 
In section 5.2 of this chapter, the context of formal and informal 
institutions was described for the economic valuation process of gas 
extraction in the Wadden Sea. The next question becomes what influence 
elements in this context had on choices made in the economic valuation 
process.  
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In the informal institutional context, policy paradigms and scientific 
paradigms were distinguished. Regarding policy paradigms, four key elements 
can be distinguished for which it can be argued that they played an 
important role in the economic valuation process. These are:  
 
1. dominance of rational and economic arguments at the time of the 
economic valuation process 
2. institutionalization of environmental problems of the Wadden Sea 
3. dominance of an integrated water management approach 
4. perception of the Wadden Sea as the Netherlands’ last wilderness area 
 
The major influence of these four elements was on one of the first pre-
assessment choices, and as such a key choice for the entire economic 
valuation process – definition of the phenomenon being studied. The 
phenomenon was defined as the environmental effects of gas extraction in 
the Wadden Sea. Greenpeace chose this phenomenon as the object of their 
study in first instance because policy paradigms in the Netherlands made it 
interesting for them to define it in this way. First of all, the discussions in 
the government at this time were dominated by rational and economic 
arguments mostly favoring gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. Carrying out 
a social cost-benefit analysis implied a focus on the economic effects in the 
broadest sense – not only traditional economic effects were included but 
also environmental and social effects that have an effect on the economy 
were part of the analysis. By linking the gas extraction to these broader 
economic effects, and aiming to derive economic arguments of why gas 
extraction should not take place, Greenpeace links with the prevailing 
policy paradigms, dominated by such economic aspects. 
 
Secondly, Greenpeace knew a broad public would be interested in an 
economic valuation study because the environmental problems of the 
Wadden Sea had become institutionalized in the minds of many people. 
The general public in particular but also certain politicians like Tineke 
Witteveen and the Minister of Environmental Affairs, had become 
convinced that the Wadden Sea was a vulnerable and valuable nature area 
that should not be influenced by human actions. Carrying out a study 
aimed at the negative effects of gas extraction on the Wadden Sea in 
economic terms in addition to more general environment conservation 
arguments would further mobilize such people and thus Greenpeace’s 
supporters. 
 
The third aspect of influence is the dominance of an integrated water 
management approach in the Netherlands. Such an approach implies a 
more ecosystem approach towards water management issues in which 
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different stakeholders are taken into account. This means that policy had to 
incorporate not only a single stakeholder of the Wadden Sea (such as the 
NAM), but also stakeholders like nature organizations, tourists and 
recreationists. Greenpeace therefore knew that it had an audience also in 
the government in their campaign against gas extraction. Hence, giving an 
assignment focussing on the negative aspects of gas extraction again links 
with the prevailing policy paradigms in which people would actually listen 
to such arguments. 
 
The fourth aspect, the perception of the Wadden Sea as the Netherlands’ 
last wilderness area was also of influence on choices in the economic 
valuation process. The Wadden Sea was perceived by many, especially 
towards the end of the governmental discussions, as the Netherlands’ last 
wilderness area. The Netherlands being as heavily populated as it is, has 
very little nature areas perceived as wilderness areas in which the 
interventions of humans, although present, remain relatively unnoticed. 
Hence, the focus of Greenpeace on the negative effects of gas extraction in 
the Netherlands’ last wilderness area was in part determined by the fact that 
people generally felt sympathy towards this particular nature area. 
 
In the second aspect of the informal institutional context of the economic 
valuation process are scientific paradigms. Two elements of scientific 
paradigms were distinguished that are likely to influence the choices in the 
economic valuation process: 
 
1. increased popularity of economic valuation studies 
2. dominance of certain economic paradigms 
 
The first aspect influences in particular the first element in the pre-
assessment choices – the definition of the phenomenon being studied. It 
was explained in section 5.2.2 that economic valuation was still not very 
popular in the Netherlands at the time of the gas extraction discussions, 
however several scientific economic valuation studies were carried out 
outside the Netherlands that had gained much publicity in the Netherlands. 
The most notable study was an economic valuation of the world’s 
ecosystems by Costanza et al. (1997). After reading such studies 
Greenpeace learned the added value of economic valuation studies for their 
campaigns, namely the possibility to highlight the economic value of 
ecosystems and thereby utilize it as ammunition in their campaign. It is for 
this reason that they approached the economic side of Wadden Sea gas 
extraction, as opposed to a tradition of only focussing on ecological and 
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biological effects. They knew that the term ‘economic’ would gain them 
support, while at the same time allowing them to pursue their goals. 
 
The dominance of certain economic paradigms with the key stakeholders, 
the second element of influence, influenced choices throughout the 
economic valuation process. In particular, it influenced the last two 
elements in the pre-assessment choices and the first element in the 
assessment choices. In all these elements, it can be seen that an interesting 
mix of paradigms leaning towards a more traditional neoclassical 
economics and a more ecological economics is supported, depending on 
how well each of the paradigms supported the goal of the principal. In the 
determination of which impacts to identify, ecological economics, due to its 
basis in ecology, was more dominant since it allowed a broader perspective 
towards ecological functions and, more importantly, ecological 
relationships. It therefore allowed the stakeholders to integrate an extensive 
list of functions in their study, ranging from the more typical economic 
analysis functions like production functions to the less typical functions to 
be included in an economic valuation study like pest control, mitigation of 
salt spray and natural growth of land.  
 
The next step, identification of impacts to be valued however takes a more 
neoclassical economics approach due to the additional step that was taken 
in the economic valuation process. This step involved the quantification of 
the entire Wadden Sea before choosing which functions to incorporate in 
the cost-benefit analysis. The approach is more neoclassical because the 
authors quantify all ecosystem functions, even those that most ecological 
economists would never do. The most notable one is “nature”, a 
controversial function to be valued among economists. Generally, the 
neoclassical economists would support quantification of such a function, 
while ecological economists oppose this quantification since nature cannot 
and should not be quantified (see the discussion in section 2.3.2). 
Obviously, taking a more neoclassical approach to the quantification of 
Wadden Sea functions allows the stakeholders to derive a higher economic 
value. 
 
In the first element of the assessment choices, the quantification of impacts 
into monetary units, the neoclassical economics paradigm also dominated. 
While ecological economics often questions the use of many economic 
valuation methods, neoclassical economics has a wide range of valuation 
methods at hand. The authors of the study applied a relatively large number 
of different valuation methods to obtain their quantitative values: dose-
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response, mitigation behavior, replacement cost, benefit transfer (receiving 
much criticism even among neoclassical economists), market pricing, and 
the most interesting one, a non-textbook valuation method “investment by 
public bodies”. The latter method was based on the income derived from 
members’ donations and payments to a Dutch nature organization 
(Natuurmonumenten) and was applied to calculate the economic value of 
nature. It was argued this represented people’s willingness to pay for 
nature. This method, however, raises many questions – for example, are all 
these people would actually willing to pay this money for the nature 
function of the Wadden Sea or do they donate to protect other nature 
areas? Or perhaps  do the people donate based on other motivations like 
buying off guilt? 
 
The third element in the institutional context of the economic valuation 
process is the set of formal institutions, or rules and regulations. With respect 
to the economic valuation process, one must think in terms of guidelines or 
standards of procedure. The following three aspects were distinguished in 
section 4.2.4 as being of influence on the choices in the economic valuation 
process: 
 
 
1. Rules and regulations for the economic instruments 
2. Rules and regulations economic valuation process 
3. Environmental rules and regulations 
 
First, no rules and regulations existed regarding economic instruments. The 
OEEI report (a guideline for social cost-benefit analysis) was not yet 
published. Although this guideline says little about economic valuation of 
ecosystems, it does provide guidance for such economic instrument in this 
case study (Eijgenraam et al., 2000). It can be argued that the lack of such 
guidelines influenced some of the choices made in the economic valuation 
process – in other words, some of these choices may have been made 
differently had such guidelines existed. The basis for these arguments is the 
OEEI guidelines themselves, which have influence on the following 
choices. Its first influence is on the definition of the project-alternative, one 
of the most criticized aspects of the analysis. The guidelines are clear that 
this alternative is not necessarily “doing nothing” or based on current 
policy, but instead a combination of the best alternative allocation of the 
available investment means and the best possible alternative solution to the 
problem the project deals with. The project alternative in this cost-benefit 
analysis, however, was defined as “doing nothing”, and may have been 
defined differently had the guidelines been available. The second influence 
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is on the identification of impacts. The OEEI guidelines state that the 
environmental impacts should be linked to the impacts identified in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (or MER). Although the principal of 
this study was not a public organization, it could have followed the MER 
reports or other environmental studies that had been carried out on gas 
extraction in the Wadden Sea. Instead, the principal and contracting parties 
decided not to follow the MER reports and define their own environmental 
impacts of gas extraction. The third influence is on the identification of 
impacts to be valued. The OEEI guidelines explain how only those effects 
that can actually be quantified should also be quantified, and for those 
functions for which this may be difficult, PM-posts should be created in 
which these effects are qualitatively incorporated in the analysis. In the 
analysis on gas extraction, however, no effects were incorporated 
qualitatively and hence no PM-posts were created. Instead, all effects were 
quantified, no matter how difficult this process was. 
 
Secondly, it can be argued that the lack of formal institutions or guidelines 
for the economic valuation process had influence on the choices in the 
process. Such guidelines could hypothetically influence all of the choices in 
the valuation process except for the first choice, definition of the 
phenomenon, which is entirely dependent on the principal. However, some 
of these choices could also be covered by other guidelines, such as the rules 
and regulations for the economic instrument, as was explained in the 
previous section. Nevertheless, choices remain that are more specific to the 
economic valuation process that are not covered by these guidelines. For 
these choices, specific guidelines could be set up to guide decisions. 
Guidelines for the economic valuation process could direct the definition 
of the affected parties, about how to define geographical boundaries, which 
valuation methods are the most appropriate for the valuation of certain 
environmental impacts, the height of the discount rate for projects that 
specifically affect the environment as well as the length of the time span in 
the discounting process (see section 3.2 on discussions about the height of 
the discount rate and length of the time period for projects that affect 
nature) and, lastly, what factors to test in the sensitivity analysis.  
 
Third, the EU Birds and Habitat directives were the most important 
environmental regulations affecting the Wadden Sea, and they were likely 
to have had influence on choices in the economic valuation process. More 
specifically, they affected the definition of the phenomenon being studied – 
gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. Greenpeace knew the Wadden Sea was 
covered by the Directives, and by showing that gas extraction would result 
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in major environmental costs would be countering the EU Directives. On 
basis of these Directives, NAM would then not be allowed to extract gas in 
the Wadden Sea. 
 
5.6.2  Influences of the Characteristics of the Economic Instrument 
 
A second element in the context of the economic valuation process that 
was distinguished in section 3.4.5 are the characteristics of the economic 
instrument in which the economic valuation process is applied. In this case 
study the economic instrument is the social cost-benefit analysis. The 
following elements are likely to have had an influence on the choices of the 
economic valuation process: 
 
1. Use type 
2. Goal 
3. Time constraints 
4. Budget constraints 
 
While the first three elements had significant influence on the choices in 
the valuation process, the last element (budget constraints) played no role. 
There was plenty of money to carry out the valuation study and any 
potential limits were completely overshadowed by the time constraints. 
The first characteristic of the cost-benefit analysis is its use type, which in 
this case study was project evaluation. This use type probably had an 
influence in particular on the second choice of the economic valuation 
process, determination of the parties affected, as well as the choice of 
impacts to identify. Its influence on the choice of parties can be found in 
the fact that the project was being evaluated with a social cost-benefit 
analysis. Hence, the parties to take into account are those that lose (for 
example the environment) and those that benefit (NAM). The use type also 
influenced the choice in the identification of impacts. Greenpeace and 
AIDEnvironment felt that the studies carried out by NAM on gas 
extraction in the Wadden Sea only illuminated the benefits. Since a social 
cost-benefit analysis includes both social benefits and social costs, it 
provided Greenpeace with the mechanism to also integrate the 
environmental costs of gas extraction. To make this as extensive as 
possible, an exhaustive range of functions was selected.  
 
The second characteristic of the cost-benefit analysis is the goal of the cost-
benefit analysis. This goal was to influence the political decision making 
process on gas extraction in the Wadden Sea, and was a key influence on 
the choices throughout the economic valuation process. The goal was part 
of a larger campaign of the environmental organizations including 
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Greenpeace to completely ban human activities in the Wadden Sea. The 
goal influenced the decision on the phenomenon that would be studied in 
the economic valuation process. The study focussed on the economic value 
of environmental effects of gas extraction in the Wadden Sea and aided 
Greenpeace in the pursuit of their goals – it allowed Greenpeace to show 
what the economic consequences would be for Dutch society if the cabinet 
decided to allow gas extraction. Secondly, the goal influenced the 
determination of the project alternative. The project-alternative was defined 
as “doing nothing”, which was compared with a scenario of a total 
blowout. These are two extremes being compared, which result in the 
highest possible outcomes of negative effects of gas extraction on the 
Wadden Sea and hence best serves the goal of the economic valuation 
process. 
 
Third, the goal influenced the choice of parties that are affected. Valuing, 
and thereby highlighting, the parties that bear the costs of gas extraction in 
addition to those benefiting would provide Greenpeace with additional 
ammunition in their campaign. The goal also influenced the drawing of the 
geographical boundaries. Greenpeace decided to draw these boundaries 
according to ‘ecological functioning’ that sets the area in relatively broad 
dimensions. Other boundaries could have been used, such as those of the 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. However, these provide smaller areas. By 
choosing a larger area, the outcome of the economic valuation process of 
ecological functions would be higher and hence the cost-benefit analysis 
would be more likely to lean towards a net cost of gas extraction. Another 
influence of the economic instrument goal is on the choice of impacts to 
identify. As was explained in section 5.5, a wide range of functions was 
selected for quantification. It was also explained that an additional step was 
taken in this economic valuation process, namely a quantification of the 
entire Wadden Sea ecosystem before a selection of the functions that 
would actually be affected by gas extraction and thus be incorporated in the 
cost-benefit analysis. This additional step in the selection of functions 
serves the goal of the cost-benefit analysis well. By valuing the entire 
Wadden Sea first, the study has the opportunity to show what the value of 
such an ecosystem actually is before cutting into this value to select the 
functions actually affected by gas extraction. The selection of functions to 
be incorporated in the social cost-benefit analysis, the sixth step, was 
furthermore quite extensive. The most notable choice here was nature, a 
relatively vague and disputed value to be quantified. However, in light of 
the goal of the study, as many functions as possible needed to be quantified 
to obtain a higher value on the cost side of gas extraction.  
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Another choice affected by the goal of the economic instrument is the 
quantification of impacts into monetary units.  All sorts of valuation 
methodologies were applied, depending on what type of data was available, 
but no explanations were given as to why a particular valuation method was 
applied. Furthermore, many of the methods were applied in a “quick and 
dirty” manner, where the valuation method itself played the role of guiding 
the contracting party for types of information. Anything was done to 
obtain as many economic values as possible. Once more the most notable 
valuation method was “investment by public bodies” for the nature 
function. This method is not a standard textbook valuation methodology 
and receives much criticism. In theory, the only method that can calculate 
(existence value of) nature is Contingent Valuation. However, there was 
not enough time available, so one option could have been to leave this 
function out of the actual quantification of impacts and instead mention 
the impact qualitatively. The party, however, decided to apply a less 
conventional valuation method so that the economic value of the negative 
effects due to gas extraction would increase, and thereby better pursue their 
goal. Another interesting calculation approach was performed during the 
quantification of functions to actually be incorporated in the cost-benefit 
analysis. The economic value of five functions was first calculated for the 
entire Wadden Sea, and then multiplied by one-third to obtain the costs of 
gas extraction. This fraction is based on their own projections and although 
the effects on each function will differ, this approach was taken as there 
was not enough time to calculate the effects on each function separately. In 
light of the goal of the valuation study, some value may be better than 
none. This brings us to the last interesting quantification approach, namely 
that all the values are based on a worse case scenario - a total collapse of 
one-third of the Wadden Sea ecosystem. The likelihood of this scenario is 
still heavily disputed, but use of this scenario in the calculations provided 
the contracting party and more importantly the principal with much higher 
economic values, which suits their goal.  
 
The last two choices on which the goal had an influence are discounting 
and sensitivity analysis. In the discounting process, the choice of the 
discount rate was not so much influenced by the goal of the cost-benefit 
analysis since the contracting party applied the standard discount rate for 
government projects in the Netherlands. However, the choice for the time 
span over which the economic values were discounted may have been 
influenced by the goal, since the maximum time period possible under a 
discount rate of 4% was applied. Any economic values after a period of 
fifty years would approach zero when discounted. A maximum time period 
over which functions are discounted result in a higher total economic value 
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on the cost side of the cost-benefit calculations of gas extraction. This is 
clearly in the interest of the principal’s goals. In the sensitivity analysis, the 
elements that were tested were the discount rate, the time period and three 
different scenarios at which the gas damage would take place. The first two 
elements are almost standard in sensitivity analyses, but the third element 
still assumes a complete collapse of one third of the system. No factors that 
are at the basis of the calculations were however tested, such as physical 
quantities, assumptions, and shadow prices. Especially these factors are 
very uncertain in the calculations, and should probably have been tested in 
a sensitivity analysis. However, this would most likely undermine the 
economic value calculations and make the entire study less reliable as 
ammunition in the Greenpeace campaign. 
 
Time constraints, the third element, had a significant influence on the 
quantification of impacts into monetary units. While initially the study had 
a time span of approximately two years, time was suddenly limited by 
Greenpeace due to an eruption of the debate on gas extraction in the 
government. If the study was to play an important role in these discussions, 
as Greenpeace had planned, the study had to be completed before a final 
decision was made. Due to this time pressure, AIDEnvironment had to 
find (sometimes innovative) ways to quantify the ecosystem functions. The 
most notable one is the valuation approach towards “nature”, which, had 
there been enough time, would probably have been approached with a 
time-consuming Contingent Valuation approach. Since this time was not 
available, the authors needed to find other ways to calculate the economic 
value of this function and they chose “investment by public bodies”, a non-
conventional and controversial valuation method.  
 
5.6.3  Influences of the Stakeholders Context 
 
In section 5.4, two aspects in the stakeholders' context of the economic 
valuation process were distinguished: who these stakeholders are and what 
their relationships are. In terms of the first aspect, the stakeholders were 
divided into direct and indirect stakeholders. With respect to the direct 
stakeholders, it was explained that the following key actors had an influence 
on choices in the economic valuation process :  
 
1. Principal 
2. Contracting party 
3. Steering Committee 
4. Interviewed and consulted persons 
5. Peer review group 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Gas Extraction in the Wadden Sea 
 137
The stakeholders of most significant influence were the principal, 
Greenpeace, and the contracting party, AIDEnvironment. The steering 
committee, peer review group and interviewed and consulted people played 
a limited role in the choices of the economic valuation process.  
 
The first direct stakeholder, the principal, had the most influence on the 
first four choices in the economic valuation process: decisions concerning 
the phenomenon being studied, the project alternative, the parties affected, 
and geographical boundaries. In the economic valuation process, the 
contracting party and principal both indicated that these choices were made 
either by Greenpeace or in consultation with Greenpeace. Greenpeace’s 
main goal as an environmental organization is to challenge global 
environmental problems. With respect to the Wadden Sea, Greenpeace 
pursues a moratorium on gas drilling and extraction, aiming to keep the 
area free from human interventions. The fact that the phenomenon was 
defined as gas extraction in the Wadden Sea is therefore in line with 
Greenpeace’s goals and approaches to protect the environment. The same 
argument can be made for the second choice, definition of the project-
alternative, namely “doing nothing”. A comparison of this alternative with 
a worst-case scenario results in the highest possible economic effects of gas 
extraction and thus links well with the goals and approaches of Greenpeace 
to protect the Wadden Sea from human interference. The identification of 
the parties affected by the project is also influenced by the characteristics of 
the principal in the sense that the focus was on the parties that would lose 
from gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. Highlighting the environmental 
costs of gas extraction converges with Greenpeace’s goals to protect the 
Wadden Sea. Lastly, the drawing of the geographical boundaries was done 
in consultation with Greenpeace. The fact that this boundary was relatively 
broadly defined also relates to the goals and approaches of Greenpeace – 
such a broad definition ensures a higher economic value of ecosystems. A 
higher economic value implies stronger arguments for the support of a 
protection of the Wadden Sea. 
 
The second direct stakeholder of key importance in the choices of the 
valuation process was the contracting party, AIDEnvironment. Its main 
influence was particularly on the last three pre-assessment choices and all 
assessment choices. AIDEnvironment in fact made most of these choices 
alone. AIDEnvironment is a non-profit research and consulting company 
focussing most of its projects on the conservation of ecosystems. Their 
expertise lies in the field of ecology and biology and they had sympathies 
with the viewpoints of Greenpeace towards the Wadden Sea. Their goals 
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are therefore ideological. The determination of geographical boundaries 
was done in consultation with Greenpeace, and the fact that a broad 
definition of the Wadden Sea was chosen was, in line with their ideological 
standpoint towards the protection of the environment. The next choice 
made by AIDEnvironment concerned the identification of impacts. Again, 
a large and relatively exhaustive number of functions were included in the 
analysis, closely related to the ecological concerns of the contracting party. 
The linking of functions with values is yet another important element that 
may be related to the goals and ideologies of AIDEnvironment. In first 
instance, all of the selected functions were in fact selected for 
quantification, no matter how difficult the process. More economic values 
would obviously increase the total economic value of the Wadden Sea, 
which is what AIDEnvironment wanted. However, only some of these 
quantified functions were to be incorporated in the cost-benefit analysis as 
effects of gas extraction. The functions that were chosen were, on the other 
hand, also extensive. Such behavior is also seen in the first choice in the 
assessment, namely the quantification of  functions. All sorts of valuation 
methods were applied to value environmental functions, even a relatively 
unknown valuation method “investment by public bodies” to value a 
relatively debated function “nature”. The goal was again to increase the 
economic value as much as possible in line with their ideology and goal. 
The same arguments can be made for the choices in the discounting 
process, where a maximum time period was applied to increase the present 
values, and in the sensitivity analysis, where key elements of the economic 
valuation process were not tested.  
 
The most important indirect stakeholders of the economic valuation process 
were: 
 
1. NAM  
2. Tineke Witteveen  
3. Minister of Economic Affairs  
4. Minister of Environment 
5. Wadden Association  
 
Their influence was indirectly on all the choices of the valuation process. 
However, it is not so much through their individual existence, but through 
the actual forming of coalitions with other indirect stakeholders and direct 
stakeholders, and the resulting interest group politics among these 
coalitions that their influence on the valuation process becomes clear and 
can be understood. More specifically, the influence of these indirect 
stakeholders was through their relationship with the principal.  
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In this case study, four different coalitions were formed, as was explained in 
section 5.4.2 (Figure 11): 
 
1. Principal and contracting party 
2. Principal, Minister of Environment and Tineke Witteveen 
3. Principal and Wadden Association 
4. NAM and Minister of Economic Affairs 
 
The key to the first three coalitions is the principal, Greenpeace. Through 
its first coalition with AIDEnvironment, the contracting party, it could steer 
the research in a certain direction, even if only through choosing a specific 
contracting party that fits its goals and perspectives. The existence of this 
coalition was of major influence on all choices in the economic valuation 
process as discussed in the previous paragraphs. These choices  were made 
in the interest of the goals and perspectives of both parties in the coalition - 
the principal and contracting party. Greenpeace’s second coalition with the 
Minister of Environment and Tineke Witteveen was also crucial – 
Greenpeace knew that a positive outcome of the economic valuation 
process could play a role in the government discussions. Both the Minister 
and Tineke Witteveen were aware of the economic valuation study and 
supported the execution of this study due to its possible contribution to 
their debates. The influence of this coalition was also on choices 
throughout the valuation process that were likely to result in a positive 
outcome for the parties in the coalition – Greenpeace, the Minister and 
Tineke Witteveen. The third coalition that Greenpeace formed was with the 
Wadden Association. This was a relationship that surpassed the time span 
of the economic valuation study and was thus much older. Both 
stakeholders shared similar goals and interests in the Wadden Sea. This 
coalition influenced all choices to pursue a positive outcome of the 
valuation study – a positive outcome would benefit the strength of their 
coalition against gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. 
 
The first three coalitions form a larger coalition and engage in interest 
group politics with a fourth coalition (see Figure 12). The fourth coalition is 
formed between two indirect stakeholders, NAM and the Minister of 
Economic Affairs. This coalition is of importance for the economic 
valuation process since these were the two key stakeholders that opposed a 
ban on gas drills, which resulted in an interest group politics relationship with 
the other three coalitions. The relationship of interest group politics 
between the two key stakeholders on opposite sides, Greenpeace and 
NAM, in fact goes back to other incidents. The two most notable incidents 
are the Brent Spar and Shells’ (one of the two shareholders of NAM) role 
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in Nigeria. In both cases, Greenpeace fought (and in the case of Nigeria 
still fights) the position Shell took towards the environment; for its one-
sided economic interests and environmental negligence. Greenpeace thus 
had a motivation to increase their power in this interest group politics with 
NAM. It pursued this power through attempting to fight NAM with their 
own economic arguments. It is thus likely that most choices in the 
economic valuation process were made to increase the economic costs of 
gas extraction so Greenpeace could gain power in their struggle for 
interests with NAM. 
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Chapter 6  Two Cost-Benefit 
Analyses Related to 
the Rotterdam Port 
Development  
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, the analytical model presented at the end of Chapter 4 will 
be applied to two other case studies: a cost-benefit analysis of land 
reclamation and a cost-benefit analysis of the development of 750 hectares 
nature and recreation area. The two cases are combined in one single 
chapter because they have similar elements in their context since both are 
related to the expansion of the Rotterdam port – the two cost-benefit 
analyses were executed for two sub-projects that were both related to the 
port expansion. As was the case in the previous chapter, the aim of the case 
study analysis is to map both the choices within the process of economic 
valuation and the context of institutions, economic instrument and 
stakeholders in which the process is carried out. This is guided by the 
analytical model of section 4.4. These two case studies will then be 
compared and contrasted with the first case study of the previous chapter - 
costs and benefits of gas extraction in the Wadden Sea - in Chapter 7. 
 
6.2 Formal and Informal Institutional Context  
 
6.2.1 Emergence of Formal and Informal Institutions 
On 28 May 2001, the Central Planning Bureau (CPB), Netherlands 
Economic Institute (NEI) and the National Institute of Public Health and 
the Environment (RIVM) published their cost-benefit analysis on the 
reclamation of land for the expansion of the Rotterdam port. This was 
followed by the publication of a second cost-benefit analysis also published 
in May 2001, carried out by NEI and RIVM on the creation of 750 hectares 
of new nature and recreation area. Both cost-benefit analyses were carried 
out as part of the Project Mainport Development Rotterdam (PMR) that 
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researched the options of an expansion of the Rotterdam port. The PMR 
consisted of three sub-projects: 
 
1. Land reclamation and nature compensation 
2. Creation of 750 hectares new nature and recreation area  
3. Improvement of existing port space 
 
The cost-benefit analyses concerned the first two sub-projects. Both 
studies were published within a complex political and economic context, in 
which formal (rules and regulations) and informal institutions (policy and 
scientific paradigms) can be distinguished. In order to understand this 
context, it is necessary to go back in time and explain the emergence of 
institutions concerning the expansion of the Rotterdam port in the 
Netherlands. This discussion will be held according to the time line 
presented in Table 2. 
 
The city of Rotterdam, situated in the West of the Netherlands on the 
North Sea, houses the world’s largest port, simultaneously the most 
important port for Europe’s mainland. Covering an area of 10,400 hectares, 
more than 300 million tons of goods are handled every year in the 
Rotterdam port (RMPM, 2002). Due to an enormous growth in the port’s 
activities, land was reclaimed from the sea between 1970 and 1985 and the 
first “Maasvlakte”, or Meuse plain, was created. This extended the harbor 
with 3000 hectares. In the decade that followed, activities further increased, 
and growth projections of the port of Rotterdam showed that in order to 
meet the increase in demand and thus maintain its competitive position, 
more land would have to become available for the port (RMPM, 2002). 
The shortage of space, in particular for the chemical industry, was also 
discussed in several policy documents (see for example “Port Plan 2010” of 
the Municipality of Rotterdam, 1993). 
 
In 1993, twenty-three private and public parties agreed to a balanced 
development of both the economic performance and the quality of the 
social environment in the Rijnmond area (PMR, 2002). This agreement was 
called the ROM-Rijnmond agreement, which presented a list of projects 
and measures that were to lead to a balanced development. One of these 
projects focused on the possibilities of an expansion of the Rotterdam port 
through further land reclamations in the sea; the second Meuse Plain. The 
agreement was followed by a ROM-report in 1995, in which the shortage 
of space in the port was substantiated. In 1996, the Dutch cabinet 
recognized the shortage of space in the port and decided to initiate an 
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exploration into both the need and necessity (in terms of the effects of a 
shortage on the Dutch economy) and possible solutions to deal with this 
shortage of space. The starting point in this research was to be the so-called 
“double objective”: to strengthen the position of the Rotterdam port and 
simultaneously improve the quality of the social environment. This 
exploration, called VERM (Verkenning Ruimtetekort Mainport 
Rotterdam), focussed on a wide range of issues including economics, 
environment, spatial development, nature, mobility, social costs and 
benefits as well as the business-economics dimension, and the results were 
to lead to a cabinet decision in 1997. 
 
Table 2 Time Line Port Development of Rotterdam 
1993 1995 1996 1997 
➜ ROM-Rijnmond 
agreement 
➜ Report ROM project  ➜ Initial decision 
cabinet & start VERM 
procedure 
➜ Nyfer report 
"Maa$vlakte" 
➜ Project decision following 
VERM procedure 
➜ CPB statement 
questioning amount of port 
expansion 
1998 1999 2000 2001 
➜ Starting Note 
PKB+ procedure & 
EIA IEE 
➜ Nyfer report 
Golden Brim of 
Rotterdam 
➜ PMR Interim Report: 
"PMR On Course" 
➜ Unanimous advise  
ONR to cabinet 
➜ Letter to the Lower 
House: tentative 
conclusion need port 
expansion 
➜ Press release CPB: 
no capacity problems 
➜ Reaction RMPM on 
CPB press release 
➜ Cabinet presents PKB-I 
and EIA 
➜ CPB/NEI/RIVM cost-
benefit analyses 
published & presented 
➜ Debate cost-benefit 
analyses 
➜ Report advisory board on 
cost-benefit analyses 
➜ Reaction RMPM on cost-
benefit analysis land 
reclamation 
➜ Cabinet agrees with 
PKB-III 
2002  
➜ Lower House 
agrees with cabinet 
proposal PKB-III 
➜ Upper House 
agrees with cabinet 
proposal PKB-III 
 
 
 
In May 1997, the research institute Nyfer published a report called 
“Maa$vlakte” (Nyfer, 1997), which it had conducted on assignment of the 
Rotterdam Municipal Port Management (RMPM). This report explained 
how investments in the Rotterdam port were important for the 
development of the port and the entire Dutch economy. It also criticized 
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the calculations that had earlier been carried out by the CPB, in which CPB 
explained how investments in infrastructure projects could lead to negative 
economic effects.  
 
The VERM exploration ended and halfway 1997 the cabinet decided that 
the need and necessity for additional space in the Rotterdam port had been 
justified. The results of the research showed that the chances of a shortage 
of space in the Rotterdam port in the near future were pronounced and 
that this situation was undesirable due to the importance of the port for the 
Dutch economy. The cabinet recognized that expansion of the port was 
both necessary and useful and that in light of these spatial developments, 
the possibilities for an improvement in the quality of the social 
environment would be utilized. In order to perform more research and set 
up project activities, the Rotterdam Mainport Development Project (PMR) 
was established, which consisted of five ministries, the city of Rotterdam, 
the municipality of Rotterdam and the province of South-Holland (PMR, 
2002). The assignment for PMR was very broad, but in principle consisted 
of an investigation of possible solutions to reach the double objective. 
When PMR began her tasks in 1998, however, the Rotterdam Municipal 
Port Management (RMPM) did not receive PMR “with a very warm 
welcome” (PMR, 2002: 11). In Rotterdam, the RMPM had already decided 
in its Port Plan of 1993 that an expansion of the port was necessary. 
Furthermore, RMPM had already started a project for possible land 
acquisitions in 1994. The RMPM realized, however, that government 
intervention in this project was necessary for the procedures of spatial 
planning and financing, and eventually co-operated with PMR (PMR, 
2002). 
 
In May 1998 the cabinet decided that the decision making process for the 
expansion of the Rotterdam port would follow a Core Planning Decision 
(PKB) procedure. The result of a PKB procedure is a government decision 
that cannot be reversed – the concrete policy decisions are no longer liable 
for discussion at decision making processes of the national government or 
other governments. In addition to the PKB procedure, the cabinet also 
decided that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and an Inventory 
Economic Effects (IEE) would be carried out. The IEE was to focus on 
the social costs and benefits of the Rotterdam port expansion. 
 
Opinions on the dimensions of the shortage of space in the Rotterdam 
port were, however, still ambiguous. While the RMPM had published data 
that showed the necessity for the port expansion by 1000 hectares, CPB 
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had provided arguments that showed 650 hectares would be sufficient. In 
September 1998, the research institute Nyfer published another report on 
assignment of RMPM called “Golden Brims of Rotterdam” (Gouden 
Randen van Rotterdam, Nyfer, 1998). The argumentation was that old port 
areas could be used for expensive housing and offices that would result in a 
value increase of the land. This value increase constitutes income that could 
then be allocated to the financing of the Rotterdam port expansion. The 
study received much criticism. Mr. Stekelenburg from the South-Holland 
Environmental Federation (Zuid-Hollandse Milieu Federatie, ZHF) argued 
that although such an idea sounded attractive, it was unthinkable as most of 
the land was already owned by people who would not want to move. 
Professor Pols of Delft University furthermore criticized Nyfer for stating 
an idea that is already twenty years old and only benefits RMPM while 
criticizing its rival CPB. Both statements were made during radio interviews 
(Argos, Radio 1, 18 October 2002) in the context of a program on the 
“scientific independence” of Nyfer in its research for such principals as the 
RMPM. It shows how the conflict between CPB and the RMPM existed 
from the start of the port expansion project. 
 
After PMR was established, a first key document that was published in 
June 1999 was called “PMR on Course” (PMR op Koers) (PMR, 1999). In 
this report PMR concluded that the need and necessity for a port 
expansion had been substantiated. The path to be taken to deal with the 
port expansion would be (1) to make the use of existing port space more 
efficient; (2) to reclaim land from the sea; and (3) to link the port 
development to the development of 750 hectares of new nature and 
recreation area. A year later, in June 2000, a compromise was reached with 
the Consultation Non-Governmental Partners (ONR), a panel of different 
stakeholders, including environmental organizations, the Province of 
South-Holland, the Municipality of Rotterdam and the City of Rotterdam. 
The ONR agreed on 1000 hectares port expansion and 750 hectares of new 
nature and recreation area and presented a unanimous advice to the 
cabinet. In July, the cabinet presented its decisions in a letter to the Lower 
House, where much of the ONR advice had been incorporated. The 
research task of PMR ended and its activities were now aimed at the 
preparation of political decision making and establishing the public-private 
cooperation for further planning and execution of the project (PMR, 2002).  
 
Already in the initial decision of the cabinet in 1996, it was decided that 
social costs and benefits of the Rotterdam port development would need to 
be identified. Initially, only an analysis of land reclamation was to be 
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performed, but the environmental organizations were very interested in a 
cost-benefit analysis of the 750 hectares nature and recreation area as well, 
as a support for government decisions. The Province of South-Holland, the 
delegated principal of this sub-project,  was also in favor of such a cost-
benefit analysis and the organizations lobbied with PMR for the analysis to 
be carried out. They succeeded. In August 2000, the social cost-benefit 
analysis process on the reclamation of land was started and later that year 
the cost-benefit analysis on the development of 750 hectares of nature and 
recreation area.  
 
While still working on the cost-benefit analyses, CPB, NEI and RIVM 
made the press by stating in a tentative report that in the short run no 
capacity problems were to be expected in the Rotterdam port. They further 
substantiated these statements in a letter to the Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works and Water Management (CPB, 2000). In this letter, CPB 
explained how it did not expect major bottlenecks in the capacity of the 
port and instead supported the use of markets that would stimulate 
competition to provoke an increase of space in the port. The RMPM 
reacted to this letter (RMPM, 2000) by stating that the figures used by the 
CPB were still in the process of being discussed since the research was still 
in progress. RMPM questioned whether the Steering Committee and 
Advisory Board of the cost-benefit analysis would agree with CPB’s 
interpretation of the numbers. Major discussions erupted between CPB and 
RMPM, in which the point of dispute lay in particular in expected future 
norms of noise pollution.  
 
In May 2001, the cabinet initiated part I of the PKB. Two of the sub-
projects (land reclamation and improving use of current port space) would 
be delegated to the Municipality of Rotterdam, while the other project (750 
hectares of nature and recreation area) would be delegated to the Province 
of South-Holland.   
 
Both cost-benefit analyses were published in May 2001. The result of the 
cost-benefit analysis of land reclamation was that in light of the shortage of 
space in the Rotterdam port, reclamation of land for the second Meuse 
plain would contribute positively to welfare in the Netherlands. However, 
the benefits would be dependent on when this shortage of space would 
occur – if shortage of space remains limited until 2035, the costs of land 
reclamation would exceed its benefits. Benefits would furthermore be 
dependent upon future economic growth scenario’s and future norms on 
noise pollution. These elements would also influence the phases in which 
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the land is to be reclaimed. If more than 3% economic growth is realized, 
land reclamation should be performed between 2007 and 2010. If 
economic growth is approximately equal to 2.5%, land reclamation should 
be postponed. Similarly, when the current space in the port can’t be 
increased within existing norms on noise pollution, benefits of land 
reclamation would exceed its costs. If, on the other hand, current space can 
be increased within noise pollution norms, land reclamation would result in 
net costs. The results of the second cost-benefit analysis on the 
development of 750 hectares of new nature and recreation area show that 
in the long run (more than 35 years), the willingness to pay by Dutch 
society for the 750 hectares exceeds the investment costs. 
 
6.2.2 Institutional Context of the Economic Valuation Process 
 
Choices in the economic valuation process are made within a context of 
formal and informal institutions (see section 3.4). In this context, scientific 
paradigms, policy paradigms and rules and regulations can be distinguished. 
This section will explain these institutions in the context of the two 
economic valuation processes in relation to the port development in 
Rotterdam. 
 
The discussions in the policy arena were dominated by policy paradigms of 
rational economic arguments. This is a long-standing tradition in decisions 
of large governmental infrastructural projects in the Netherlands, where the 
amounts of money invested in these projects are enormous and therefore, 
understandably, would need to be compensated by at least the same 
amount of benefits. Hence, decisions on infrastructural projects needed to 
be substantiated with quantitative economic analyses. Any decision in this 
context is a political decision and both cost-benefit analyses played a 
limited role in the discussions, although the cost-benefit analysis on land 
reclamation played a more prominent role than the analysis of the 750 
hectares of nature and recreation area. Its major role lay in the 
recommendations regarding the phasing of the land reclamation. As 
conveyed by many of the interviewed, however, the fact was that the 
outcome of the cost-benefit analysis was relatively positive in terms of 
benefits of reclamations, and the question remains what role it would have 
played in policy making had the outcome been negative.  Would this have 
led to a negative decision by the cabinet on land reclamation and thus have 
played a more important role? Nevertheless, both cost-benefit analyses 
linked well with existing policy paradigms on infrastructural projects that 
remain dominated by rational economic arguments in the Netherlands. 
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Other policy paradigms also played an important role in the context of the 
port development in Rotterdam. First, environmental problems in general 
were institutionalized in Dutch society, which was reflected in the large 
number of environmental organizations, backed by an enormous number 
of supporters that were involved in the decision making process of the 
Rotterdam port expansion. Furthermore, the government accepted that 
nature should play a key role in the port developments since activities that 
would affect the environment would be compensated and, additionally, the 
plans were linked to a development of 750 hectares of new nature area. 
Secondly, government policy towards infrastructural projects in water 
management were dominated by an integrated water management 
approach. In fact, the decision making process of the port expansion was 
labeled as the Netherlands’ first ‘green polder model’, where all 
stakeholders of the project were integrated. All functions and parties 
affected, including those representing the ecological functions that would 
be affected by the port expansion, were recognized and played an 
important role in the decision making processes. Third, the area in the 
North Sea that would be reclaimed for the port expansion was recognized 
as a scarce resource since the entire area would be compensated by the 
creation of an exact same area somewhere else.  
 
The second element in the informal institutional context are scientific 
paradigms. In this element, two aspects were distinguished as being of 
influence on choices in the economic valuation process -  domination of 
certain economic paradigms and a general increase in popularity of 
economic valuation studies. In the cost-benefit analysis on land 
reclamation, the first aspect plays an important role, while the second 
aspect is less important. The interviewed clearly stated that the increasing 
popularity of economic valuation was not a motivation for certain choices 
in this economic valuation study and is thus disregarded as a key influence 
on valuation choices. The dominance of certain economic paradigms, 
however, did play an important role. It can be argued that the scientific 
economic paradigm in the context of the economic valuation process was 
slightly dominated by more traditional, neoclassical economic viewpoints. 
Standard economic arguments on economic profitability played a major 
role in the political motivations to allow land reclamation for the port 
expansion in the first place, even if this would involve human interference 
with the ecosystem. As long as nature is compensated and the benefits of 
land reclamation would exceed its costs, land reclamation would in 
principal be supported. The scientific paradigms of the CPB and NEI, the 
economic research institutes involved in this study, also slightly lean 
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towards a more traditional economic approach as opposed to for example a 
more ecological economics approach. The starting point in both research 
institutes is the economic system, not the integrated economic-ecological 
system.  
 
In the second cost-benefit analysis on the development of 750 hectares 
nature and recreation area, the other aspect of scientific paradigms played 
an important role in the choices of the economic valuation process – 
increased popularity in economic valuation studies. The dominance of 
certain economics paradigms was less significant since one of the two 
contracting parties (NEI) was dominated by a more traditional economics 
approach, while the second stakeholder (RIVM), as a more environment 
and healthcare oriented research institute was dominated by a less 
traditional economics approach. It is unclear as to which of the two 
dominated. The increase in popularity in economic valuation studies, 
however, did play a clear role in the choices of the economic valuation 
process. The interviewed principals of this valuation study stated that the 
publication of economic valuation studies had given them the impression 
that such studies could be carried out and could be useful in certain 
decision making contexts concerning the environment. It stimulated them 
in carrying out the economic valuation studies.  
 
In the formal institutional context, major rules and regulations on the 
economic valuation process were absent, however a significant report was 
published that provided guidelines to the process of social cost-benefit 
analysis. In the 1990s, major discussions erupted on the benefits of various 
large infrastructure projects, especially in the development of the 
“Betuwelijn”, a railroad track for the transport of goods from the port of 
Rotterdam to Germany. The effects of government investments differed 
according to each study, which could often be explained by the application 
of different terms, disagreement on the type of benefits that may be 
attributed to a certain project and even political games (Volkskrant, 2000). 
Following these discussions, the Ministries of Transport and Economic 
Affairs initiated the Research Program on the Economic Effects of 
Infrastructure (OEEI). The program produced about ten reports, which 
were integrated into a guide for cost-benefit analysis. This guide was 
published in 2000 (Eijgenraam, et al., 2000). The essence of the report was 
that all large infrastructural projects should be subject to a social cost-
benefit analysis, and the report provided guidelines on how such an analysis 
should be performed. The report was written by the same organizations 
that carried out the cost-benefit analyses related to the port development of 
Rotterdam (CPB and NEI), and served as a basis for both analyses. 
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Although the OEEI report doesn’t provide specific guidelines on 
economic valuation of ecosystems, it mentions economic valuation and its 
methods as an approach to integrate environmental effects in a social cost-
benefit analysis. It thereby stimulated discussions on economic valuation 
and raised awareness among both scientists and policy-makers on the 
possibilities and limitations of economic valuation. 
 
An important element in the formal institutional context of the Rotterdam 
port expansion were the EU Birds and Habitat Directives, which had been 
adopted by the Netherlands. These directives call for an obligation to 
prevent any pollution or disturbance to birds in a certain area and prohibit 
any activities that may affect the protected area. The area designated for 
reclamation in the project fell under these Directives. This meant that the 
area affected would need to be compensated by the exact same type of 
nature area. It therefore steered the identification of the area Midden-
IJsselmonde as compensation area in the Rotterdam port project. 
 
6.2.3 Institutional Context Following the Economic Valuation Process 
 
After the two cost-benefit analyses where published, a debate was 
organized to discuss specific aspects of the studies. The reactions in this 
debate where more or less positive. This was followed by a report of the 
Advisory Board (KPMG, 2001). In addition to a role as supervisor, it was 
asked to examine and judge both cost-benefit analyses. Its report stated 
among others that the researchers had worked and delivered their reports 
in a responsible way. The Advisory Board criticized the contents of the 
land reclamation cost-benefit analysis based on non-transparency of the 
calculations as well as the decision made by the researchers that no 
empirical research was carried out on use and existence values for the study 
on 750 hectares of nature and recreation area. The Board was less satisfied 
with the process in the cost-benefit analyses – it was unclear who was the 
principal of the research: the PMR and its delegated principals or the 
researchers (contracting parties). 
 
In December 2001, the RMPM gave an official reaction to the cost-benefit 
analysis on land reclamation (RMPM, 2001). In this report, RMPM argued 
why the numbers presented by CPB, NEI and RIVM should be perceived 
as a minimum. It provided arguments that substantiated the need and 
necessity of the port expansion and that, based on these arguments, the 
outcome of the cost-benefit analysis is in actual fact a worse case scenario. 
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Also in December 2001,  the cabinet presented Part III of the PKB 
together with both cost-benefit analyses to the Lower House. The Lower 
House agreed half a year later, followed by the Upper House in July 2002. 
In February of that same year, a request for advice had been sent to the 
European Commission on the Bird and Habitat Directives. At the moment 
of writing, the European Commission still needs to decide whether the 
European Bird and Habitat Directives have been properly followed in the 
PKB decision making procedure. Once this has been received, the 
government decision about the project is officially published in Part IV of 
the PKB+, and, followed by possible procedures of appeal, made 
irrevocable.  
 
6.3 Characteristics of the Two Cost-Benefit Analyses 
 
6.3.1 Land Reclamation 
 
Section 3.4.5 explained that characteristics of the economic instrument of 
which the economic valuation process is part are important influences on 
the choices of the economic valuation process. The economic instrument 
used in these case studies is social cost-benefit analysis, and the following 
characteristics may be identified as influences: the use type of the economic 
instrument, its goal, and its time and budget constraints. This section will 
explain these characteristics for the cost-benefit analysis on land 
reclamation, while the next section will discuss the cost-benefit analysis on 
the development of 750 hectares nature and recreation area. 
 
The social cost-benefit analysis was applied as part of the Core Planning 
Decision Procedure (PKB), the political decision making process 
concerning the expansion of the Rotterdam port. The use type is project 
evaluation – an evaluation of all direct social welfare effects of the project 
land reclamation in comparison with a situation without land reclamation. 
 
The goal of the study is less clear cut. In first instance, one may think in 
terms of decision identification – the government needs to make a decision 
on how to deal with the shortage of space in the port and one solution is to 
reclaim land from the sea. The cost-benefit analysis is applied to identify 
whether the option to reclaim land is economically interesting. On the 
other hand, a very likely goal was also to justify political decisions that have 
already been made based on other (political) factors. This is, however, 
difficult to say since the outcome of the cost-benefit analysis was in favor 
of the decision to reclaim land for the port expansion. Had the outcome of 
the study been negative, it remains unclear, according to the interviewed, 
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what the consequences of this for the decision making process would have 
been. Hence, due to a lack of argumentation, it is assumed that the goal of 
the cost-benefit analysis is to identify a decision on the port expansion. 
 
Both time constraints and budget constraints did not significantly exist for this 
cost-benefit analysis. The interviewed clearly stated their choices were not 
affected by these elements.  
 
6.3.2  Development of 750 Hectares Nature and Recreation Area 
 
The social cost-benefit analysis on the development of 750 hectares new 
nature and recreation area was also applied as part of the Core Planning 
Decision Procedure (PKB), the political decision making process 
concerning the expansion of the Rotterdam port. The use type was project 
evaluation, where the cost-benefit analysis is applied to identify all direct 
effects of the creation of 750 hectares new nature and recreation area 
compared to a situation without this area. 
 
Although it may be argued that the goal of this cost-benefit analysis was also 
to identify decisions, arguments can be made that support the goal as being 
a justification of decisions. The interviewed stated clearly that the political 
decision for the development of 750 hectares nature and recreation area 
had already been made. Additionally, there was no initial need from the 
government to carry out a cost-benefit analysis - it was only after demands 
from Consept and the Province of South-Holland, that the assignment for 
this cost-benefit analysis was given. Both Consept and the Province of 
South-Holland viewed the economic valuation as an extra support, a solid 
economic base, to further justify the political decisions.  
 
Both time constraints and budget constraints played a major role in this cost-
benefit analysis. The time available for this study was several months less 
than the cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation. Furthermore, the budget 
necessary for a decent quantification of ecosystem functions was also 
lacking. The interviewed stated that both aspects played a major role in the 
choices of the cost-benefit analysis. 
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6.4 The Stakeholders Context 
 
6.4.1  Direct and Indirect Stakeholders 
 
The stakeholder context of the two processes of economic valuation is very 
complex. Since the valuation study was applied as part of a political 
decision making process, dominated by what was called the “first green 
polder model” (PMR, 2002), numerous stakeholders were involved, both in 
the direct and in the indirect context of the valuation study. In this section, 
the key direct and indirect stakeholders in the context of the two valuation 
processes will be explained. If necessary, a distinction will be made between 
the stakeholder context of the cost-benefit analysis of land reclamation and 
the cost-benefit analysis of the development of 750 hectares of nature and 
recreation area. 
 
With respect to the cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation, the following 
direct stakeholders are distinguished: 
 
1. Principal: PMR 
2. Contracting party: CPB, NEI, RIVM 
3. Steering Committee: Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management,  Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finances, City of Rotterdam, Municipality of 
Rotterdam, Province of South-Holland, representatives of the PMR Board 
and representatives of the Expertise Center of PMR. 
4. Interviewed and Consulted Persons 
5. Advisory Board: Mr. Blankert, Mr. Jonkhart, Professor Mennes, Professor 
Opschoor and Mrs. van Lier Lels. 
 
For the cost-benefit analysis on the development of 750 hectares of nature 
and recreation area, the following direct stakeholders are distinguished: 
 
1. Principal: Province of South-Holland 
2. Contracting party: NEI, RIVM 
3. Steering Committee: Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management,  Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Ministry of   Finances, City of Rotterdam, Municipality 
of Rotterdam, Province of South-Holland, representatives of the PMR 
Board and representatives of the Expertise Center of PMR. 
4. Interviewed and Consulted Persons 
5. Advisory Board: Mr. Blankert, Mr. Jonkhart, Professor Mennes, Professor 
Opschoor and Mrs. van Lier Lels. 
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In the starting bill of the project in 1998, it was decided that a cost-benefit 
analysis was to be carried out as an integrated assessment of the costs and 
benefits of land reclamation for Dutch society. Mr. Bas van Holst was 
asked to become the manager of this project, and one of his first tasks was 
to find the contracting party to carry out the analysis. The Central Planning 
Bureau (CPB) was the most obvious and interested party to take this 
position, but RMPM, the Rotterdam Municipal Port Management, objected 
(PMR, 2002). As was explained in section 6.2, the relationship between 
CPB and RMPM was dominated by conflict and RMPM saw CPB in the 
position of contracting party as an organization with double interests: its 
official role as advisor to the Dutch government and an “impartial” 
executor of the cost-benefit analysis. The problem for the principal of the 
analysis, PMR, was that not many other organizations in the Netherlands 
existed with the required expertise to carry out a cost-benefit analysis35. A 
solution was at first sought in a cooperation between private and public 
partners: private parties would provide project proposals and the CPB 
would test these proposals together with the Netherlands Economic 
Institute (NEI) and the National Institute of Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM) (PMR, 2002). The latter three public organizations 
would develop a guideline for cost-benefit analysis, which the private 
parties could apply to their proposals. The cabinet, however, decided it 
would not support such a public-private cooperation and new solutions 
needed to be sought. This was eventually found in a cooperation between 
the three organizations CPB, NEI and RIVM as contracting parties of the 
analysis, while an Advisory Board with external experts would guard the 
process and quality of the research (PMR, 2002).  
 
The principal of the cost-benefit analysis of land reclamation was the Project 
Mainport Development Rotterdam (PMR). This organization, which started its 
activities in 1998, consisted of representatives from the following 
organizations: 
 
- Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W) 
- Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM) 
- Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (LNV) 
- Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) 
- Ministry of Finances (Fin) 
- City of Rotterdam 
                                                 
35 This situation is also highlighted by Buck Consultants in their evaluation of the OEEI 
guidelines (Buck Consultants, 2002), who state that many parties view the position of the 
CPB in the Netherlands as too dominant in the execution of cost-benefit analyses. 
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- Municipality of Rotterdam  
- Province of South-Holland 
 
In the logbook, of PMR (PMR, 2002), it is explained how each of these 
organizations had different interests in the expansion of the Rotterdam 
port project. Although stated somewhat simplistically, it shows how the 
principal was not one single stakeholder but that the cost-benefit analysis 
already from the principal perspective was carried out in a context of 
stakeholders with diverse interests. For example, the main interests of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries regarding the 
port expansion was mainly nature protection and development. The 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, on the other 
hand,  wanted houses in the Waal port and an improvement in the quality 
of the social environment. The Ministry of Finance did not want to “waste” 
any money, while the Ministry of Economic Affairs pursued economic 
growth. Furthermore, the Province of South-Holland particularly desired a 
better position within public management of the Netherlands, and the 
municipality of Rotterdam (which includes - and was often represented by - 
the RMPM) wanted to finally realize the expansion of the Rotterdam port it 
had made clear years before. It is evident that the principal of the cost-
benefit analysis PMR consisted of a wide variety of interests and stakes.  
 
Within PMR, a special project on cost-benefit analysis was established. This 
group was led by Mr. Bas van Holst, himself an economist. Mr. van Holst 
had been involved with many cost-benefit analyses and had extensive 
knowledge of the procedures and calculations. Therefore, he was asked by 
the Dutch Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water Management as 
an expert in cost-benefit analysis to lead the group.  
 
The principal of the other cost-benefit analysis on the development of 750 
hectares of nature and recreation area was also PMR, but was delegated to 
the Province of South Holland. The Province strongly supported the execution 
of this cost-benefit analysis, and together with the environmental 
organizations, of which the South-Holland Environmental Federation 
(Zuid-Hollandse Milieu Federatie) was the most important one, could be 
seen as the initiators of this cost-benefit analysis. They believed that a 
secure economic substantiation would be important for the decision 
making process. After discussions between CPB, NEI, PMR and other 
stakeholders, it was decided that the Province would lead the cost-benefit 
analysis as they were also leading the project 750 hectares nature and 
recreation area. From the Province, Mr. Ron Houterman led the cost-
benefit analysis, and Mr. Slootweg provided the link between the cost-
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benefit analysis and the project 750 hectares nature and recreation area and 
consistency on the contents. 
 
As was explained earlier, the cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation was 
carried out by three organizations: the Central Planning Bureau (CPB), the 
Netherlands Economic Institute (NEI) and the National Institute of Public Health 
and the Environment (RIVM). Initially, the other cost-benefit analysis on the 
development of 750 hectares of nature and recreation area was also to 
involve these three organizations, but the CPB had both difficulties with 
this analysis and little time due to its leading role in the cost-benefit analysis 
on land reclamation, and decided not to co-operate. As a result, NEI and 
RIVM together carried out the second cost-benefit analysis.  
 
In the mission statement of the CPB, it says that it aims to make 
independent economic analyses and prognoses, with a scientific base (CPB, 
2002). Their research is relevant for policies of government, the parliament 
and other organizations like political parties and businesses within the 
Netherlands. It has much in-house economic expertise, and most economic 
research for the government is carried out by the CPB. Its research has a 
good reputation, and thus it is often asked to carry out economic research. 
The CPB was very interested to carry out the cost-benefit analysis on the 
expansion of the Rotterdam port and was asked by PMR to perform the 
cost-benefit analysis because (i) the CPB had already been involved in 
research on the Rotterdam port, and (ii) the CPB was involved with the 
“Research Program on the Economic Effects of Infrastructure” (OEEI), 
which was to produce a guideline for cost-benefit analysis. The CPB was 
assigned as head contractor for the cost-benefit analysis on land 
reclamation. 
 
The NEI (now called ECORYS-NEI) was established in 1929 and is now a 
major institute in the field of economic research and consulting in the 
Netherlands. It is an independent organization that performs research and 
gives policy advice globally in the fields of applied economics, technical 
assistance, training and knowledge transfer (NEI, 2002). According to Mr. 
van Holst of PMR, NEI was asked to join the CPB in the execution of the 
cost-benefit analysis because he had particularly good contacts with NEI: 
one member of NEI, Mr. Nol Verster, was his personal advisor in the 
PMR project, and Mr. van Holst had also worked for the NEI in the past.  
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Co-operation in the cost-benefit analyses with RIVM was suggested to 
PMR by CPB. RIVM is an institute that falls under the Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Sports, which carries out activities that aid policy development 
and inspection in the areas of healthcare, environment and nature. It also 
carries out research for other parties. The organization was included in the 
cost-benefit analysis of land reclamation mainly for their expertise 
regarding the environment. However, in the second cost-benefit analysis on 
the development of 750 hectares of nature and recreation area, it was 
actually the key organization to carry out the economic valuations of 
nature. 
 
To supervise both cost-benefit analyses, a Steering Committee was formed. 
This Steering Committee consisted of representatives from all PMR 
partners: the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management; 
the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment; the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries; the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs; the Ministry of   Finances; the City of Rotterdam; the 
Municipality of Rotterdam; and the Province of South-Holland. 
Furthermore, representatives of the PMR Board and of the Expertise 
Center of PMR were members. The PMR Board consisted of eleven 
representatives from the concerned Ministries, as well as the municipality 
of Rotterdam, who was represented by the Rotterdam Municipality Port 
Management, RMPM. The Expertise Center of PMR consisted of about 
twenty-five people and its main role was to generate information and 
supervise the Environmental Effects Report (MER). The Center grew out 
of the SM2V, a cooperation between the RMPM and the regional office of 
the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Water Management, set up 
during the preliminary discussions on the Rotterdam port. The contracting 
parties who carried out the cost-benefit analyses (CPB, NEI, RIVM) met 
with the Steering Committee approximately every three weeks for the 
entire period. The steering committee could ask questions and give 
feedback on the work that had been done.  
 
In both cost-benefit analyses, the interviewed and consulted persons were 
relatively limited. In general, the information and data input as well as the 
calculations were based on sources internal to the contracting parties. 
Although certain information was obtained from other parties such as 
PMR or the municipality of Rotterdam, no significant amount of 
stakeholders were interviewed that may have provided major inputs to the 
calculations. Other than the direct influence of the MER commission 
(which will be discussed separately in one of the following sections) 
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influences from interviewed and consulted persons on the choices made in 
both economic valuation processes was limited. 
 
An Advisory Board for both cost-benefit analyses was also established, which 
consisted of external experts. The Board was led by Mr. Blankert, and 
members were Mr. Jonkhart, Professor Mennes, Professor Opschoor and 
Mrs. van Lier Lels. The secretariat of the Board was provided by 
KPMG/BEA. The role of the Board was to “guard the quality of the cost-
benefit analyses” (PMR, 2002). They judged the professionalism and 
scientific accountability of the approach, guarded the process and reported 
to the Project Minister, Ms. Tineke Netelenbos, about the quality of the 
research. The organizations that carried out the cost-benefit analyses met 
with the Board ten times during the entire period. The Board evaluated 
both cost-benefit analyses after its publication in a letter to the project 
Minister. 
 
The second group of stakeholders of economic valuation processes are 
indirect stakeholders. For the cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation, the 
following key indirect stakeholders can be distinguished: 
 
1. Consept 
2. ONR 
3. RMPM 
4. Users of the services of the project 
5. MER Commission 
 
For the cost-benefit analysis on the development of 750 hectares of nature 
and recreation area, RMPM and users of the services of the project played a 
very limited role since the project was only indirectly related to the port 
developed – unlike the other cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation, the 
outcome of this cost-benefit analysis had no effect on the decision whether 
the port would be extended or not. Therefore, the key indirect stakeholders 
of this analysis were: 
 
1. Consept 
2. ONR 
3. MER Commission 
 
The major environmental organizations in the Province of South Holland 
had united in a coalition called Consept (Stekelenburg, 2002): 
 
- Zuid-Hollands Landschap 
- Stichting Duinbehoud 
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- Consulentschap Natuur en Milieu 
- Zuid-Hollands Landschapsbeheer 
- Vereniging tegen Milieubedreiging 
- Vereniging Natuurmonumenten Zuid-West 
- Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie (South-Holland Environment Federation) 
 
The leader of Consept was Arno Stekelenburg of the South-Holland 
Environment Federation (Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie). Consept’s main 
interest in the cost-benefit analyses lay in the environmental consequences 
of the analyses on land reclamation and the realization of the development 
of 750 hectares nature and recreation area. Their attitude towards the 
expansion of the Rotterdam port was proactive and it was perceived as one 
of their own projects. One year before the inception of PMR, the 
organizations had made their own analysis of the port situation in 
Rotterdam, which was used as a basis for the governmental starting note. 
In fact, many of the texts were actually adopted in the starting note (PMR, 
2002). Consept fully supported both cost-benefit analyses as necessary 
supports for the political decisions, and lobbied especially for the cost-
benefit analysis of the 750 hectares nature and recreation area 
(Stekelenburg, 2002).  
 
An important second group of stakeholders were united in the Consultation 
Non-Governmental Parties (ONR). The ONR was led by Mr. Hans Alders, the 
Commissary of the Queen in Groningen. Three groups can be 
distinguished in the ONR. The first group is Consept, which has been 
explained in the previous paragraph. Secondly, seven national organizations 
were invited to join Consept in a discussion panel to contribute to the 
discussions with PMR: 
 
- VNO-NCW 
- FNV 
- Nederland Distributieland (NDL) 
- ANWB 
- Unie van Waterschappen 
- Vereniging Natuurmonumenten 
- Stichting Natuur en Milieu 
 
The criteria for joining this panel were that the organizations should have 
some influence on management, a variety and high quality of social 
contributions to discussions with PMR and an interest in a dialogue with 
representatives of other groups with different stakes. The panel discussed 
with other stakeholders in the ONR.  
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The panel organizations represented a diversity of interests. VNO-NCW is 
the largest organization for Dutch companies – its members represent 80% 
of employment in the Netherlands. It promotes the interests of Dutch 
business both nationally and internationally. FNV is the largest trade-union 
in the Netherlands, and its area of interest concerns work and income. 
NDL represents the logistics sector of the Netherlands. Its goals are to 
promote the Dutch position in international logistics competition and to 
increase the knowledge base about the Dutch logistics sector. The ANWB 
sells all sorts of products in the areas of recreation, tourism, traffic and 
transport. In terms of interest promotion, its goals run along the following 
seven aspects: availability, approachability, livability, safety, affordability, 
freedom of choice and security. The Unie van Waterschappen is an 
umbrella organization that represents 53 water boards. Water boards are 
responsible for water management tasks in the Netherlands, such as flood 
control and drink water management. Both Stichting Natuur en Milieu and 
Natuurmonumenten are environmental organizations. Natuurmonumenten 
is an independent organization that promotes a “livable Netherlands” with 
sufficient space for nature. Its main activities include buying and managing 
nature areas. Stichting Natuur en Milieu also promotes a healthy nature and 
clean environment, but they are more a lobbying organization that aims to 
influence decisions in both the Netherlands and Europe. The main interest 
of both organizations lay therefore in the environmental aspects of the 
cost-benefit analyses.  
 
A third group of stakeholders in the ONR was the Province of South-
Holland, the Municipality of Rotterdam and the city of Rotterdam. The 
Province of South-Holland particularly desired a better position within 
public management of the Netherlands, and the municipality of Rotterdam 
(which includes - and was often represented by - the RMPM) wanted to 
finally realize the expansion of the Rotterdam port it had made clear years 
before. The city of Rotterdam pursued both an improvement of livability in 
the city and an improvement in its (future) economic position through an 
expansion of its port. 
 
As can be concluded from the previous sections, it cannot be said that the 
ONR represented a single interest. Moreover, it is such a complex 
organization that makes it impossible to state how each of the stakeholders 
within ONR may have influenced choices in the economic valuation 
process within the time available for this research. On the other hand, it 
can also be argued that although their stake in the entire project was big, in 
the economic valuation process itself the stake of the organizations other 
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than those united in Consept and the RMPM was less significant. These 
two stakeholders are discussed separately. To simplify the analysis, and 
thereby make the stakeholder context more manageable for the analysis in 
section 6.6, ONR as one stakeholder will be excluded from the analysis 
concerning the effects of elements in the context of the economic 
valuation process on its choices.  
 
The Rotterdam Municipal Port Management (RMPM) is another key 
indirect stakeholder in the economic valuation process, in particular with 
respect to the cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation. RMPM is 
authorized by the Municipality of Rotterdam to manage the port and 
industrial zone. Among other, its main tasks are the development, 
construction, management and operation of the port. Its goal is to 
“strengthen the position of the Rotterdam port and industrial zone within a 
European perspective” (RMPM, 2002). 
 
Other major organizations that had a stake in and influence on the project 
and cost-benefit analyses were the users of the services provided by the 
project and the Commission Environmental Effects Report (MER 
Commission). The users of the services of the project had a major stake in the 
cost-benefit analysis because they would be the organizations using the 
space and services provided by the expansion of the Rotterdam port. Here 
one must think of large container companies and particularly the chemical 
industry. Secondly, the MER Commission had an influence on the project 
because it decided what the environmental impacts of the cost-benefit 
analysis were and finally what environmental impacts were to be 
incorporated in the cost-benefit analyses. Since the cost-benefit analyses 
were to follow the MER directly, the choices made in the analyses 
concerning environmental effects were very much guided by the MER. 
 
6.4.2 Stakeholder Relationships 
 
In this section, the key stakeholder relationships will be explained for those 
direct and indirect stakeholders identified in the previous section. Two 
types of relationships will be distinguished according to the discussion in 
section 3.3.2: coalitions and interest groups. It was explained that 
stakeholders are most likely to form a coalition when the pay-off of 
forming a coalition exceeds the pay-off of engaging in interest group 
politics. This pay-off is related to the amount functional goals and 
ideologies converge. As a result, different coalitions will form that may 
compete with each other in interest group politics.  
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Coalitions are likely to form among stakeholders with converging goals and 
perspectives towards nature and economic issues. In the cost-benefit 
analysis on land reclamation, two key coalitions can be distinguished, which 
are depicted in Figure 11. The first coalition is formed between the different 
contracting parties, CPB, NEI and RIVM. These three stakeholders had 
one functional goal in common, namely to carry out the economic 
valuation study in order to identify the economic profitability of the project 
land reclamation. In the cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation, the CPB 
was the head-contractor. This implied that CPB decided, in consultation 
with NEI and RIVM, how the study and calculations were to be carried 
out. The three organizations divided up the tasks on who would carry out 
what aspects of the cost-benefit analysis - RIVM carried out most of the 
environmental calculations, while NEI and CPB shared the economic 
calculations. Hence, no conflict of interest existed with respect to ideology 
between RIVM on one side and CPB and NEI on the other side. 
Furthermore, the economic approaches of NEI and CPB converged in 
relation to this cost-benefit analysis. Due to the convergence of functional 
goals and no conflict in ideological standpoints, it is likely that the three 
contracting parties formed a coalition. The power within this coalition 
tends towards the CPB as the head contractor. Furthermore, it also receives 
the highest respect out of the three contractors when it comes to economic 
research in the Netherlands. 
 
Figure 11 Coalitions in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Land Reclamation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second coalition in this cost-benefit analysis is formed between the 
principal PMR and the contracting parties CPB, NEI and RIVM. The four 
parties had converging functional goals, namely to carry out the cost-
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benefit analysis to identify the decision on land reclamation. Concerning 
their ideologies, the perspective of the three contracting parties towards 
economics more or less converged with the economics perspective of the 
cost-benefit analysis project leader within PMR, Mr. Bas van Holst. Mr. van 
Holst had been an employer of one of the contracting parties, the NEI. On 
most aspects, the principal and contracting parties therefore formed a 
coalition. Power within this coalition seems to lean towards the contracting 
parties, with the CPB as the head contractor. This can be argued by looking 
at the advise of the Advisory Board, who found it difficult to see in both 
cost-benefit analyses who was actually the principal and who was the 
contracting party. Its overall impression of the process of the cost-benefit 
analyses was that the organizations delivered good work and operated in a 
responsible way, but one of its main criticisms was that in the process of 
both of the cost-benefit analyses it was unclear as to who directed the 
analyses: PMR and the Province of South-Holland, or the contracting 
parties. The Board therefore did not find a “standard principal-contractor 
relationship” but signals that this relationship was often perceived to be 
dominated by the contracting parties.  
 
The third coalition is formed between the Rotterdam Municipal Port 
Management (RMPM) and the users of the project’s services. The latter are 
companies that rely on the Rotterdam port, such as container companies 
and chemical companies. Their goals regarding the Rotterdam port and the 
outcome of the cost-benefit analysis converge: both want an expansion of 
the Rotterdam port and a positive outcome of the cost-benefit analysis that 
allows them to further pursue this expansion. Their interests are completely 
economic: while the port wants to retain its competitive position as the 
world’s largest port, the users of the services of the project want enough 
space to store their goods and containers. The power within this coalition 
increasingly leans towards the users of the services. This can be illustrated 
by a newspaper article of January 2001 (NRC, 2001), where it was 
explained how the Rotterdam port is slowly losing its competitive position, 
while other ports (like the port of Antwerp) improve their position. Hence, 
if space in the Rotterdam port does not increase, users will go to other 
ports. This provides them with more power relative to the RMPM, who 
will lose if the users go somewhere else. An example is the recent diversion 
of the Rotterdam’s largest customer, Maersk/Sealand, to the Bremerhaven 
port in Germany. 
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In the second cost-benefit analysis on the development of 750 hectares 
nature and recreation area, four coalitions were formed (see Figure 12). The 
first coalition is between the two contracting parties RIVM and NEI. Their 
common functional goal was to perform the cost-benefit analysis and, 
furthermore, their perspectives towards nature and economics in relation to 
this cost-benefit analysis more or less converged. Hence, their relationship 
can be characterized as a coalition. The second coalition is formed between 
these contracting parties and the principal, the Province of South-Holland 
(PZH). Their common functional goal was to perform this cost-benefit 
analysis, while their perspective at least towards economics also converged. 
 
Figure 12 Coalitions in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of 750 Hectares 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third coalition in this cost-benefit analysis is formed between the 
principal PZH and the principal of the project, PMR. PMR was officially 
the principal of both cost-benefit analyses, but had delegated it to the PZH. 
Their functional goal regarding the cost-benefit analysis converged, namely 
to carry out the cost-benefit analysis to justify the political decision, and so 
did their general viewpoints towards nature and economics. The fourth and 
last coalition of importance in this cost-benefit analysis is formed between 
the principal PZH and the coalition of environmental organizations 
Consept. The PZH stated to have sympathies with the environmental 
organizations and shared a similar perspective towards environmental 
aspects regarding this cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, their common 
functional goal was to carry out this cost-benefit analysis and both were the 
key initiators of this study. The power in all these coalitions did not 
significantly lean towards one of the stakeholders, except for the second 
coalition. Here, the same arguments apply as in the coalition between 
principal and contracting parties in the other cost-benefit analysis on land 
reclamation. Based on the advice of the Advisory Board, it was unclear as 
to who directed the analyses: the Province of South-Holland, or the 
contracting parties. Also in this analysis, the Board did not find a “standard 
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principal-contractor relationship” but signals that this relationship was 
often perceived to be the other way around. Power, therefore, leaned 
towards the contracting parties. 
 
Although a large number of stakeholders existed in both cost-benefit 
analyses, each with different interests, the most significant relationship in 
terms of interest group politics was formed between the CPB (one of the 
contracting parties) on the one hand and the coalition of the Rotterdam 
Municipal Port Management (RMPM) with the users of the project’s 
services on the other hand (see Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13 Interest Group Politics in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Land Reclamation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The core of the conflict is the relationship between the CPB and the 
RMPM, where the latter forms a coalition with the users of the port 
(container companies and chemical companies) and therefore does not 
stand alone in this conflict. Section 6.2 explained how this relationship was 
formed and what it looked like. For example, in November 2000, when the 
CPB, NEI and RIVM where still working on the first cost-benefit analysis 
but had not yet presented their results, the CPB published data that showed 
that a shortage of space in the Rotterdam port was not be expected in the 
immediate future (Netelenbos, 13 November 2000). This contradicted 
completely with the claims of the RMPM that were based on a market 
consultation with large shipping companies, namely that a shortage of 
space was looming and thus an expansion of the Rotterdam port necessary. 
This led to major disagreements between the two organizations, where the 
RMPM reacted by stating that the CPB’s statements were based on wrong 
calculations and above all did not take the increasing noise limitations in 
the port into account. These noise limitations became a second major point 
for dispute and dominated discussions with the Steering Committee and 
Advisory Board in which the RMPM took part. To solve the dispute, 
KPMG was contracted to research the effects of noise limitations and 
PMR organized several debates between RMPM, CPB and container 
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companies (PMR, 2002). Eventually, research showed that the effects of 
noise limitations were small (PMR, 2002), and CPB decided to include the 
post in the cost-benefit analysis, but without quantitative information – 
only stating that the effects were unknown and still needed to be 
determined. After the publication of the cost-benefit analysis, the RMPM 
published a reaction to the study “of the CPB, in cooperation with NEI 
and RIVM” (RMPM, 2001: 5). In this report, the RMPM explained why it 
viewed the results of the cost-benefit analysis as minimum estimations. It 
perceived the role of the cost-benefit analysis as a tool for evaluation as 
limited and stated that the analysis did not provide a correct total picture of 
the project. Therefore, the RMPM concluded, the end result of the cost-
benefit analysis is in actual fact more positive, which “suggests a larger 
credit balance of the expansion of the port than calculated in the cost-
benefit analysis.” (RMPM, 2001: 30). 
 
The base of this conflict of interest between these two organizations lies in 
conflicting goals and interests regarding the port expansion and the cost-
benefit analysis. While the coalitions are characterized by stakeholders that 
have converging goals and interests, these two stakeholders' goals and 
interests conflict. For example, while the RMPM desires the expansion of 
the Rotterdam port and sees the cost-benefit analysis either as a hindrance 
to this desire or as a substantiation, the CPB wants to carry out the analysis 
to identify whether the decision to extend the port through land 
reclamation is economically justified. The CPB is the key government 
economics advisor and has a high reputation to live up to when it comes to 
making economic projections. When other organizations make different 
projections that are not based on CPB models, its reputation is attacked. At 
the same time, the RMPM has a strong interest in extending the Rotterdam 
port so that it can continue to live up to its reputation as the world’s largest 
port. When an organization states that an expansion of the port may not be 
necessary, its interests in the port expansion are attacked.  
 
In both cost-benefit analyses, the other indirect and direct stakeholders are 
less important for the choices made in the economic valuation processes.  
 
6.5 Choices in the Two Economic Valuation Processes 
 
6.5.1 Land Reclamation 
 
In the next two sections, the characteristics of the economic valuation 
processes in the two cost-benefit analyses will be explained. This will be 
based on the theory of section 3.2, where it was explained how the 
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different formal stages in an economic valuation process can be 
summarized under pre-assessment and assessment choices. This section 
will not explain or account for these choices since this will be the task of 
the next section. Only a characterization of the choices in the valuation 
processes will be given.  
 
In the pre-assessment choices, five decisions need to be made. The first choice is 
to decide on the phenomenon that is being studied. In this study, the 
phenomenon was defined as land reclamation for the expansion of the 
Rotterdam port, which was made by the Dutch cabinet. The leadership for 
this project was given to PMR, who gave the assignment to carry out the 
cost-benefit analysis to CPB, NEI and RIVM. The second choice concerns 
the definition of the project-alternative. In this cost-benefit analysis, the 
project alternative was not defined as “doing nothing” or “current policy” 
(like in the cost-benefit analysis on gas extraction in the Wadden Sea) but 
as follows. If land would not be reclaimed, the result would be a shortage 
in port capacity, which would lead to an increase in rental price of space 
and measures to decrease the port customers or, alternatively, increase port 
space productivity. No land reclamation also leads to less reservation of 
port space for infrastructure. This project alternative allowed the 
contractors to develop scenario’s for noise pollution (yes or no), for 
potential demand and for the supply of current port areas based on 
information from the RMPM (“Vervolgstappen BRG”). 
 
The third choice is to decide which parties will be affected. The economic 
valuation process in this case study was part of a cost-benefit analysis so all 
relevant parties that loose and gain were identified. The exploiters of the 
Rotterdam port were identified as the first group who would profit by an 
increase in income, and users of the Rotterdam port were identified as the 
second group of gainers by increasing space available to them. The 
exploiter of the port was also identified as a stakeholder that would lose 
from the land reclamation project as it would have to compensate for 
nature that would be lost as a result of extending the port. Furthermore, 
parts of society would pay due to an increase in pollution as well as the 
chemical and container companies who would be facing increased 
environmental regulation burdens as a result of increased pollution. Of 
course, these are all gross losses: most groups both benefit and lose and the 
net effect is to be determined in the analysis. Additionally, the focus of the 
analysis was on the social effects of the port expansion in the Netherlands 
– this therefore includes environmental effects, but excludes the positive 
effects of the port expansion on the rest of Europe. These decisions were 
all made by PMR.   
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The fourth choice involves drawing the geographical boundaries. These were 
clearly drawn around the Netherlands – all effects of the Rotterdam port 
expansion outside the Netherlands were to be ignored in the economic 
valuation study. This choice was made by PMR. A fifth choice in the 
economic valuation process is to identify the impacts. These were: 
 
- Decrease in less important nature types 
- Decrease in important nature types 
- Increase in very important nature types through land reclamation 
- Increase in dunes through compensation 
- Increase in sea reserve through compensation 
- Possible negative effects on the Wadden Sea 
- Negative effects on landscape (such as view) 
- Air pollution 
- Water quality 
- Inconvenience due to smell 
 
Interestingly, effects as opposed to functions were selected, the reason 
being that the cost-benefit analysis had to connect with the Environmental 
Impact Statement of the MER Commission. All the selected environmental 
effects were in fact taken from the MER report. Not all of these impacts 
were, however, quantified, which brings us to the sixth and last step of the 
pre-assessment choices. First, the contracting parties CPB, NEI and RIVM 
decided that the quantification of the first five effects should be based on 
the costs of compensating the loss in nature elsewhere. The monetary 
values of these effects were calculated with the costs of the loss of nature 
as a result of the expansion of the Rotterdam port, which were set equal to 
the investment and management costs of a compensation area that would 
be created. However, since nature was being compensated, the net effects 
of the port expansion such as the decrease in less important nature types 
and important nature types, an increase in very important nature types 
through land reclamation, in dunes through compensation and in sea 
reserve through compensation in the Netherlands as a whole would equal 
zero. Therefore, the effects of the Rotterdam port on nature in the cost-
benefit analysis were set at zero. The only cost would be investment costs 
of compensating nature areas, which were incorporated in the construction 
costs of the land reclamation. Furthermore, possible negative effects on the 
Wadden Sea were uncertain so it was decided not to value them and 
exclude them from the cost-benefit analysis. The same decision was made 
for the effects on landscape. As for effects on water quality and smell, it 
was expected that the net effect of the expansion of the harbor would also 
be zero, so they were not quantified either. Thus, only air pollution effects 
were quantified. However, increased pollution due to more traffic entering 
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and leaving the area where the land reclamation would take place was 
analyzed but not valued. The reason is that without expansion of the port, 
containers for the Netherlands would need to be detoured to other ports, 
and so the net effects of pollution were set at zero. 
 
In the assessment choices, the first decision concerns how to quantify the 
effects into economic values. In this cost-benefit analysis, these choices 
concern the quantification of the effects of a port expansion on air 
pollution. This valuation first involved the quantification of pollution of 
CO2, NOx, SO2, VOS and PM10 into physical terms (tons or kilos) and 
later into monetary terms. The following valuation methods were applied: 
 
- CO2 pollution: Dose-Response approach 
- NOx and SO2: a combination of Dose-Response approach, Mitigation 
Behavior approach and cost-effectiveness of NOx reduction regulations 
- VOS and PM10: Dose-Response approach 
 
The information was taken from existing databases and publications and 
no new data was gathered. These decisions were made by the contracting 
parties CPB, NEI, and RIVM. The second step involves discounting the 
economic values. For this process, a discount rate of 4% was used and a 
time period of 35 years. The time period was selected because it was 
expected that most of the land reclamation could be finished by then and it 
therefore equals the project life span. The third and last step was a 
sensitivity analysis, which was carried out for three different scenarios for 
economic development into the future: (1) Divided Europe (GDP growth 
of 1.5 % per year); (2) European Co-ordination (GDP growth of 2¾ % per 
year); and (3) Global Competition (GDP growth of 3¼ % per year). These 
scenarios were developed by the CPB. Secondly, for each scenario two 
different perspectives on the capacity within the noise norms were applied: 
(1) much capacity within the noise norms; and (2) little capacity within the 
noise norms. This grew out of the discussions with the RMPM. 
 
6.5.2 Development of 750 Hectares Nature and Recreation Area 
 
In the pre-assessment choices of this second cost-benefit analysis in relation to 
the expansion of the Rotterdam port, the first choice concerns the 
definition of the phenomenon being studied. In this valuation process, the 
object is the construction and exploitation of 750 hectares of new nature 
and recreation area in the Rotterdam region to improve living conditions. 
The decision for the execution of the project was made by the cabinet, but 
the decision that a separate cost-benefit analysis would be carried out for 
this project was made by PMR after pressures from Consept and the 
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Province of South Holland. In the study, ten different options for this 
project were studied and compared with the alternative of not creating the 
750 hectares of nature and recreation area such that other developments 
would take place in the area. The second choice is the definition of the 
project alternative. Like in the cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation, the 
project alternative was not defined as “doing nothing” or “current policy” 
but as follows. In the situation that the 750 hectares of nature and 
recreation area is not realized, other nature development projects like the 
Main Ecological Structure (Ecologische Hoofdstructuur, EHS) and the 
1000 hectares ROM-Green agreement would still be completely realized. 
As a result, the 750 hectares is additional nature area in the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, when the 750 hectares is not developed, the land remains 
agricultural ground as it is today.  
 
The third step is to determine the parties that will be affected by the project. 
In this study, both costs and benefits in the Netherlands were analyzed, 
where the major costs were the development and exploitation costs of the 
nature area, and the major benefits were the development of new nature 
and recreation areas (the creation of use and non-use values). This was all 
decided by the contracting parties NEI and RIVM. The fourth choice was to 
draw the geographical boundaries, which were set around the Netherlands. 
Fifth, the following impacts of the creation of 750 hectares nature and 
recreation area were selected:  
 
- Costs of the initial investment; 
- Costs for management and maintenance 
- Benefits of exploitation of the areas 
- Costs and benefits to current inhabitants and owners of land (such as the 
sacrifice of agricultural land) 
- Benefits of an increase in use and existence value of nature and recreation 
area for surrounding communities 
- External effects 
 
The last two effects were taken from the MER, while the first were 
determined by NEI and RIVM.  The sixth and last step in the pre-
assessment choices is to determine which impacts to value. Not all of the 
effects selected in the previous step were chosen to be quantified. The 
costs and benefits to current inhabitants were largely not quantified 
because (1) forced  movements to other areas would not be required; and 
(2) only approximately 50 houses exist in the area so the effects on use and 
existence values are negligible and were included in the effects on 
surrounding communities. Hence, only part of this effect was selected for 
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quantification. The increase in existence value for surrounding 
communities, part of the fifth effect, was not quantified into monetary 
terms either but listed qualitatively, including its relative importance. The 
major reason was that in order to value these effects, it was necessary to 
carry out surveys (through for example the Contingent Valuation Method). 
Since the time was limited, but more importantly because of a limited 
budget, this was not possible. The same goes for the last effect, external 
effects of the project.  
 
In the assessment choices, the first decision is how to quantify the functions or 
effects into economic values. The following valuation methods were 
applied : 
 
- Costs of the initial investment: Market Pricing 
- Costs for management and maintenance: Market Pricing 
- Benefits of exploitation of the areas: Market Pricing 
- Costs and benefits to current owners of land: Dose-Response 
- Use value: both Hedonic Pricing Method and Travel Cost Method 
 
The second step involves the discounting process. For this process, a 4% 
discount rate was used and a time period of 35 years, the same as for the 
expansion of the Rotterdam port. The third step was a sensitivity analysis, 
which was carried out on ten scenarios concerning the types of nature areas 
developed. These scenarios were based on information from the 
Environmental Impact Assessment of the MER commission. 
 
6.6 Relationship Between Choices Valuation Processes and          
Their Contexts 
 
6.6.1 Influences of the Institutional Context 
 
So far, this chapter has explained the economic valuation processes and 
their contexts that are part of two cost-benefit analyses. These cost-benefit 
analyses, one on land reclamation and the other on the development of 750 
hectares new nature and recreation area, are both related to the expansion 
of the Rotterdam port. In section 6.2 of this chapter, the context of formal 
and informal institutions was explained, which was similar for both 
economic valuation processes as both were related to the same project. 
This section will explain what the influence of these institutions was on the 
different choices made in the two valuation processes that were described 
in section 6.5. 
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In the informal institutional context, three elements can be distinguished 
namely policy paradigms, scientific paradigms and rules and regulations. 
The influence of these elements was generally the same for both economic 
valuation processes, as will be further explained below. Policy paradigms 
contain the following three key elements that are likely to play an important 
role in the choices of the economic valuation processes: 
 
1. institutionalization of environmental problems  
2. dominance of rational and economic arguments  
3. dominance of an integrated water management approach 
4. perception of water as a scarce resource 
 
In the first cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation, all four elements of the 
policy paradigm context were of importance for the choices made during 
the economic valuation process. In particular, the first decision in the pre-
assessment choices was influenced, definition of the phenomenon being 
studied. The phenomenon of the economic valuation process was defined 
as the environmental consequences of land reclamation. These 
environmental consequences were incorporated in the social cost-benefit 
analysis due to the existing policy paradigms. First of all, environmental 
effects were integrated in the decision making process because 
environmental problems were institutionalized. Policy makers accepted the 
importance of the environment and the fact that nature areas affected by 
the land reclamation would need to be compensated. Furthermore, 
environmental organizations were involved in the decision making process 
from the start and were invited to voice their opinions in negotiations on 
how and how much the nature area would need to be compensated. This 
compensation formed the basis for the environmental valuations. Secondly, 
the discussions within the policy-making process were dominated by 
rational and economic arguments. The expansion of the Rotterdam port 
through land reclamation would be beneficial for the Dutch economy. 
Furthermore, since the expansion would be associated with huge sums of 
investments, the economic aspects of this project were of crucial 
importance. Therefore, a social cost-benefit analysis needed to be carried 
out as an economic substantiation of the political decision. Quantifying the 
environmental effects of the project and integrating them into the cost-
benefit analysis finalizes this economic substantiation. The third aspect is 
the integrated water management approach in policy making. Such an 
approach implies a more ecosystem approach towards water management 
issues in which different stakeholders are taken into account. This means 
that policy makers had to take the environment into account as well as the 
different stakeholders of the land reclamation project, which included 
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environmental organizations. The integration of the environmental 
organizations led to the definition of the compensated nature area, which 
formed the base for the economic calculations. Lastly, the fourth aspect, the 
perception of water as a scarce resource, also influenced the definition of 
the phenomenon. Aquatic ecosystems were increasingly recognized as 
valuable nature areas. The negative effects of human interventions in these 
ecosystems would therefore need to be compensated. The compensated 
nature area forms the basis of the phenomenon that is being studied by the 
economic valuation process. 
 
In the second cost-benefit analysis on the development of 750 hectares new 
nature and recreation area, the most important influence of these four 
elements was particularly on the first pre-assessment choice, definition of 
the phenomenon being studied. The phenomenon was defined as the costs 
and benefits of the development of 750 hectares nature and recreation area 
to improve living conditions in the Rotterdam area. This area, however, 
was not defined as an aquatic ecosystem. Therefore, the last two elements 
in the informal institutional context (dominance of an integrated water 
management approach and perception of water as a scarce resource) were 
not of significant influence on the first choice made in this valuation 
process because the phenomenon itself was not defined as a water 
management issue. The other two elements, however, were of key 
influence. 
 
The first element in the policy paradigm context concerns the fact that 
environmental problems had been institutionalized in the Netherlands. A 
high level of environmental awareness existed in society and the 
environmental movement had been mobilized. In fact, the environmental 
organizations were included in the decision making process on the 
Rotterdam port from the start. It was also the environmental movement 
that initiated the cost-benefit analysis on the 750 hectares in the first place 
and therefore played a key role in the determination of the phenomenon of 
the economic valuation process. Secondly, the discussion on the Rotterdam 
port expansion was dominated by rational arguments. The environmental 
movement and the principal of this valuation study, the Province of South-
Holland, were both interested in the development of 750 hectares new 
nature and recreation area, and knew that it would connect well with 
prevailing rational discussions by carrying out a cost-benefit analysis. This 
would aid in their pursuit to obtain the 750 hectares. Not only a traditional 
environmental or ecological analysis but also an economic analysis would 
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show that the development of this nature and recreation area would be 
beneficial to Dutch society. 
 
In the second aspect of the institutional context, scientific paradigms were 
distinguished. Two elements within this context were seen as important 
influences on choices in the economic valuation processes: 
 
1. Increased popularity economic valuation 
2. Dominance neoclassical and ecological economics  
 
The first element influences in particular the definition of the phenomenon 
in the economic valuation study on the development of 750 hectares new 
nature and recreation area. This element is less important in the cost-
benefit analysis on land reclamation – the principal (PMR) was convinced 
economic valuation should be carried out because it concerned a large 
infrastructural project for which social cost-benefit analyses had to be 
carried out according to government guidelines (see next section). In the 
cost-benefit analysis on 750 hectares of nature and recreation area, it was, 
however, less evident that a social cost-benefit analysis had to be carried 
out as it was not covered by the guidelines as a project. The principal 
(Province of South-Holland) and the coalition of nature organizations 
Consept, who initiated this cost-benefit analysis, stated they were 
influenced by reading other valuation studies in their demand for an 
economic valuation study. During this period, economic valuation of 
ecosystems gained more attention, partly due to an increase in international 
economic valuation studies, published in well-read journals in the 
Netherlands. The stakeholders knew the cost-benefit analysis could have 
added value in decision making on this project and were very optimistic 
about the possibilities of such a study.  
 
The second element is a dominance of certain economic paradigms with the 
key stakeholders of the economic valuation studies. While in the other case 
study on gas extraction (see chapter 5), the dominance of a combination of 
two economic paradigms with the two key stakeholders led to very 
interesting choices in the economic valuation process that were often not 
substantiated, such a situation does not prevail in these two case studies. 
Throughout the choices in both economic valuation processes, a balance is 
found between different economics paradigms, leading to relatively stable 
choices that are substantiated throughout the analysis. A very likely reason 
for this balance is that a wide variety of stakeholders with different 
perspectives were integrated in the cost-benefit analysis calculations, 
mitigating the effects of an economics paradigm residing within one or two 
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stakeholders as was the case in the previous chapter. For example, the NEI 
and CPB are institutes with more traditional economics paradigms, but 
RIVM is an environment institute that, according to the interviewed, is still 
skeptical about economic valuation of the environment. Furthermore, both 
the Steering Committee and the Advisory Board had a wide mix of people 
with diverging opinions, viewpoints and economic paradigms. As a result, 
the different scientific paradigms were mixed in both economic valuation 
studies to derive balanced choices throughout the economic valuation 
process. 
 
The third  element in the institutional context of the economic valuation 
process is the set of formal institutions, or rules and regulations. With respect 
to the economic valuation process and economic instrument, one must 
think in term of guidelines or standards of procedure. The following three 
aspects were distinguished in section 4.2.4: 
 
1. rules economic instruments 
2. rules economic valuation process 
3. rules environment 
 
First, while in the previous chapter, no guidelines for cost-benefit analysis 
existed, such a guideline had been produced by the time these cost-benefit 
analyses were carried out (see Eijgenraam et al., 2000). This guideline was 
abbreviated to “OEEI” (Research Program on the Economic Effects of 
Infrastructure), and was set up by the same organizations that carried out 
the cost-benefit analyses related to the Rotterdam port expansion – CPB 
and NEI. More specifically, the same people within these organizations 
were involved in both studies. Although the guidelines particularly 
emphasized the different steps that should be taken in a cost-benefit 
analysis, it also gave guidance to more specific choices within these steps. It 
can be argued that the OEEI guidelines particularly influenced three steps 
in both economic valuation processes. The first is the definition of the 
project alternative. The guidelines clearly state that this should equal neither 
“doing nothing” nor “current policy”. Instead, it should equal the best 
possible alternative, which is exactly how the project alternatives were 
defined in both cost-benefit analyses. Secondly, the guidelines influenced 
the identification of impacts to take into account, namely that the cost-
benefit analysis should follow the MER report and both cost-benefit 
analyses followed the MER report on the identification of environmental 
impacts. The third choice is the identification of impacts to be valued. The 
OEEI guidelines state that quantification of certain external effects are 
associated with uncertainties. In this case, attempts should not necessarily 
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be made to quantify these effects, depending on time and money. All those 
effects not quantified should be included in the cost-benefit analysis as PM 
(pro memory) posts. In the cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation the 
noise effects were included as a PM-post, while in the cost-benefit analysis 
on 750 hectares nature and recreation area, the external effects of vaults 
were a PM-post.  
 
There is at this point, however, still a lack of formal institutions or 
guidelines concerning the economic valuation process, the second element. 
This lack of guidelines also influenced the choices in the process. Only for 
those choices that are covered by the cost-benefit guidelines do agreements 
exist - the determination of the project-alternative, the identification of 
impacts, and the identification of impacts to be valued. The other choices 
of the valuation process had no such agreements. As was explained in the 
previous chapter, in the United States the NOAA panel developed 
guidelines for the Contingent Valuation method (Arrow et al., 1993), in 
which they cover guidelines for sampling, questionnaires and interviews, 
the elicitation format, present value calculations and so on.  It can be 
argued that specific economic valuation guidelines can influence especially 
those choices not covered by the OEEI cost-benefit analysis guidelines. 
These choices are the definition of the affected parties, how to define 
geographical boundaries, which valuation methods are the most 
appropriate for the valuation of certain ecosystem functions, which 
discount rate and which time span to apply in the discounting process, and, 
lastly, which factors to assess in the sensitivity analysis.  
 
Third, environmental regulations played a key role in the choices of the 
economic valuation processes. The EU Birds and Habitat Directives were 
important environmental regulations affecting the expansion of the 
Rotterdam port, and they were likely to have had influence especially on 
choices in the economic valuation process on land reclamation. In the 
other economic valuation process on the development of 750 hectares 
nature and recreation area, environmental regulations played a less 
prominent role in influencing the choices of the economic valuation 
process. In the study on land reclamation, they affected choices on which 
impacts to identify, which impacts to value and how to value them. The 
Habitat Directives state that any affected nature area that falls under these 
Directives needs to be compensated by developing exactly the same area 
somewhere else. The area designated for the port expansion falls under 
these Directives and therefore needs to be compensated. For the effects of 
the port expansion on the aquatic ecosystem, therefore, the choice on 
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which effects to take into account, which to value and how to value them 
became relatively straightforward – these choices would be completely 
covered by the investment and management costs of the compensated area.  
 
6.6.2 Influences of the Characteristics of the Economic Instrument 
 
The second element in the context of the economic valuation processes are 
the characteristics of the economic instrument in which the economic 
valuation process is applied. In both case studies, the economic instrument 
is the social cost-benefit analysis. The following elements were identified as 
likely influences on the choices in the economic valuation process: 
 
1. Use type 
2. Goal 
3. Time constraints 
4. Budget constraints 
 
The first characteristic of the cost-benefit analysis is its use type. In both case 
studies, this was defined as project evaluation. This use type probably had 
an influence on two of the pre-assessment choices, namely the parties 
affected and the impacts to identify. Its influence on the determination of 
the parties to take into account in both economic valuation processes is 
related to the fact that the project was being evaluated by a cost-benefit 
analysis. This implies that those parties that lose and those that gain from 
the projects need to be incorporated. The same argument can be made for 
the environmental impacts. Since the projects were being evaluated with a 
social cost-benefit analysis, all effects of the projects needed to be taken 
into account, including external environmental effects. Therefore, a wide 
range of environmental effects was selected to be taken into account.  
 
The second characteristic is the goal of the cost-benefit analysis. In the first 
cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation, the goal was to identify the 
decision on land reclamation, which influenced particularly the pre-
assessment choices. The first element it influenced was the identification of 
the project alternative, which was not set equal to “doing nothing” or 
“current policy”. Instead this situation was described according scenarios 
on noise pollution, potential demand and so on. Had the project-alternative 
been described as the situation equal to doing nothing, the decision on land 
reclamation would not be truly identified since the project alternative to 
which the decision is compared to would be  unrealistic. The second choice 
influenced by the goal was the selection of parties affected by the project. 
Since a decision was to be made based on a social cost-benefit analysis, 
both parties that lose and win as a result of the project needed to be 
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identified. The goal of the cost-benefit analysis also influenced the 
geographical boundaries of the economic valuation study. The goal was to 
identify decisions for Dutch society, and therefore the geographical 
boundary was drawn around the Netherlands. Especially the benefits, 
however, also fell outside these boundaries, in particular in Germany. 
These benefits have been presented in an appendix to the cost-benefit 
analysis, but where never incorporated in the analysis itself since this would 
not relate to the goal of the study. The next choice influenced by the goal 
was the identification of impacts. As the goal was to determine whether the 
option of land reclamation would be economically interesting from a social 
perspective, it meant that also social and environmental effects would need 
to be identified.  
 
The assessment choices in this cost-benefit analysis were less likely to be 
influenced by the goal of the cost-benefit analysis. For example, the choice 
on how to quantify the impacts into monetary units was based on available 
studies that allowed the contracting parties to quantify the effects on the 
one hand and the fact that nature would be completely compensated on the 
other. Standard and accepted valuation methods were applied for the 
quantification of pollution, like dose-response and mitigation behavior. 
This data was available. Furthermore, since nature would be completely 
compensated, the investment and management costs of new nature area 
would equal the economic value of the affected nature due to land 
reclamation. The choices for discounting variables were based on the 
OEEI guidelines for cost-benefit analysis, while the variables tested in the 
sensitivity analysis were substantiated as being the key factors of 
uncertainty in the cost-benefit analysis – future economic growth and 
future noise pollution levels. The goal of the cost-benefit analysis therefore 
played a limited role in these choices.  
 
It can be argued that the influence of the goal of the second cost-benefit 
analysis concerning the development of 750 hectares nature and recreation 
area was mainly on the first five choices - definition of the phenomenon 
being studied, the project alternative, the parties affected, geographical 
boundaries, identification of impacts and identification of impacts to be 
valued. The goal of this cost-benefit analysis was to justify the decision on 
the development of 750 hectares nature and recreation area. The 
phenomenon was defined as the costs and benefits of the development and 
exploitation of this nature and recreation area. Focussing on both costs and 
benefits, and presenting these aspects quantitatively would link very well 
with the goal of justifying political decisions. This way, the outcome of any 
possible future discussion on whether such a project could be justified in 
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terms of investment and exploitation costs versus the benefits of the 
project could be immediately influenced by such an analysis that showed 
positive net benefits. Secondly, the goal influenced the definition of the 
project alternative. The project alternative was not set equal to “doing 
nothing” or “current policy” – instead, this situation was described 
according to future scenario’s on land use. Had the project-alternative been 
described as the situation equal to doing nothing, the decision on land 
reclamation would not be truly justified since the project alternative to 
which the decision is compared to is unrealistic. The third choice 
influenced by the goal was the selection of parties affected by the project. 
Since a decision was to be substantiated by a social cost-benefit analysis, 
both parties that lose and win as a result of the project needed to be 
identified. The goal of the cost-benefit analysis also influenced the 
geographical boundaries of the economic valuation study. The goal was to 
justify decisions for Dutch society, and therefore the geographical 
boundary was drawn around the Netherlands. The last choice influenced by 
the goal was the identification of impacts. As the goal was to determine 
whether the option of developing 750 hectares nature and recreation area 
could economically be justified from a societal perspective, it meant that 
also social and environmental effects would need to be identified.  
 
The other two elements of the characteristics of the cost-benefit analysis, 
time and budget constraints, played a very important role in the cost-benefit 
analysis on 750 hectares nature and recreation area, but none in the choices 
of the cost-benefit analysis of land reclamation. In the latter analysis, 
neither time nor budget constraints were said to be significant. In the other 
cost-benefit analysis, however, both constraints existed and played a key 
role in one of the choices in the economic valuation process -  the 
identification of impacts to be valued. The fact that both time and budget 
constraints existed seriously influenced the choice that not every impact 
could be quantified. The valuation of existence value, for example, is very 
time intensive and costs quite a lot of money – as this was not available, the 
contracting parties decided not to carry out the quantification.  
 
6.6.3 Influences of the Stakeholders Context 
 
In section 6.4, two aspects in the stakeholder context of the economic 
valuation process were distinguished – the stakeholders and their 
relationships. In terms of the first aspect, stakeholders were divided into 
direct and indirect stakeholders of the valuation process. The following 
direct stakeholders were distinguished for both cost-benefit analyses on land 
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reclamation and the development of 750 hectares of nature and recreation 
area: 
 
1. Principal 
2. Contracting parties 
3. Steering committee 
4. Interviewed and consulted persons 
5. Advisory board 
 
The key stakeholders in both valuation processes were the principal, the 
contracting parties, the steering committee and the advisory board. The 
influence of the set of interviewed and consulted persons was limited as in 
both case studies data was primarily obtained from sources internal to the 
contracting parties or principal. The first important direct stakeholder in 
both economic valuation processes is the principal and its main influence 
was on the definition of the phenomenon being studied. Both PMR and 
the Province of South-Holland defined the subject of the cost-benefit 
analyses, which was the economic analysis of land reclamation and 
development of 750 hectares. The second direct stakeholder is the group of 
contracting parties, who in the first cost-benefit analysis consisted of CPB, 
NEI and RIVM, and in the second study of NEI and RIVM. Their main 
influences were throughout the economic valuation processes, as most of 
these choices were in fact made by the contracting parties. The exception is 
the first pre-assessment choice, the definition of the phenomenon, which 
was made by the principals. The third and fourth important direct 
stakeholders are the steering committee and advisory board. Through 
constant and regular discussions with the contracting parties, and the 
possibilities to ask critical questions, their influence on all choices, except 
for the definition of the phenomenon, was crucial.  
 
The most important indirect stakeholders of the first economic valuation 
process on land reclamation were defined as: 
 
1. Consept 
2. MER commission 
3. RMPM 
4. Users of the services of the project 
 
The first indirect stakeholder is the coalition of nature organizations 
Consept. It was involved in the negotiations on land reclamation and in 
particular in negotiations on nature compensation for the land reclamation. 
In that sense, it played an important role behind the scenes in this cost-
benefit analysis, but had little influence on the actual choices made in the 
valuation process. Its influence on choices was, however, important in the 
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other cost-benefit analysis, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
The MER commission was a second key indirect stakeholder in the 
economic valuation process, and its influence on the choices in the 
economic valuation process was direct, not through forming coalitions or 
engaging in interest group politics, as is the case with most other indirect 
stakeholders. The MER commission’s influence was in particular on the 
identification of impacts to take into account. The MER commission had 
identified all environmental impacts of land reclamation and the cost-
benefit analysis was to be exactly linked to the findings of the MER. Hence, 
the MER primarily determined the identification of impacts to take into 
account. The third and fourth indirect stakeholders of importance for the 
economic valuation process are RMPM and the users of the services of the 
project. Both had an indirect influence on choices in the valuation process 
through the forming of coalitions and engaging in interest group politics, 
which will be explained in the next paragraphs.  
 
In section 6.4.2, it was explained that two coalitions were formed in the 
cost-benefit analysis on land reclamation, namely: 
 
1. Contracting parties 
2. Principal and contracting parties 
3. RMPM and users project services 
 
First, a coalition was formed between the three contracting parties, in which 
power leaned towards the CPB. Since the contracting parties determined all 
the choices in the valuation process except for the first choice, this 
coalition influenced eight out of nine choices. A second crucial coalition is 
formed between the principal and the contracting parties. It was explained 
how power within this coalition leaned towards the contracting parties. 
This coalition also influenced all of the choices throughout the valuation 
process except for the first choice, which means that as the contracting 
parties had most of the power, they determined the choices in the valuation 
process. The third and last coalition was formed between the RMPM and 
users of the project services, such as container companies. The influence of 
this coalition was through engaging in interest group politics with another 
stakeholder, the CPB.  
 
The interest group politics relationship between the coalition of RMPM with 
the users of the project’s services on the one hand and the CPB on the 
other hand influenced particularly two choices in the economic valuation 
process. Both of these choices relate to the expected future norms on noise 
pollution, a major source of conflict between the CPB and RMPM. The 
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RMPM expected these norms to increase in the future, and was convinced 
this would form a major limitation to the expansion of current port space. 
They felt that the CPB did not take these expectations enough into account 
in their cost-benefit calculations. The first choice affected by the interest 
group politics is determination of the project alternative. This project 
alternative consisted among others of scenarios of future noise pollution. 
The second choice affected was the sensitivity analysis, where the expected 
future noise pollution scenario’s also played a key role.  
 
The two most important indirect stakeholders of the second cost-benefit 
analysis on the development of 750 hectares nature and recreation area were defined 
as: 
 
1. MER commission 
2. Consept 
 
The first indirect stakeholder is the MER commission. Although all indirect 
stakeholders up until now have had influences on economic valuation 
choices through forming coalitions or engaging in interest group politics, 
the MER commission’s influence on the valuation process was direct. More 
specifically, its influence was directly on the identification of impacts to 
take into account. The MER commission had identified all environmental 
impacts of land reclamation and the cost-benefit analysis was to be exactly 
linked to the findings of the MER. Therefore, the MER actually 
determined the identification of impacts to take into account. The influence 
of the second indirect stakeholder, Consept, however must be explained by 
looking at the coalition it formed.  
 
In the cost-benefit analysis on the development of 750 hectares nature and 
recreation area, three coalitions were formed: 
 
1. Contracting parties 
2. Principal and contracting parties 
3. Delegated principal cost-benefit analysis and principal project 
4. Principal and Consept 
 
The first coalition was formed between the two contracting parties, NEI 
and RIVM. Its influence was on all the choices of the economic valuation 
process since these were made by the coalition except for the first choice, 
which was made by the principal. The second coalition was formed between 
the principal and contracting parties, in which power, as was explained in 
section 6.4.2, leaned towards the contracting parties. This coalition also 
influenced all the choices except for the first choice. In other words, the 
Two Cost-Benefit Analyses Related to the Rotterdam Port Development 
 183
contracting parties made the choices in a coalition with the principal, 
however as power within this coalition leaned towards the contracting 
parties they dominated in the choices. Third, a coalition was formed 
between the delegated principal of the cost-benefit analysis and the 
principal of the project. Its influence was only on the first choice of the 
economic valuation process – definition of the phenomenon being studied. 
Both principals together determined that the development of 750 hectares 
nature and recreation area should be justified with a cost-benefit analysis. 
The fourth and last coalition was formed between the principal and the 
coalition of nature organizations, Consept. Both stakeholders initiated the 
execution of the cost-benefit analysis on 750 hectares nature and recreation 
area. This coalition, therefore, particularly influenced the first choice in the 
economic valuation process – definition of the phenomenon to be studied.  
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Chapter 7 Significance of the 
Context of Valuation 
Processes 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, a comparison will be made between three cost-benefit 
analyses: a cost-benefit analysis on gas extraction, a cost-benefit analysis on 
land reclamation, and a cost-benefit analysis on the development of 750 
hectares new nature and recreation area. These cases were analyzed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. In this analysis, the focus was on the influence of 
elements in the context of the valuation process on the choices made 
within this process. This context consisted of formal and informal 
institutions, the characteristics of the economic instrument and the 
stakeholders and their relationships.  
 
For each of the three case studies, the key influences on the choices have 
been extracted and are summarized in tables A1, A2 and A3 in the 
Appendix. This will form the basis for the discussion in this chapter, in 
which the three case studies are compared and contrasted. Although the 
answer to the main research question of this dissertation will be given in 
the concluding chapter of this thesis (Chapter 8), the underlying chapter 
will provide the guidance for this discussion. Differences and similarities of 
influences on choices among the three cases will be discussed, where the 
emphasis is on the following seven most noted differences and similarities: 
(1) rules and regulations for the economic instrument; (2) scientific 
paradigms; (3) policy paradigms; (4) goal of the economic instrument; (5) 
time and budget constraints; (6) stakeholder participation; and (7) 
stakeholder communication.  
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7.2 Formal and Informal Institutional Influences 
 
7.2.1 Formal Institutions: Rules and Regulations for the Economic Instrument 
 
In the formal institutional context, a first important difference between the 
three cases is the prevalence or absence of guidelines for the cost-benefit 
analysis of which the economic valuation processes were part. While the 
two cost-benefit analyses related to the expansion of the Rotterdam port 
were subject to guidelines (see sections 6.2 and 6.6.1), the cost-benefit 
analysis on gas extraction in the Wadden Sea was not (see sections 5.2 and 
5.6.1). This difference had a strong influence on the analyses, to the extent 
that different choices were made. The cost-benefit analysis guidelines that 
existed in the two case studies related to the Rotterdam port were called 
“OEEI” guidelines. These guidelines were initiated by the government 
particularly to guide cost-benefit analyses of large infrastructural projects - 
typically government-financed projects. Consequently, the guidelines 
provided a structure to several steps in the cost-benefit analyses of the port 
expansion. One example where this can be observed is in the selection of 
the project alternative, the alternative situation to which the costs and 
benefits of the project must be compared. The OEEI guidelines clearly 
state that this alternative should not be set equal to “doing nothing” but 
instead should be defined as the best alternative to the project. In line with 
this guideline, the project alternative was defined as the best alternative in 
both studies on the port expansion. In the cost-benefit analysis on land 
reclamation, the project alternative was explained as the situation without 
land reclamation, which would inevitably lead to a shortage in port space. 
The consequences of this shortage in space were explained, which formed 
the basis for the project alternative. A similar approach is taken in the cost-
benefit analysis on the development of 750 hectares nature and recreation 
area: the project alternative is explained as the situation where this nature 
development would not take place . In other words: what would happen to 
the land designated for nature development and which other projects 
would be realized? Clearly, both studies were guided by the OEEI 
guidelines. In the other case study on gas extraction, however, no such 
guidelines existed. It was argued in Chapter 5 that the absence of such 
guidelines was of particular influence on the choice for the project 
alternative. Contrary to what is suggested in the OEEI guidelines, the 
project alternative was defined as “doing nothing” or “current policy”. 
Consequently, the project itself, defined by the researchers as a total 
collapse of the Wadden Sea ecosystem, was compared with the project 
alternative defined as the current situation in the Wadden Sea.  
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Second, the OEEI guidelines recommend that a cost-benefit analysis should 
be directly linked to an Environmental Impact Statement, or MER. The 
economic and the environmental studies should be attuned to one another, 
and the cost-benefit analysis should generally follow the framework of 
environmental impacts derived in the MER. The prevalence of these OEEI 
guidelines for the two studies on the port expansion consequently resulted 
in a situation where both cost-benefit analyses followed the MER. In fact, 
the MER was used as a guide in step five of the economic valuation 
process - the identification of impacts. On the other hand, the absence of 
OEEI guidelines during the study of gas extractions led to a situation 
where neither the MERs carried out for the Wadden Sea nor other 
environmental studies, were used as a reference in the identification of 
impacts in the other cost-benefit analysis on gas extraction in the Wadden 
Sea. Instead, the contracting party selected the list of Wadden Sea functions 
that could possibly be affected by the gas extraction themselves and were 
not guided by official environmental impact studies.  
 
Third, the OEEI guidelines clearly explain that not every impact necessarily 
needs to be quantified in a cost-benefit analysis. When uncertainty prevails 
in the economic valuation process, there is a preference to list these 
impacts as so-called pro-memory or “PM-posts”. In the two studies of the 
port expansion that were subject to these OEEI guidelines, the impacts 
surrounded by too much uncertainty were indeed not selected for valuation 
and instead were included in the cost-benefit analysis as PM-posts. 
However, in the other study on gas extraction in the Wadden Sea, during 
which these same guidelines where lacking, no PM-posts were included and 
instead all impacts were selected for quantification. 
 
7.2.2 Informal Institutions: Scientific Paradigms 
 
In the informal institutional context, scientific paradigms played a more 
prominent role in the cost-benefit analysis on gas extraction in the Wadden 
Sea (see sections 5.2 and 5.6.1) than in the two cost-benefit analyses related 
to the expansion of the Rotterdam port (see sections 6.2 and 6.6.1). More 
specifically, this difference lies in the prevalence of scientific paradigms in 
three choices of the economic valuation process on gas extraction. First, in 
the identification of impacts, the ecological economics paradigm prevailed, 
which allowed the stakeholders to integrate an extensive list of impacts in 
their analysis. Second, the neoclassical economics paradigm prevailed at the 
next step - identification of impacts to be valued. This approach allowed 
the stakeholders to quantify an extensive number of impacts, even a 
relatively controversial impact, namely “nature”. The third choice 
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influenced by scientific paradigms is the quantification of impacts into 
monetary units, where the neoclassical economics paradigm also prevailed. 
This allowed the stakeholders to apply a wide range of valuation methods 
to obtain their quantitative values, even the application of non-
conventional methods the researchers call “investment by public bodies”.  
 
In the cost-benefit analyses related to the Rotterdam port, a more balanced 
approach was taken throughout the processes, which means that neither of 
the choices in the valuation process was particularly dominated by a 
specific scientific paradigm. As a result, the identification of impacts was 
carefully performed and substantiated with clear arguments, not all impacts 
were identified for valuation (if it was not possible to quantify an impact, 
the impact was included as a PM-post), and only scientifically accepted 
valuation methods were applied. 
 
7.2.3 Informal Institutions: Policy Paradigms 
 
An interesting common element in all three case studies is the observation 
that policy paradigms in the informal institutional context influenced only 
the first choice in the three economic valuation processes: definition of the 
phenomenon (see sections 5.2, 5.6.1, 6.2 and 6.6.1). Four policy paradigms 
were identified as significant influences: (1) ecological modernization; (2) 
institutionalization of environmental problems; (3) an integrated water 
management approach; and (4) perception of water as a scarce resource. It 
was argued that all four paradigms influenced the definition of the 
phenomenon in the valuation processes on gas extraction and land 
reclamation, while for the study on the development of 750 hectares, only 
the first two paradigms where significant. This results from the fact that 
this particular study did not concern the development of an aquatic 
ecosystem and thus the latter two paradigms didn't influence the choices in 
the valuation process. In the other two studies, however, the focus was on 
aquatic systems and so it was argued that a combination of the four 
paradigms influenced the phenomenon being studied. 
 
7.3 Influences of the Characteristics of the Economic Instrument  
 
7.3.1 Goal  
 
In relation to the characteristics of the economic instrument, a major 
difference between the three cases is that the goal of the economic 
instrument has less influence on choices in both cost-benefit analyses 
related to the port expansion than on choices in the study on gas 
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extraction. Two important observations can be made with respect to this 
difference. First, the goal influenced a larger number of choices in the gas 
extraction analysis. The goal of this study was to influence political decision 
making on gas extraction in the Wadden Sea, and it was argued that this 
influenced all nine choices made in the economic valuation process (see 
sections 5.3 and 5.6.2). In the other studies related to the port expansion, 
however, the goal was of less influence. In the analysis on land reclamation, 
the goal was to identify the political decision. This influenced particularly 
four choices in the valuation process, namely (1) definition of the project 
alternative; (2) the parties affected; (3) geographical boundaries; and (4) the 
identification of impacts. In the second study related to the Rotterdam 
port, the goal was defined as the justification of political decisions and it 
was argues that this particularly influenced the first five choices in the 
valuation process : (1) definition of the phenomenon being studied; (2) 
project alternative; (3) parties affected; (4) geographical boundaries; and (5) 
identification of impacts. A second observation in relation to the goal is that 
the different goals of the three studies also resulted in completely different 
choices in some of the steps of the valuation processes. This difference can 
particularly be found between the cost-benefit analysis on gas extraction on 
the one hand and the two cost-benefit analyses related to the Rotterdam 
port on the other. The differences will be elaborated in the next paragraph. 
Interestingly, the choices in the two studies on the Rotterdam port were 
similar, despite their different goals.  
 
The differences between the three economic valuation processes is most 
prominent in five choices (see sections 5.6.2 and 6.6.2). First, the project 
alternative was defined differently. In the study on gas extraction, the 
project alternative was defined as the situation of “doing nothing”, which 
was compared to a situation of a total collapse of (part of) the Wadden Sea 
ecosystem. This allowed the stakeholders to increase the outcome of the 
economic valuation study, which would best serve their goal. In the other 
two studies related to the Rotterdam port, however, the project alternatives 
were not defined as “doing nothing” but were explained and substantiated 
as representing the best alternative allocation of means to the project. 
Second, in the study on gas extraction, the geographical boundaries were 
drawn so that the area on which the valuation process would focus would 
be as large as possible. The more conventional geographical boundaries of 
the Wadden Sea, drawn by other (scientific) institutes, were not applied - 
the stakeholder preferred to draw their own boundaries around the 
Wadden Sea, which resulted in a larger map of the area than under the 
conventional boundaries. Again, such choices allowed the stakeholders to 
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increase the outcome of the economic valuation study, which would best 
serve their goal. In the other two studies on the port expansion, however, 
the geographical boundaries were simply drawn around the Netherlands, 
even though many of the benefits (some say most of the benefits) of the 
Rotterdam port expansion would accrue to stakeholders outside the 
Netherlands, namely in Germany. Third, in the cost-benefit analysis of gas 
extraction, a wide range of impacts were selected for quantification. In fact, 
all impacts selected were also quantified. Even more interestingly, an 
unusual step was taken by the stakeholder: first all functions of the Wadden 
Sea were identified and quantified in economic valuation (in other words, a 
total economic value of the Wadden Sea was calculated), then a selection 
was made as to which of these functions would actually be affected by gas 
extraction, followed by the application of formulae to determine what the 
loss in economic value as a result of gas extraction would be. In both 
studies related to the Rotterdam port, on the other hand, no such 
additional step was made – only those elements identified as actual impacts 
of the land reclamation or of the development of 750 hectares nature and 
recreation area were selected, and from this a separate selection was made 
for those impacts to quantify. Which brings us to the fourth difference: 
while in the study on gas extraction, all impacts were quantified, leading to 
a higher economic value, in the analyses related to the Rotterdam port only 
selected impacts were quantified. The fifth and last difference between the 
studies is the actual quantification of impacts into monetary terms and in 
particular the quantification of one impact: the  loss in existence value of 
nature. In the literature, it is generally accepted that existence value is most 
appropriately quantified using the Contingent Valuation method. However, 
in the cost-benefit analysis of gas extraction, this impact was quantified 
with a non-conventional method, namely investment by public bodies. The 
reason was that, since Contingent Valuation is both expensive and time-
consuming and both time and budget were limited, this analysis was not 
possible. As opposed to choosing not to quantify existence value, the 
stakeholders decided to apply this alternative method, thereby increasing 
the outcome of the economic valuation study. Again, this best serves their 
goal. In the other two studies, however, existence value was not quantified. 
Time and budget were too limited for a Contingent Valuation approach, 
and the stakeholders chose not to quantify the existence value. In line with 
the literature, the principal and contracting parties decided only contingent 
valuation was an appropriate method to calculate existence value and 
instead included this value qualitatively as a PM-post. 
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7.3.2 Time and Budget Constraints 
 
Observations on time and budget constraints can be made for two of the 
three studies in which these constraints played an important role: the cost-
benefit analysis on gas extraction (time constraints) and the cost-benefit 
analysis on the development of 750 hectares nature and recreation area 
(time and budget constraints). In both studies, time constraints influenced 
particularly one of the choices in the valuation processes, albeit different 
ones. In the study on gas extraction, time constraints particularly influenced 
the quantification of impacts into monetary units (see section 5.6.2). While 
at the start of this study, the time span available was long, after the study 
commenced the time span was significantly shortened. Due to the 
imposition of this time constraint, the contracting party had to find ways to 
quantify the different impacts within a limited time period. Sometimes 
unconventional methods were applied, such as the quantification of 
existence value, which was discussed in the previous section.  
 
In the other study, the development of nature and recreation area, both 
time and budget constraints played an important role in particular in the 
identification of impacts to be valued (see section 6.6.2). Both constraints 
led to the decision that not every impact could be selected for 
quantification. For example, existence value was not quantified for the 
simple reason that a good analysis would cost a lot of time and money – 
instead, it was included in the analysis as a PM-post.  
 
7.4 Stakeholder Influences 
 
7.4.1 Organization of Stakeholders 
 
In this section, the influence of direct and indirect stakeholders on the 
three economic valuation processes will be discussed in relation to the 
organization of these stakeholders in the valuation processes. This 
discussion will be held along the lines of stakeholders' participation in the 
process and the communication of their ideas, goals and viewpoints to choices 
made in the valuation process. This will be compared and contrasted 
between the three case studies in the following two sections. The last 
section will discuss the prevalence and influence of interest group politics, 
in which both participation and communication of certain stakeholders 
come together. 
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7.4.2 Participation of Stakeholders in the Valuation Process 
 
In terms of participation of stakeholders, a first important difference 
between the three case studies is the role of the principal and the 
contracting party (or parties). In the cost-benefit analyses related to the 
Rotterdam port development, the principal participated less in the making 
of choices in the valuation process than in the cost-benefit analysis on gas 
extraction. Conversely, the contracting parties' role in making choices was 
more dominant in the cost-benefit analyses related to the Rotterdam port.  
 
A second difference between the three case studies is the role of stakeholders 
organized in different committees that guide the economic valuation 
processes. In short, one can state that the different committees in both 
analyses related to the port expansion played a more prominent role in the 
making of choices of the valuation process than those involved in the other 
analysis on gas extraction. In the latter, two committees were involved: a 
steering committee and a peer review group (see sections 5.4 and 5.6.3). 
The peer review group was exactly that - it read the draft manuscript and 
provided comments. According to the interviewed, however, very little was 
done with these comments in the drafting of the final document. The 
steering committee consisted of three people with a scientific background, 
but was to provide more of a theoretical guidance concerning 
environmental economics than steering the process. On the other hand, the 
steering committees for the two studies related to the port expansion (see 
sections 6.4 and 6.6.4) consisted of carefully-selected representatives of 
different stakeholder groups of the two projects. The contracting parties 
and steering committee had regular meeting in which questions were 
answered and feedback was given. Their advisory boards consisted of 
several external experts who judged the professionalism and scientific 
accountability of the approach, guarded the process and reported to the 
project minister. The contracting parties directly dealt with the advisory 
board's concerns and questions. 
 
A third difference between the cases was the participation of indirect 
stakeholders. Coalitions of indirect stakeholders participated more 
prominently in the choices of the valuation process on gas extraction than 
in the other processes related to the Rotterdam port expansion. In the 
study on gas extraction, it was explained that five indirect stakeholders 
played a key role (see section 5.6.3) throughout the valuation process. More 
specifically, their influence was through their relationship with other 
stakeholders. Three of these indirect stakeholders (the Minister of 
Environment, Ms. Tineke Witteveen and the Wadden Association) 
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participated in the valuation process by forming a coalition with the 
principal of the study. The other two stakeholders (the Minister of 
Economic Affairs and NAM) together formed a separate coalition and 
engaged in interest group politics with the other three coalitions. In the 
other two case studies, however, coalitions of indirect stakeholders 
participated less prominently in the valuation processes (see section 6.6.3). 
In the first study on land reclamation, four key indirect stakeholders were 
identified. One of these (Consept) played a very limited role in this 
valuation process, while a second stakeholder, the MER commission, did 
not need to form coalitions but directly participated in the valuation 
process through the identification of the environmental effects that would 
need to be taken into account in the valuation process. The other two 
stakeholders (RMPM and the users of the project’s services) did form a 
coalition, whose participation was somewhat limited. In the second study 
on the development of 750 hectares nature and recreation area, two key 
indirect stakeholders were identified (see section 6.6.3). One of these 
stakeholders was the MER commission who, like in the other study, 
directly participated in the valuation process by identifying the impacts. The 
other stakeholder (Consept) formed a coalition with the principal of the 
cost-benefit analysis. Their participation was also limited. 
 
7.4.3 Communication of Stakeholders in the Valuation Process  
 
This section will discuss whether the goals, interests and viewpoints of the 
stakeholders influence the choices in the three economic valuation 
processes. First, observations on the communication of interests of the 
principal and contracting parties will be made. The previous section 
explained that the principal participated more prominently in the making of 
choices in the cost-benefit analysis on gas extraction than in the two cost-
benefit analyses related to the Rotterdam port. On the other hand, the 
participation of contracting parties was more prominent in the two cost-
benefit analyses related to the Rotterdam port. The next question is 
whether this difference in participation of principals and contracting parties 
also resulted in a difference in the communication of their ideas to the 
choices in the valuation processes. In the analysis of the previous chapters, 
it has been difficult to measure exactly which choices would have been 
made differently if the principal would have had more or less influence. 
However, it can be argued that in general different choices will be made, 
depending of course on the principal and contracting party. In the case on 
gas extraction, for example, the principal had a very clear position, namely 
gas extraction should be banned from the Wadden Sea. If the principal 
then participates significantly in the making of choices in the valuation 
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process, these choices are likely to be influenced by the communication of 
the (subjective) ideas and preferences of the principal. This is further 
enhanced when the principal forms a coalition with a contracting party in 
which power leans towards the principal, as was also the case in the gas 
extraction study. If, on the other hand, the principal participates less in the 
making of choices than the contracting parties, as was the case in the two 
other studies, the communication of ideas and preferences of the principal 
will most likely be less. Furthermore, if the principal forms a coalition with 
contracting parties, in which they behave relatively independent and hence 
power leans towards the contracting parties, as was also the case in these 
two studies, the interests of the principal are even less communicated. 
 
More specifically, the principal in the gas extraction study was in the 
position to communicate its goals particularly to the first four choices in 
the economic valuation process (see section 5.6.3): the principal determined 
the phenomenon to be studied; the project alternative; the parties affected; 
and the geographical boundaries. The last choice was made by the principal 
and contracting party together. The contracting party, in turn, determined 
the remaining choices of the economic valuation process: identification of 
impacts; identification of impacts to be valued; quantification of impacts 
into monetary units; discounting; and sensitivity analysis.  
 
In both studies on the port expansion, however, the communication of the 
principal's goals was much more limited. It can be argued that the principal 
only determined the first choice – definition of the phenomenon being 
studied. In the study on the development of 750 hectares nature and 
recreation area, the principal did this in co-operation with the principal of 
the larger project “Rotterdam port expansion”, with whom the principal 
had formed a coalition. The contracting parties then made the other 
choices in the valuation processes and in both studies the contracting 
parties made these choices as part of a coalition. 
 
The second difference in communication between the three case studies 
involves the communication of the perspectives of the different 
stakeholders that were organized in committees. As was also explained in 
the previous section, the participation of committees and their 
communication in the cost-benefit analyses related to the Rotterdam port 
was more prominent than in the cost-benefit analysis of gas extraction. 
Through regular meetings between the committees and the contracting 
parties, they were able to have influence on most choices in the economic 
valuation process except for the first choice, definition of the 
phenomenon. This decision was made by the principal. In the other study, 
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however, it can be argued that although committees were officially included 
in the valuation process of gas extraction, the communication of their 
perspectives to the choices in the economic valuation process was very 
much limited. The next question is whether the difference in the 
communication of committees in these three cases also resulted in different 
choices in the economic valuation process. It can be argued that different 
choices are likely to result. For example, if committees consist of 
stakeholders and experts that have a serious say in the choices of the 
valuation process, as was the case in both studies related to the Rotterdam 
port, subjective preferences and interests of specific principals and 
contracting parties in the valuation process may be limited.   
 
The third difference in communication among the three case studies is 
related to the indirect stakeholders. The previous section explained that 
coalitions of indirect stakeholders in the cost-benefit analysis related to the 
Rotterdam port expansion participated relatively less in the process than in 
the cost-benefit analysis on gas extraction. Only one stakeholder directly 
communicated its ideas to choices in the valuation process on the cost-
benefit analysis on land reclamation - the MER commission directly 
determined the identification of impacts. Two other stakeholders, RMPM 
and the users of the project services, formed a coalition and communicated 
their ideas in two choices, namely defining the project alternative and the 
sensitivity analysis. In the other study on the 750 hectares new nature and 
recreation area, similar communication of indirect stakeholders can be 
found: the MER commission also directly determined the identification of 
impacts. A second indirect stakeholder, Consept, formed a coalition with 
the principal of the study and through this communicated its ideas to one 
of the choices in the valuation process, namely the definition of the 
phenomenon being studied. In the cost-benefit analysis of gas extraction, 
on the other hand, three indirect stakeholders formed a coalition through 
which they were able to communicate their ideas to all choices in the 
valuation process. Two additional indirect stakeholders formed a separate 
coalition to engage in interest group politics, through which they also 
communicated their ideas on all choices in the valuation process, as will be 
further explained in the next section. 
 
The question that remains is whether the different abilities of indirect 
stakeholders to communicate their ideas in these three cases also resulted in 
different choices in the economic valuation processes. It can be argued that 
different choices may result and that this is influenced particularly by the 
way in which these stakeholders communicate their ideas. In the case on 
gas extraction, indirect stakeholders communicated their ideas by forming 
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different coalitions, among others with the principal. Through these 
coalitions, choices were influenced but in a non-transparent way. In the 
other studies of the Rotterdam port, stakeholders either directly determined 
the choices (like the MER commission) or formed a coalition that had a 
very limited amount of communication possibilities to the choices in the 
valuation processes. This means that the influence indirect stakeholders 
have on the process was at least transparent. 
 
7.4.4 Interest Group Politics 
 
Some stakeholders of the valuation processes were involved in interest 
group politics. As a result, this allowed them to communicate their ideas 
and goals to the choices in these valuation processes. Both the level of 
engagement and influence on choices in the valuation process differed 
between the three case studies. In the cost-benefit analysis on gas 
extraction, for example, interest group politics played a major role in the 
choices throughout the valuation process. On the other hand, in the study 
on land reclamation for the port expansion, interest group politics played a 
less prominent role while in the other study on the port expansion it in fact 
played no role at all.  
In the analysis on gas extraction, one particular coalition engaged in interest 
group politics with three other coalitions (see sections 5.4.2 and 5.6.3). The 
key to this interest group politics lay in two stakeholders: the Netherlands 
Petroleum Company (NAM) and Greenpeace, who was the principal of 
this valuation study. It was explained how this relationship could be traced 
back to other incidents like the Brent Spar and Shell’s (one of the two 
shareholders of the NAM) role in Nigeria. Greenpeace and NAM are thus 
regularly engaged in interest group politics in relation to their diverging 
positions and interests towards economics and the environment. As a 
result, it is likely that the choices in the study were influenced in one way or 
another by this interest group politics relationship in order to increase 
Greenpeace’s power over NAM so that gas extraction in the Wadden Sea 
would be banned. Obvious examples are the choices of the phenomenon 
being studied, which was defined by Greenpeace to increase power over 
NAM in the first place; the definition of the project alternative, which was 
defined as a complete collapse of the ecosystem in the case of gas 
extractions, thereby increasing its cost; and the drawing of geographical 
boundaries that produced a larger geographical area than the use of 
boundaries produced by other institutes, thereby also increasing the cost of 
gas extractions and thus the power of Greenpeace over NAM. 
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In one of the studies related to the Rotterdam port, the cost-benefit 
analysis on land reclamation, an important interest group politics 
relationship was formed between one of the contracting parties, CPB, and 
the Rotterdam Municipality Port Management (RMPM). This relationship 
was characterized by disagreements on several assumptions of the 
economic valuation process, including noise limitations and future 
economic growth. It is likely that this interest group politics relationship 
influenced some of the choices in the valuation process, in particular two 
choices in which these assumptions were relevant: the determination of the 
project alternative and choices in the sensitivity analysis (see section 6.6.3).  
Once more the question arises whether different choices are made when 
there is less interest group politics, as was the case in the studies related to 
the Rotterdam port. It can be argued that a higher participation of 
stakeholders in interest group politics, like in the case on gas extraction, 
leads to different choices. An example is the choice on how to value the 
existence value of nature: while Greenpeace and its partners decided to 
apply an unconventional method to at least be able to derive some sort of 
figure that would increase the cost of gas extractions and hence their power 
over NAM, PMR and its partners, who were not involved in such similar 
power struggles decided not to use unconventional methods. 
Perhaps a more important observation in this section is that it is the way in 
which stakeholders communicate their preferences to the choices that 
matters. While in the case studies related to the Rotterdam port, many 
stakeholders with different goals and interests related to the project were in 
fact integrated in the analysis by joining committees, in the cost-benefit 
analysis on gas extraction this wasn't the case. They nevertheless had an 
important influence through engaging in interest group politics, but their 
influence was indirect and hence less transparent. In the cases related to the 
Rotterdam port, it can be argued that as the interests and goals of 
stakeholders had been directly integrated in the valuation process, it 
thereby made the analysis and thus the balancing of stakeholder interests 
more transparent.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusions for 
Valuation Processes  
in Dutch Water 
Management 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation has analyzed the process of economic valuation of 
ecosystems in Dutch water management. The goal was to formulate 
conclusions and recommendations on how to improve valuation processes 
by limiting inconsistencies in their outcomes.  
 
Balanced decisions in integrated water management require transparent 
processes: a process in which it is clear to all stakeholders which choices 
and assumptions are made and why. It was explained that, despite a growth 
in popularity of valuation studies, overviews of publications show that a 
repetition of studies on the same subject is not uncommon, but that the 
outcomes of these studies may be completely different. At the basis of 
these inconsistencies in outcomes lies the fact that economic valuation has 
a variety of methodological tools that are at the disposal of different 
practitioners with different interests. At the same time, little agreement 
exists on these methodologies, and as a consequence different 
methodological constructions are used resulting in diverging outcomes. 
Despite these inconsistencies, economic valuation studies have an 
important added value in environmental management, including water 
management. It is the only method that allows for the quantification of 
environmental effects in monetary terms, and as such plays an important 
role in highlighting the values of ecosystems, in countering arguments on 
ecosystem conversion and in balancing environmental effects with other 
costs and benefits. However, there is a possibility that persistent 
inconsistencies in outcomes of valuation studies may undermine the 
usefulness of valuation studies to integrated water management in the long 
run. Decision-makers may become increasingly skeptical to valuation 
studies if they tend to reflect the subjective preferences of only one 
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stakeholder, while balanced decisions in integrated water management 
often need to involve the preferences of numerous stakeholders.  
 
In order to explain inconsistencies in valuation outcomes, an institutional 
theory perspective on economic valuation processes was taken. The key to 
this perspective is that choices in valuation processes and their outcomes 
are influenced by the context in which they are made. The two sub-
questions analyzed therefore were: (1) Which choices are made in 
economic valuation processes and how? and (2) Which factors can be 
distinguished in the context of choices in economic valuation processes? 
Both questions were answered from a theoretical and an empirical 
perspective, focussing on the field of water management in the 
Netherlands. The sub-questions guided the answers to the main research 
question of this thesis: How are choices in economic valuation processes in water 
management influenced by the context in which they are made? Conclusions on this 
question will be drawn in this chapter, preceded by a discussion of each of 
the two sub-questions that will take place in the following two sections. 
The chapter will finish with a discussion in which a reflection is given on 
the major strengths and weaknesses of this research, including the analytical 
model, and recommendations are formulated for theory and the practical 
application of economic valuation in water management. 
 
8.2 Choices in the Economic Valuation Process 
 
This section will answer the first sub-question of this dissertation: Which 
choices are made in economic valuation processes and how?  
 
The perspective introduced in this thesis was that economic valuation of 
ecosystems is a process, which consists of a series of actions within which 
actors make choices (see Chapter 2). This implies that in order to 
understand the economic valuation process, it is necessary to understand 
the choices that are made within this process. An important first step 
therefore is to analyze which choices were made. In Chapter 3, several 
authors were distinguished that provided important contributions to 
explaining the types of choices involved in the valuation process, including 
Hanley and Spash (1993), Barbier et al. (1997), and Eijgenraam (2002). The 
theoretical contributions of these different authors were complemented by 
participant observation of two economic valuation processes with an NGO 
and a Dutch government department in Chapter 4. The result was a clear 
identification of choices:   
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 1. Pre-assessment choices 
a) defining the phenomenon to be studied 
b) defining the project alternative 
c) defining the parties affected 
d) defining the geographical boundaries 
e) identification of impacts 
f) identification of impacts to be valued 
 
2. Assessment choices 
a) quantification of impacts into monetary units  
b) discounting 
c) sensitivity analysis 
 
The next step was to analyze whether these choices could also be found in 
the three case studies of economic valuation processes in Dutch water 
management, which were carried out in Chapters 5 and 6. For each of the 
three case studies, the pre-assessment and assessment choices made were 
analyzed. The analysis showed that the choices identified in the analytical 
model were appropriate.  
 
8.3 The Context of the Choices  
 
In this section, the second sub-question of this dissertation will be 
answered: Which factors can be distinguished in the context of choices in economic 
valuation processes?  
 
The use of an institutional theory perspective on the economic valuation 
process implies that the question of how stakeholders make choices in this 
process is important and that this can be understood by analyzing the 
institutional context in which these choices are made. Economic valuation 
of ecosystems is based on a stakeholder perspective known as the 
neoclassical theory of consumer behavior. In this perspective, theories are 
developed that explain why people make certain choices under scarcity, if 
the motivation of the economic actor (homo oeconomicus) is self-interest. 
An important limitation to this approach, however, is that a boundary is 
drawn around the stakeholder and as a result the influence of social and 
ecological contexts on its choices are ignored. Since this thesis wants to 
obtain a broader understanding of actor choices in the economic valuation 
process, whereby the context in which these choices are made play a key 
role, neoclassical economic theory can therefore not be applied. Instead, 
other theories were sought that explicitly relate actor behavior to its 
context. One such theory is institutional theory.  
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The institutional theory perspective applied in this dissertation identified 
elements in the context of economic valuation processes that influence the 
choices stakeholders make within this process. For this reason, the first set 
of influences that was defined was the set of actors in the economic 
valuation process and their relationships. Actors were distinguished as 
direct and indirect stakeholders in the process that sustain various 
relationships with each other. It was explained that direct stakeholders are 
actors that are involved in the economic valuation process itself and thus 
are in a position to directly influence choices in the economic valuation 
processes. The most obvious direct stakeholders are the principal and 
contracting party. Indirect stakeholders, on the other hand, are not directly 
involved in the valuation process, but must nevertheless be recognized as 
important influences on choices of the valuation process. They may 
influence choices through pressure and lobbying, and include for example 
nature organizations, political parties, and the industry.  
 
Both direct and indirect stakeholders influence choices in valuation 
processes through the relationships they sustain. The nature of these 
relationships is based on stakeholder goals and ideologies - coalitions are 
likely to form between stakeholders with converging functional and 
ideological goals, while stakeholders more easily engage in interest group 
politics when these goals diverge. Functional goals relate to the specific 
goals of the organization, or to the goal of the economic valuation process, 
while ideologies relate to perspectives towards nature and water. Theories 
on power and strategic behavior were introduced, based on Callon (1998), 
Knight (1992) and Bacharach and Lawler (1980), which  the following 
perspective: rational agents with competing functional goals and ideologies 
make choices in economic valuation processes to gain a strategic advantage 
over other agents involved in the conflict of interests. This strategic 
advantage is directly related to a quest for power, in which valuation 
processes may be applied as tools that increase power. 
 
This theoretical perspective on actors and actor behavior was applied to 
three case studies.  The distinction between direct and indirect stakeholders 
was a useful tool for a broad identification of important stakeholders in the 
case studies. In all cases, a principal, contracting party (or parties), steering 
committee, and interviewed and consulted persons were distinguished as 
direct stakeholders of the valuation processes. The three cases differed 
however with respect to the role of one of the direct stakeholders. Whereas 
the cost-benefit analysis on gas extraction in the Wadden Sea had a peer 
review group who reviewed the study after it had been completed, the two 
cost-benefit analyses related to the Rotterdam port expansion had an 
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advisory board, whose members guarded both processes throughout the 
time it took to carry out the cost-benefit analysis in addition to peer-
reviewing the studies when they were finished. As for the indirect 
stakeholders, several groups could be distinguished, including ministers, 
non-governmental organizations, companies, politicians, and commissions. 
 
In the identification of relationships between these stakeholders, the 
theoretical perspective also served the purpose of identifying key 
relationships that may influence the choices made in each valuation 
process. By distinguishing coalitions and interest group politics, the 
network of complex relationships that existed in the three case studies 
could be unraveled into two relatively straightforward categories. In all 
three case studies, coalitions and interest group politics relationships could 
be identified that influenced specific choices made in the valuation 
processes.  
 
A send set of influences on choices in valuation processes consisted of the 
context within which stakeholders and their relationships are embedded. A 
literature review of institutional theory was carried out to distinguish the 
types of institutions that may influence stakeholder behavior. The main 
theory applied was institutional theory according to North, who 
distinguished formal and informal institutions: formal institutions relate to 
rules and regulations, while informal institutions concern norms and values. 
It was explained how stakeholders make choices in the economic valuation 
process within this context of different formal and informal institutions, 
which determines how these choices are made. This perspective was then 
applied to important government documents that focussed on institutions 
in integrated water management in practice. The following set of formal 
and informal institutions were identified for the economic valuation 
process in Dutch water management: 
 
- policy paradigms 
- scientific paradigms 
- rules and regulations 
 
In the informal institutional context, policy paradigms were explained as    
"institutionalization of environmental problems", "ecological 
modernization", "integrated water management" and "water as a scarce 
resource". Discussions of scientific paradigms related to the increased 
popularity of economic valuation and the dominance of neoclassical and 
ecological economic paradigms. The last characteristic in the institutional 
Valuation of Water 
 204 
context that was identified were rules and regulations for economic 
instruments, the economic valuation process and the environment.  
 
The theoretical perspective on the institutional context that was developed 
proved satisfactory for the case study analysis. It was a useful guide in 
analyzing the very complex set of institutions in all three case studies. In 
fact, the set of institutions identified in the analytical model could be filled 
in for each of the case studies and allowed a selection of key factors in the 
context of stakeholders that were likely to have influenced the choices of 
these stakeholders. 
 
The third influence on choices in the economic valuation process was 
identified as the set of characteristics of the economic instrument of which 
the economic valuation process is part. The economic instrument can be a 
multi-criteria analysis or a cost-benefit analysis, in which economic 
valuation is applied to quantify environmental effects. The following 
characteristics of the economic instrument were identified: 
 
- use type 
- goal 
- time constraints 
- budget constraints 
 
The identification of these key characteristics was based mainly on 
participant observation in two economic valuation processes for NGO and 
the Dutch government department.  
 
In all three case studies, the economic instrument was a social cost-benefit 
analysis, where the use type was project evaluation. The goals on the other 
hand, differed: while the goal of one of the cases on the Rotterdam port 
was an identification of decisions, the goal of the other case of the 
Rotterdam port was a justification of decisions. In the case study on gas 
extraction in the Wadden Sea, the goal was to influence political decisions. 
The analysis of time and budget constraints showed that in two of the three 
cases time and budget constraints played a major role. 
 
In general, the distinction of the different characteristics of the economic 
instrument in the analytical model proved useful. It allowed a clear 
dissection of different characteristics of the economic instrument that may 
not be apparent as influences on choices at a first glance. However, the 
distinction of "use type" proved to be irrelevant to the analysis. Although it 
was likely to have played a role in some of the choices, no significant 
relationships could be found.   
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8.4 Main Conclusions 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn in relation to the main research question: 
How are choices in economic valuation processes in water management 
influenced by the context in which they are made? 
 
The analysis in this dissertation showed that several factors in the context 
of valuation processes influenced choices made within these processes. The 
first conclusion of this dissertation therefore reads as follows:  
 
Choices within a valuation process are influenced in particular by 
four elements in its context: (a) the prevalence or absence of 
guidelines; (b) the goal for which the valuation study is carried out; 
(c) participation of certain stakeholders within the process and the 
effectiveness of the communication of their ideas, and; (d) the time 
and budget constraints imposed on the valuation process.  
 
The second conclusion relates to the role of the institutional theory 
perspective that was applied in this dissertation. This research has shown 
that institutional theory contributes to understanding the inconsistencies in 
choices between valuation processes, by focussing on the context in which 
these choices were made. Therefore, the second conclusion can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
Through applying an institutional theory perspective, this dissertation 
contributes to the understanding of choices in valuation processes 
and explains the inconsistencies in their outcomes.  
 
Some of the choices made in the valuation processes in the three cases 
were influenced by the context such as subjective perspectives and goals of 
stakeholders and limited time and budget constraints. Integrated water 
management, however, requires an integrated balancing of different 
stakeholder interests. When economic valuation, as part of cost-benefit 
analysis, does not convey the different stakeholder interests but instead the 
interests of a few dominant or more powerful ones, economic valuation 
does not contribute to policy making in a positive way. Conversely, only 
when transparency in choices of valuation processes are pursued will 
economic valuation contribute to integrated water management. Therefore, 
the third conclusion is: 
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Pursuing transparency within valuation processes as part of decision 
making tools such as cost-benefit analysis is necessary if these 
processes are to contribute to balancing stakeholder interests in water 
management. A transparent valuation process is characterized by a 
situation in which it is clear who has made the choices and for what 
reasons.  
 
Chapter 7 explained how the organization of certain stakeholders in 
committees steered choices in valuation processes (see section 7.4). In 
particular the absence of certain stakeholders in committees and hence 
their inability to communicate their ideas to the choices of the valuation 
process resulted in non-transparent choices. A committee, whether it is 
called a steering committee, an advisory board or a peer review group, 
should consist of a representative set of stakeholders whose opinions on 
the choices of the valuation process are taken seriously. If not, the 
establishment of committees are mere pretexts for principals and 
contracting parties to secure a non-deserved level of 'objectivity'. When it is 
unclear which role such stakeholders, either within committees or directly, 
play in a valuation process, the choices of this process become non-
transparent. Once more, in the case of integrated water management, 
where the integrated balancing of stakeholder interests is required, such 
economic valuation processes do not contribute to balanced decisions or 
policy-making in a positive way. Therefore, the fourth conclusion is: 
 
Transparency in valuation processes is enhanced by the participation 
of all relevant stakeholders and the effective communication of their 
interests.  
 
In one of the cases, guidelines had been established in the formal 
institutional context to guide some of the choices in the valuation process. 
These guidelines contributed to a more structured and transparent 
valuation process - some of the choices could be substantiated based on 
these guidelines. The guidelines provided support, for example, as to how 
the project alternative should be defined and where to draw the 
geographical boundaries. It was also explained, however, that only a limited 
amount of such choices were subject to guidelines, allowing the other 
choices to be non-transparent. Again, when economic valuation is applied 
in integrated water management where different stakeholder interests need 
to be balanced, there is a need for transparent choices by stakeholders in 
the valuation process. Hence, in pursuit of limiting the inconsistencies of 
valuation outcomes, the fifth conclusion can be stated as follows: 
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Transparency is improved through the development of guidelines for 
valuation processes. 
 
Lastly, it was shown in the case study analysis (see sections 5.6.2 and 6.6.2) 
that time and budget constraints seriously affect the choices made in a 
valuation process. In those cases where little time and limited budget was 
available, choices were made to fulfill the requirements of finishing the 
study within the given constraints as opposed to applying the most 
appropriate choices. In the case of integrated water management, economic 
valuation requires sufficient time and budget so that the choices in the 
valuation process reflect the values of different stakeholders. The sixth and 
last conclusion, therefore, reads as follows: 
 
Sufficient time and budget result in a more transparent valuation 
process in which inconsistencies of choices and their outcomes are 
limited. This increases the usefulness of valuation processes to water 
management decisions.  
 
8.5 Discussion 
 
Now that the main conclusions have been drawn, it is important to focus 
on several additional aspects. First, this section will outline some of the 
strengths and weaknesses of this research and their consequences for the 
findings. Next, the contribution of this research to theory will be discussed. 
The section will end with the formulation of recommendations for the 
practical application of the economic valuation process in integrated water 
management.  
 
8.5.1 Strengths and Limitations 
 
A strength of this research that was important for its findings is the 
continuous interaction between theory and practice. Throughout the 
research, theory was applied to practice and insights from practice were 
applied to theory. This continuous feedback allowed the development of an 
analytical model that was directly applicable to the case studies, thereby 
limiting the shortcomings of this model as discussed in sections 8.2 and 8.3.  
 
With regard to the weaknesses of this research, a first limitation is related to 
the methodological approach of this thesis. It was difficult in the case study 
analysis to eliminate the subjective perspective on the case studies, 
something that relates to most qualitative analyses. This implies that the 
analysis and results were based on the perspective of the researcher. This 
subjectivity, however, has been limited as much as possible in the following 
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ways. First, the analysis followed the lines of an analytical model based on 
institutional theory. It was therefore the theory that guided the analytical 
model and the cases in the first place. Second, many different stakeholders 
of the valuation processes were interviewed, which often gave a broader 
perspective on the cases. The interviews were typed out and sent to the 
interviewed for verification. Third, the chapters have been proofread by 
experts that were not stakeholders of the cost-benefit analyses. Hence, 
although subjectivity can never be completely eliminated in most qualitative 
research, a variety of measures were taken to limit this as much as possible. 
 
Although this research answered its main research question of how choices 
in valuation processes are influenced by the context in which they are 
made, a second limitation is that it generally could not answer whether a 
different context necessarily results in different choices. The reason for this 
limitation is that all three case studies deal with three different economic 
valuation processes carried out in three different contexts. Only if the three 
case studies would have had one single economic valuation process, carried 
out in three different contexts such aspects could have been scientifically 
tested. Such case studies, however, do not exist in water management in the 
Netherlands, and the time within which this research needed to be carried 
out did not allow for other empirical analyses like simulations that may 
provide answers to such additional research questions. Therefore, this 
research explains how the context influences choices in economic valuation 
processes, and thus that such processes and their outcomes must be 
interpreted in relation to their context, but does not claim that a different 
context necessarily leads to different choices.  
 
A third limitation is related to the generalization of the analytical model. In 
this thesis, the model was applied to three case studies in water 
management, and it can be argued that this model is applicable to 
economic valuation processes in Dutch water management in general. The 
model can be used to search for contextual influences and choices and their 
relationships, and in this respect is not limited to specific economic 
valuation processes. Certain parts of the model are, however, less 
applicable to economic valuation processes in water management outside 
the Netherlands and outside the field of water management. This limitation 
lies particularly in the characterization of the formal and informal 
institutional context, which is field- and country specific. Therefore, 
although the general framework of the model is generally applicable, the 
characterization of the formal and informal institutional context must be 
adjusted to fit the specific field or country. 
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8.5.2 Theoretical Contribution 
 
Now that the strengths and weaknesses have been discussed, it is 
interesting to look at how the different insights of this research can 
contribute to both theory and practice. The base for the main theoretical 
contribution of this research consists of the first two conclusions drawn in 
section 8.4. These conclusions stated that (1) the context of the economic 
valuation process influences the choices made within this process, and; (2) 
that institutional theory has contributed to building an understanding of 
these choices and the  inconsistencies in their outcomes. Stakeholders often 
apply economic valuation as part of their strategic behavior to pursue 
personal goals and ideologies, with as a main goal obtaining more power. 
Rules and regulations may exist that guide specific choices in valuation 
studies. Or certain scientific and policy paradigms may be prevalent that 
have influenced the choices in such studies. From a theoretical perspective, 
it is important to understand this behavior and these elements in the 
institutional context in which stakeholders operate in order to understand 
the outcomes of the economic valuation process. Consequently, the 
theoretical contribution of this thesis is that it has contributed to an 
explanation of how the inconsistencies in economic valuation outcomes are 
not only attributable to the application of diverging methodologies, as has 
been researched up until now, but also to factors in the context in which 
these studies have been carried out. Scientific research focussing on the 
process of economic valuation studies, including actors and their institutional 
context, will be needed in addition to methodological development to 
further improve valuation processes and limit the inconsistencies in their 
outcomes.  
 
8.5.3 Practical Recommendations 
 
The remaining conclusions are the key to the contribution of this research 
to practical application of economic valuation in water management, which 
will be formulated as practical recommendations. These recommendations 
are made for all actors that undertake economic valuation processes in 
water management, including government departments, non-governmental 
organizations and companies.  
 
The third conclusion states that when valuation processes are applied as 
part of decision making processes in water management, transparency in 
these processes must be pursued. Integrated water management calls for 
the balancing of stakeholder needs and interests, therefore this must also be 
conveyed in the tools applied by decision makers to aid them in making 
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such decisions. Therefore, an important recommendation of this research is 
that efforts must be directed at increasing transparency in economic 
valuation studies. More specific recommendations for such a transparent 
process can be derived from conclusions four, five and six. 
 
The fourth and fifth conclusions drawn in this chapter relate to the guidance 
of economic valuation processes: guidelines as well as guidance by a 
representative group of stakeholders, whether directly or through their 
organization in committees. In terms of guidelines, the OEEI report, a 
guideline for social cost-benefit analysis in the Netherlands, covers some of 
the choices in the economic valuation process, as was explained in 
Chapters 6 and 7. For those choices not covered by these guidelines, 
however, it is recommended that some sort of framework is developed 
and/or agreements are reached to cover the choices. This can be an 
extension of the OEEI guidelines that specifically focuses on the economic 
valuation process in large infrastructural projects, or a separate framework 
for the valuation process. Such a practical framework could, for example, 
cover the following types of elements, not yet covered by OEEI:  
 
1. how to select the parties that are affected (those that benefit and those that 
loose); 
2. where to draw the geographical boundaries of the study; 
3. which valuation methods are most suitable to value what type of 
environmental impacts; 
4. which discount rate should be applied specifically for projects affecting the 
environment, whether public financed government projects or other, and 
over what time period the impacts should be discounted; 
5. the type of factors that should be tested in a sensitivity analysis. 
 
It is clear that such a framework cannot and should not represent a strict 
framework that specifically indicates rules or regulations for dealing with 
these elements. However, a practical framework could be created that 
guides actors carrying out valuation studies on the type of options available 
to them and how they can make their choices. Along the same line, specific 
guidance should also be given to the broader process of valuation, such as: 
 
1. which stakeholders should participate and how 
2. which committees should be established with which stakeholders and what 
role should these committees play 
3. how much time and budget should be allocated to a study 
 
The result is a guidance document, which actors who are involved in water 
management issues (and other environmental management issues) can 
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resort to if they want to carry out a transparent valuation process. Such 
actors are then also forced to substantiate any choices that deviate from 
these guidelines. Following such guidelines furthermore ensures the readers 
of these studies that the outcome of the process is based on a relatively 
transparent process. 
 
In terms of improved guidance by stakeholders, several aspects are 
important. First, representatives of all relevant stakeholder groups should 
be organized to supervise the process of economic valuation, like in the 
cost-benefit analyses related to the Rotterdam port. Second, relevant 
experts should be included in the valuation process to peer review and 
judge the choices made in the valuation process when it is finished. Third, 
it is important that stakeholders have an important say in and influence on 
choices in the valuation process. Committees should not be created as a 
pretext, allowing the principal and contracting parties to pretend that there 
is an increased transparency in their studies while in actual fact the 
committees are listed for appearances. Instead, regular meetings should be 
held with a steering committee to allow all stakeholders to give their input 
to the process, while the advise of a peer review committee should be 
either processed in the study or not for substantiated reasons. 
 
In stakeholder participation processes a balance must be found between 
public participation and independence of the study. Independence through 
public participation can be pursued, however, through incorporating all 
stakeholders in the process; those opposing as well as those supporting the 
project for which the valuation study is carried out. One way to incorporate 
stakeholders has already been discussed in the previous paragraphs – 
steering committees should be established that meet regularly with the 
principal and contracting parties, consisting of representatives of all major 
stakeholders. Another possibility is to hold discussion meetings or 
workshops during the economic valuation process in which major 
assumptions and choices are debated among representatives of all major 
stakeholders. Other recommendations related to stakeholder participation 
are given by Spash (2001), who discusses Deliberative Monetary Valuation 
(DMV) – the use of formal deliberation concerning environmental impacts 
to express monetary values. DMV can be used for policy purposes, as an 
input to cost-benefit analyses. Stakeholder participation also directly relates 
to other recommendations and strategies made in water management, the 
most important one being the EU Water Framework Directive. This 
Directive promotes the active participation of all interested parties in the 
development of River Basin Management Plans (see Article 14). Integration 
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of stakeholders in economic valuation processes therefore connects well 
with a general trend towards stakeholder participation in the 
implementation of the Directive in EU member countries.  
 
Guidance of the economic valuation process by Environmental Impact 
Statements (or MERs) is also necessary. In this respect, the 
recommendations connect well with the recommendations given in the 
OEEI guidelines report (Eijgenraam et al., 2000). This report explicitly calls 
for a direct linkage between MER reports and cost-benefit analyses, where 
both studies should be performed simultaneously. Both would need to 
have the same starting points, and there should be a constant exchange of 
information. 
 
The sixth and last conclusion in this chapter is related to the time and budget 
constraints. It is important that a transparent economic valuation process 
requires sufficient time and budget. Obviously, time and money are not 
always available. This does not mean that in these cases, economic 
valuation processes should not be carried out. On the contrary – economic 
valuation processes often need to be carried out under strong time and 
budget pressures. In these cases, the studies should not pretend to be a 
comprehensive economic valuation study and choices affected by such 
pressures should be explicitly mentioned. Unfortunately, no elaborate 
economic valuation study has yet been carried out in water management (or 
environmental management in general) in the Netherlands. It is therefore 
necessary to carry out at least one such study in the Netherlands, so that it 
may provide further guidance to future economic valuation processes. Such 
a study could also serve as a guideline for economic valuation processes. 
 
Lastly, it is recognized that non-transparency can never be fully eliminated, 
no matter what the nature and extent of guidance, stakeholder 
participation, time period and budget. This further supports the 
observation that economic valuation and similar processes are only one 
input in water management decision making processes - an observation 
that was also underlined in the introduction to this research. Choices in 
valuation processes are embedded in an institutional context that 
represents, specific values and interests. Other values and interests will 
need to be taken into account at other places in decision making processes, 
conveyed through other processes and tools. 
 
  213
Literature 
 
 
Achterberg, W. (1994), Samenleving, Natuur en Duurzaamheid, Van Gorcum & 
Comp B.V., Assen 
 
AIDEnvironment (2002), www.aidenvironment.org 
 
Argos (2002), Bomhoff, Nyfer en het CPB, Radio 1 Program, 18 October, 
VPRO 
 
Ast, J. van (2000), Interactief Watermanagement in Grensoverschrijdende 
Riviersystemen, Erasmus Ph.D. Thesis, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
Eburon, Delft 
 
Ast, J.A. van, Geerlings, H. (1995), Milieukunde en Milieubeleid – Een 
Introductie, Samson, Alphen a/d Rijn 
 
Bacharach, S.B. and Lawler, E.J. (1980), Power and Politics in Organizations, 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco 
 
Bal, F. and Nijkamp, P. (1998), In Search of Valid Results in a Complex 
Economic Environment: The Potential for Meta-Analysis and Value Transfer, 
Tinbergen Discussion Paper, TI 98-005/3, Amsterdam 
 
Bannock, B., Baxter, R.E., Davis, E. (1987), The Penguin Dictionary of 
Economics, Penguin Books, London 
 
Barbier, E.B., Acreman, M., Knowler, D. (1997), Economic Valuation of 
Wetlands: A Guide for Policy Makers and Planners, Ramsar Convention Bureau, 
Gland 
 
Barde, J. and Pearce, D.W. (1991), Valuing the Environment: Six Case Studies, 
Earthscan Publication Ltd., London 
 
Bergh, C.J.M, van den, and Button, K.J. (1996), Meta-analysis of Environmental 
Issues in Regional, Urban, Transport Economics, Discussion Paper TI96-137/5, 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam 
 
Valuation of Water 
 214 
Bergh, C.J.M, van den, and Baaijens, S.R. (1997), Meta-analysis in 
Environmental Economics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 
 
Bergh, J.C.M. van den, and Button, K.J. (1996), Meta-Analysis of 
Environmental Issues in Regional, Urban and Transport Economics, Tinbergen 
Discussion Paper, TI 96-137/5, Amsterdam 
 
Bergh, J.C.M., van den (2000), Ecological Economics: Themes, Approaches, and 
Differences with Environmental Economics, Tinbergen Discussion Paper TI 
2000-080/3, Amsterdam 
 
Blankert, J.C. (2001), Advise to the Project Minister, November 
 
Blamey, R.K., (1995), Citizens, Consumers and Contingent Valuation: An 
Investigation into Respondents Behavior, Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National 
University 
 
Bouma, J.J., and Saeijs, H.L.F. (2000), Eco-Centric Cost-Benefit Analysis for 
Hydraulic Engineering in River Basins, in: “New Approaches to River 
Management”, Smits, A.J.M., Nienhuis, P.H. & Leuve, R.S.E.W., pp. 167-
178, Backhuys Publishers, Leiden 
 
Bouma, J.J. and Schuijt, K.D. (2001), Economic Valuation and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis as Tools in Integrated Water Management, Proceedings for the 
European Symposium, International Commission on Large Dams, Norway 
 
Brouwer, R., Langford, I.H., Bateman, I.J.,  Crowards, T.C., Turner, R.K. 
(1997), A Meta-Analysis of Wetland Contingent Valuation Studies, CSERGE 
Working Paper GEC 97-20, Center for Social and Economic Research on 
the Global Environment, University of East Anglia, UK 
 
Brouwer, R. (2000), Environmental Value Transfer: State of the Art and Future 
Prospects, Ecological Economics, no. 32: 137-152 
 
Buck Consultants International (2002), Evaluatie OEEI-leidraad, Buck 
Consultants International, Den Haag 
 
Brown, T.C. and Slovic, P. (1988), Effects of Context on Economic Measures of 
Value, in: Peterson, G.L., Driver, B.L., Gregory, R. Jr., “Amenity Resource 
Valuation: Integrating Economics and Other Disciplines”, Venture, 
Philadelphia State College 
 
Literature 
 215
Callon, M. (1998), The Laws of the Markets, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 
 
Cangelosi, A. Weiher, R., Taverna, J., Cicero, P. (2001), Revealing the 
Economic Value of Protecting the Great Lakes, Northeast-Midwest Institute and 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington D.C. 
 
Carson, R.T. (1994) “Contingent Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Damages 
from the Exxon Valdez”, RFF Discussion Paper QE94-18, Resources for 
the Future, Washington D.C. 
 
Carter, N. (2001), The Politics of the Environment – Ideas, Activism, Policy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
Centraal Plan Bureau (2002), www.cpb.nl 
 
Commissie Waterbeheer 21e Eeuw (2000), Waterbeleid voor de 21e Eeuw: Geef 
Water Ruimte en de Aandacht die het Verdient, Den Haag, August 
 
Common, M. (1996), Environmental and Resource Economics, Longman, 
London 
 
Costanza, R. Déarge, R., Groot, R.S. de, Farber, S. de, Grasso, M., Hannon, 
B., Limburg, K., Naeem, S., O’Neill, R., Paruelo, J., Raskin, R.G., Sutton, 
P., Belt, M. van den (1997), The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and 
Natural Capital, Nature:387: 253-260 15 May 
 
CPB, NEI, RIVM (2001), Welvaartseffecten van Maasvlakte 2 – Kosten-
Batenanalyse van Uitbreiding van de Rotterdamse Haven Door Landaanwinning, 
CPB/NEI/RIVM, Den Haag/Rotterdam/Bilthoven, May 
 
CPB (2002) Letter to the Minister of V&W 
 
Cropper, M.L.,  and Portney, P.R. (1992), Discounting Human Lives, 
Resources 108: 1-4 Summer 
 
Cropper, M.L. (2000), Has Economic Policy Answered the Needs of Environmental 
Policy?, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, no. 39: 
328-350 
 
Cullis, J. and Jones, P. (1992), Public Finance and Public Choice, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
Valuation of Water 
 216 
Daily, G. (1997), Nature’s Services – Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems, 
Island Press, Washington D.C. 
 
Davis, D., Gartside, D.F. (2001), Challenges for Economic Policy in Sustainable 
Management of Marine Natural Resources, Ecological Economics 36: 223-236 
 
Dietz, F., Hafkamp, W. and Straaten, J. van der (1994), Basisboek 
Milieueconomie, Dietz, Hafkamp, van der Straaten, Tilburg 
 
Dietz, F. and Straaten, J. van der, Natuurlijke Hulpbronnen in Fysiocratische en 
Klassieke Theoriën and Ecologische Economie, in: Dietz, F., Hafkamp, W. and 
Straaten, J. van der (1994), ‘Basisboek Milieueconomie’, Dietz, Hafkamp, 
van der Straaten, Tilburg 
 
Dietz, F.J. (2000), Meststoffenverliezen en Economische Politiek, Proefschrift 
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Uitgeverij Coutinho, Bussum 
 
Doorn, J.A.A. van (1989), Rede en Macht, CIP Gegevens Koninklijke 
Bibliotheek, Den Haag 
 
Eggertson, T. (1990), Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 
 
Eijgenraam, C.J.J., Koopmans, C.C., Tang, P.J.G., Verster, A.C.P. (2000), 
Evaluatie van Infrastructuurprojecten – Leidraad voor een Kosten-Batenanalyse, 
CPB/NEI, SDU Uitgevers, Den Haag 
 
Ewel, K.C. (1997), Water Quality Improvements by Wetlands, in: Daily, G. (ed.), 
“Nature’s Services, Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems”, Island 
Press, Washington D.C. 
 
Faber, M., Petersen, T., Schiller, J. (2002), Homo Oeconomicus and Homo 
Politicus in Ecological Economics, Ecological Economics 40: 323-333 
 
Financiele Dagblad (2002), Kamer Wil Gaswinning Wadden Toch Verbieden, Het 
Financiele Dagblad Webpagina’s, 28 March 
 
Flick, U. (1998), An Introduction to Qualitative Research, Sage, London 
 
Galbraith, J.K. (1983), The Anatomy of Power, Houghton Mifflin, Boston 
 
Literature 
 217
Galbraith, J.K. (1987), Economics in Perspective, Houghton Mifflin, Boston 
 
Garrod, W. (1999), Economic Valuation of the Environment: Methods and Case 
Studies, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., Cheltenham 
 
Gowdy, J.M. and O’Hara, S. (1995), Economic Theory for Environmentalists, St.. 
Lucie Press, Delray Beach 
 
Gowdy, J.M. and Mayumi, K. (2000), Reformulating the Foundations of 
Consumer Choice Theory and Environmental Valuation, Ecological Economics 
39: 223-237 
 
Greenpeace (1998), De Waanzin van Waddengas, Greenpeace, Amsterdam 
 
Greenpeace (2002), www.Greenpeace.nl 
 
Groenewegen, J., Kersthold, F., Nagelkerke, A. (1995), On Integrating New 
and Old Institutionalism: Douglass North Building Bridges, Journal of Economic 
Issues,29, June 
 
Groot, R.S. de (1992), Functions of Nature: Evaluation of Nature in 
Environmental Planning, Management and Decision Making, Wolters-Noordhoff, 
Groningen 
 
Grove-White, R. (1997), The Environmental ‘Valuation’ Controversy: Observations 
on Its Recent History and Significance, in: Foster, J., Valuing Nature? Ethics, 
Economics and the Environment, Routledge, London 
 
Hajer, M.A. (1992), The Politics of Environmental Performance Review: Choices in 
Design, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, Leiden 
 
Hajer, M.A. (1995), The Politics of Environmental Discourse – Ecological 
Modernization and the Policy Process, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
Hanley, N. and Spash, C.L. (1993), Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham 
 
Hazeu, C.A. (2000), Sturingsmoeilijkheden in het Milieubeleid: een Institutioneel 
Perspectief, Milieu, 2000/5, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam 
 
Valuation of Water 
 218 
Heal, G. (2000), Nature and the Market Place – Capturing the Value of Ecosystem 
Services, Island Press, Washington D.C. 
 
Hisschemöller, M., Halffman, W., Brandt, W., Sterrenberg, L. (1998), 
Kenisbenutting en Politieke Keuze: Een Dilemma voor het Milieubeleid?, Rathenau 
Instituut, Den Haag 
 
Hodgson, G.M. (1994), The Return of Institutional Economics, in: Smelser, N.J., 
Swedberg, R., ‘The Handbook of Economic Sociology’, Princeton 
University Press, New York 
 
Hodgson, G.M. (2000), What is the Essence of Institutional Economics?, Journal 
of Economic Issues, Vol. 34 
 
Hoekstra, A.Y. (1998), Appreciation of Water: Four Perspectives, Water Policy 1: 
605-622 
 
Hoevenagel, R. and Verbruggen, H. (1989), De Waarde van het Milieu, 
Insititute for Environmental Studies, R/89-09, Amsterdam 
 
Hoevenagel, R. (1994), The Contingent Valuation Method: Scope and Validity, 
Ph.D. Thesis, Free University, Amsterdam 
 
Hussen, A.M. (2000), Principles of Environmental Economics: Economics, Ecology 
and Public Policy, Routledge, London 
 
Jansen, H.M.A. and Opschoor, J.B. (1973), Waardering van de Invloed van het 
Vliegtuiglawaai op Woongebied Rond de Potentiele Locaties van de Tweede Nationale 
Luchthaven, Institute for Environmental Studies, Series A, No. 4 and 5, 
Amsterdam 
 
Jennings, A. (2001), Social Construction of Measurement: Three Vignettes from 
recent Events and Labor Economics, Journal of Economic Issues 35: 365-371 
 
Jansen, H.M.A. and Opschoor, J.B. (1973), Waardering van de Invloed van het 
Vliegtuig Lawaai op Woongebied Rond de Potentiele Locaties van de Tweede 
Luchthaven, Institute for Environmental Studies, Series A, No. 4 and 5, 
Amsterdam 
 
Jorritsma-Lebbink, A., Pronk, J.P., Faber, G.H. (1999), Standpunt van het 
Kabinet Inzake Gaswinning, ‘s Gravenhage, 7 December 
Literature 
 219
Knight, J. (1992), Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 
 
Kuhn, T.S. (1962, 1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago 
 
Kuik, O.J., Jansen, H.M.A., Opschoor, J.B. (1991), The Netherlands, in: 
Barde, J., and Pearce, D.W., ‘Valuing the Environment: Six Case Studies’, 
Earthscan Publications Ltd, London 
 
KPMG (2001), Report Advisory Board Cost-Benefit Analysis PMR 
 
Kunst, P.E.J., Olie, R.L., Romme, A.G.L., Soeters, J.L., Organisatie Deel I, 
Spryt, van Mantgem & de Does, Leiden 
 
Künneke, R.W. (1991), Op Armlengte van de Overheid: Een Theoretisch en 
Emperisch Onderzoek Naar de Effecten van Verzelfstandiging op de Efficientie van 
Openbare Nutsbedrijven, Ph.D. thesis, University Twente, Enschede 
 
Leroy, P., Geest, A. de (1985), Milieubeweging en Milieubeleid, Uitgeverij de 
Nederlandsche Boekhandel, Antwerpen/Amsterdam 
 
Linden, J.W. van der, Oosterhuis, J.B. (1987), De Maatschappelijke Waardering 
voor de Vitaliteit van Bos en Heide, Ministry of Public Housing, Physical 
Planning and Environmental Management, VROM 80115/3, 
Leidschendam 
 
Mamuth, H.A. (1993), Markteconomie – Analyse en Evaluatie, Utrecht 
 
Martinez-Alier, J. (1987), Ecological Economics: Energy, Environment and Society, 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford 
 
MacCormick, J. (1995), The Global Environmental Movement, John Wiley and 
Sons, Chichester 
 
Meadows, D. (1972), Report of the Club of Rome: Limits to growth, het Spectrum 
B.V., Utrecht 
 
Merriam-Webster (2002), www.Merriam-Webster.com 
Miller, P. (1998), The Margins of Accounting, in: ‘The Laws of the Markets’, 
Callon, M., Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 
Valuation of Water 
 220 
MinEZ (2002), www.minez.nl 
 
MinV&V (1985), Anders Omgaan met Water: Waterbeleid in de 21e Eeuw, 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, DG Rijkswaterstaat, Den Haag 
 
MinV&V (1989), Derde Nota Waterhuishouding: Water Voor Nu en Later, SDU 
Uitgeverij, Den Haag 
 
MinV&V (1998), Vierde Nota Waterhuishouding: Waterkader, Ando B.V., Den 
Haag 
 
Mooney and Ehrlich (1997), Ecosystem Services: A Fragmentary History, in: 
Daily, G. (1997), ‘Nature’s Services – Societal Dependence on Natural 
Ecosystems’, Island Press, Washington D.C. 
 
Munda, G. (1993), Fuzzy Information in Multicriteria Environmental Evaluation 
Models, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam 
 
Nabli, M.K. and Nugent, J.B. (1989), The New Institutional Economics and 
development: Theory and Applications to Tunisia, North-Holland, Amsterdam 
 
NAM (2001), Energie Uit de Diepte, NAM, Assen 
 
NAM (1998), Integrale Bodemdalingstudie Waddenzee – Samenvatting, NAM, 
Assen 
 
NAM (2001), PKB Waddenzee: De Visie van de Nederlandse Aardolie 
Maatschappij, NAM, Assen 
Nas, T.F. (1996), Cost-Benefit Analysis: Theory and Practice, Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks 
 
Navrud, S. (1992), Pricing the European Environment, Oxford University Press 
Inc., New York 
 
NEI and RIVM (2001), Kosten en Baten van 750 ha Natuur- en Recreatiegebied 
Rotterdamse Regio, NEI B.V./RIVM, Rotterdam/Bilthoven, May 
 
Nelson, R.R., Sampat, B.N. (2001), Making Sense of Institutions as a Factor 
Shaping Economic Performance, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, Vol. 44: 31-54 
 
Literature 
 221
Netelenbos, T. (2000), Brief aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer, ‘s 
Gravenhage, 22 December 
 
Nijkamp, P. & Bal, F. (1998), In Search of Valid Results in a Complex Economic 
Environment – The Potential of Meta-analysis and Value Transfer, Discussion 
Paper TI 98-005/3, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam 
 
Nijkamp, P. (1977), Theory and Application of Environmental Economics, North-
Holland, Amsterdam 
 
Norgaard, R. (1998), Next, the Value of God, and other Reactions, Ecological 
Economics 25: 37-39 
 
North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
NRC (1999), Geen Gasboringen in de Waddenzee, NRC Webpagina’s, 7 
December 
 
NRC (1999), Kamer Tegen Gaswinning Waddenzee, NRC Webpagina’s, 11 
November 
 
NRC (1999), Vrijwel Niemand Gelukkig Met Besluit Gasboringen, 6 November 
 
NRC (2001), Cijfers Haven Wijzen op Fundamenteel Probleem, 2 January 
 
Nyfer (1997), Maa$vlakte, Nyfer, Breukelen 
 
Nyfer (1998), Gouden Randen van Rotterdam, Nyfer, Breukelen 
 
O’Connor, M. (1998), The Valse Project: Social processes for Environmental 
Valuation, Final report, Report EUR 18677 EN, European Commission 
Joint Research Center, ISPRA, Italy 
 
O’Neill, J. (1997), Value Pluralism, Incommensurability and Institutions, in: 
Foster, J., ‘Valuing Nature? Ethics, Economics and the Environment’, 
Routledge, New York  
 
Oosterhaven, J. (2000), Waddengas: Mogelijk Geringe Schade, in Ieder Geval Hoge 
Baten, Nieuwsbrief Milieu en Economie, nr. 2, Jaargang 14, Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam,  
Valuation of Water 
 222 
Opschoor, H. and Turner, K. (1994), Economic Incentives and Environmental 
Policy: Principles and Practice, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 
 
Pearce, D.W., Turner, R.K. (1990), Economics of Natural Resources and the 
Environment, Harvester Wheatseaf, New York 
 
Pearce, D.W. (2001), Valuing Biodiversity: Issues and Overview, in: 'Valuation of 
Biodiversity Studies - Selected Studies', OECD, Paris 
 
Perman, R., Ma, Y., MacGilvray, J., Natural resource and Environmental 
Economics, Addison, Wesley, Longman, London 
 
PMR (1999), PMR op Koers, PMR, Den Haag 
 
PMR (2002), KBA bij Procesgestuurde Besluitvorming – Learning By Doing, 
Project Mainportontwikkeling Rotterdam, Rotterdam/Den Haag 
 
PMR (2002), Logboek – Leerdocument van Project Mainportontwikkeling 
Rotterdam, Project Mainportontwikkeling Rotterdam, Rotterdam/ Den 
Haag 
 
PMR (2002), www.mainport-pmr.nl, 2002 
 
Rees, W.E. (1998), How Should a Parasite Value its Host?, Ecological 
Economics 25: 49-52 
 
Ritzer, G. (1996), The McDonaldization of Society, Pine Forge Press, California 
RMPM (1993), Portplan 2010, Rotterdam 
 
RMPM, Brief CPB, Rotterdam 
 
RMPM (2001), Er is Meer – Reactie GHR op de KBA Landaanwinning, 
Gemeentelijk Havenbedrijf Rotterdam, Rotterdam 
 
RMPM (2002), www.portofrotterdam.com, 2002 
 
Ruijgrok, E.C.M. (1999), Valuation of Nature in Coastal Zones, Proefschrift 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Elinkwijk bv, Utrecht 
 
Rutherford, M. (1995), The Old and the New Institutionalism: Can Bridges Be 
Built?, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 29 
Literature 
 223
Saeijs, H.L.F., Flameling, I.A., Adriaanse, L.A. (1999), Ecopragmatisme, 
Omgaan met Rivieren, Delta's, Kust en Zee in de 21e Eeuw, in: Hall, A. van, 
Drupsteen, Th. G., Havekes, H.J.M., "De Staat van Water - Opstellen over 
Juridische, Technische, Financiele en Politiek-Bestuurlijke Aspecten van 
Waterbeheer", Uitgeverij Vermande, Lelystad 
 
Saeijs, H.L.F and Berkel, M.J. van (1994), Dorstige Aarde, Report 
Symposium "Honderd Jaar  Duuzame Waterstaatszorg", Hoofdredactie 
Waterstaat, Den Haag  
 
Sagoff, M. (1998), The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law and the 
Environment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
Savenije, H.H.G. (2001), Why Water is Not an Ordinary Economic Good, Value 
of Water Research Report Series No. 9, IHE, Delft 
 
Schuijt, K.D. (2001a), Economic Values of Lost Natural Functions of the Rhine 
River Basins - Costs of Human Development of the Rhine River Basin Ecosystem, 
Publication Series nr. 36, Erasmus Center for Sustainable Development 
and Management (ESM), Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam 
 
Schuijt, K.D. (2001b), Costs and Benefits of an Alternative Safety Concept (Kosten 
en Baten van een Alternatief Veiligheidsconcept), in: Economische 
Inzichten rondom RivierenLand Concept, DWW-2002-099, Delft 
 
Schuijt, K.D. (2002), Land and Water Use of Wetlands in Africa: Economic 
Values of African Wetlands, IIASA Interem Report IR-02-063, International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria 
 
Scott, W. (1995), Institutions and Organizations, Sage Publications, Thousand 
Oaks 
 
Self, P. (1975), The Politics and Philosophy of Cost-Benefit Analysis, The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., London 
 
Serafy, S. (1998), Pricing the Invaluable: the Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services 
and Natural Capital, Ecological Economics, nr. 25 
 
Spash, C. (2001), Deliberative Monetary Valuation, paper for presentation at 
the fifth Nordic Environmental Research Conference, 14-16 June, Aarhus 
 
Valuation of Water 
 224 
Spash, C.L. and Carter, C. Environmental Valuation in Europe: Findings from the 
Concerted Action, Policy Research brief no. 11, Cambridge Research for the 
Environment, Cambridge 
 
Stevens, T.H., Echeverria, J., Glass, R.J., Hager, T., More, T.A. (1991), 
Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife: What do CVM Estimates Really Show?, 
Land Economics 67(4): 390-400 
 
Sutton, D.B. and Harmon, N.P. (1973), Ecology: Selected Concepts, John Wiley 
and Sons Inc., New York 
 
Swedberg, R. (1987), Economic Sociology: Past and Present, Current Sociology 
35, No.1 
 
Tatenhove, J. van, Arts, B., Leroy, P., Political Modernization and the 
Environemtn: The renewal of Environmental Policy Arrangements, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 
 
Tietenberg, T. (1992), Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, Harper 
Collins Publishers, New York 
 
Tool, M.R. (1995), Pricing, Valuation and Systems, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, Cheltenham 
 
Turner, R.K., Adger, W.N., Brouwer, R. (1998), Ecosystem Services Value, 
Research Needs, and Policy Relevance: a Commentary, Ecological Economics 25, 
pp 61-65 
 
Turner, R.K., Pearce, D., Bateman, I. (1994), Environmental Economics – an 
Elementary Introduction, Pearson Education Limited, Essex 
 
Turner, R.K. (1993), Sustainable Environmental Economics and Management, 
Belhaven Press, London 
 
Veld, R.J. in ‘t (2000), Willens en Wetens – De Rollen van Kennis over Milieu en 
Natuur in Beleidsprocessen, RMNO, Uitgeverij Lemma BV, Utrecht 
 
Vellinga, P., Ruijgrok, E.C.M. (1996), Inventarisatie Mogelijke Natuurvisies voor 
Maasvlakte II en Omgeving, Instituut voor Milieuvraagstukken, Amsterdam 
 
Volkskrant (2000), Economen Dempen de Investeringsput, Volkskrant, 23 April 
Literature 
 225
Vries, P. de (1992), De Lastige Verhouding Tussen Departement en Agent, Ph.D. 
Thesis University Twente, Enschede 
 
VROM (2002), www.vrom.nl 
 
Waddenvereniging (2002), www.waddenvereniging.nl 
 
Walsh, R.G., Loomis, J.B., Gillman, R.A. (1984), , “Valuing Option, 
Existence and Bequest Demands for Wilderness”, Land Economics 60: 14-
29 
 
Ward, H. (1999), Citizen Juries and Valuing the Environment: a Proposal, 
Environmental Politics, volume 8, no. 2:75-96 
 
WCD (2000), Dams and development: A New Framework for Decision making, 
Report of the World Commission of Dams 
 
WCED (1987), Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
Wetten, J. van, Joordens, J., Dorp, M. van, Bijvoet, L. (1999),, De 
Schaduwkant van Waddengas, AIDEnvironment, Amsterdam 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1998), Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where it is 
Headed, De Economist, 146 (1): 23-58 
 
Wills, I. (1997), Economics and the Environment, Allen and Unwin, St. 
Leonards 
 
Wolfson, D. (2000), Recht, Ruil en Vertrouwen in het Openbaar Bestuur, in: ‘De 
Beleidsagenda 2000 – Strijdpunten op het Breukvlak van 2 Eeuwen’, 
Lehning, P.B., Coutinho, Bussum 
 
Woodward, R.T. and Wui, Y-S. (2001), The Economic Value of Wetland 
Services: a Meta Analysis, Ecological Economics, no. 37: 257-270 
 
Yin, R.K. (1994), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks 
 
Zaag, P. van der and Savenije, H.H.G. (2001), 'Demand Management' and 
'Water As an Economic Good' - Paradigms with Pitfalls, Value of Water Research 
Report Series No. 8, IHE, Delft 
Valuation of Water 
 226 
Zwiep, K. van der (1988), De Waddenzee, van Waterstaatsprobleem tot Bestuurlijk 
Vraagstuk, in: ‘Bestuurlijke Problematiek van de Waddenzee’, Brussaard, 
W., Buuren, P.J.J. van, Coolsma, J.C., Derksen, W., Drupsteen, Th. G., 
Eenhoorn, H.B., Fleurke, F., Kleisterlee, C.F., Lambers, C., Lubach, D.A., 
Sinke, T.M., Zwiep, K. van der, Kluwer, Devente 
  
227
Appendix 1   Cross-Case Analysis 
 
 
Table A-1 Key Influences on the Choices in the Economic Valuation Process of Gas 
Extraction in the Wadden Sea 
Choices Formal & Informal Characteristics Stakeholders  
  Institutional Context Economic Instrument Context 
Section 5.5 Sections 5.2 & 5.6.1 Sections 5.3 & 5.6.2 Sections 5.4 & 5.6.3 
1 Phenomenon   ✔Policy paradigms ✔Goal ✔Principal 
 being studied ✔Scientific paradigms: ✔Coalition principal/ 
  increased popularity  contracting party 
  economic valuation ✔Coalitions indirect  
  ✔Rules and  stakeholders 
  regulations:  ✔Interest group  
  environment politics 
2 Project-alternative ✔Absence rules and   ✔Goal ✔Principal 
  regulations  ✔Coalition principal/ 
  economic instrument  contracting party 
   ✔Coalitions indirect  
   stakeholders 
   ✔Interest group  
  politics 
3 The parties  ✔Absence rules and   ✔Goal ✔Principal 
 affected and regulations ✔Use type ✔Coalition principal/ 
  economic valuation  contracting party 
  ✔Coalitions indirect  
  stakeholders 
  ✔Interest group  
  politics 
4 Geographical ✔Absence rules and   ✔Goal ✔Principal 
  boundaries and regulations ✔Contracting party 
  economic valuation ✔Coalition principal/ 
  contracting party 
  ✔Coalitions indirect  
  stakeholders 
  ✔Interest group  
  politics 
5 Identification of ✔Scientific paradigms: ✔Goal ✔Contracting party 
 impacts dominance certain  ✔Use type ✔Coalition principal/ 
  economic paradigm  contracting party 
  ✔Absence rules and   ✔Coalitions indirect  
  and regulations stakeholders 
   economic instrument ✔Interest group  
  politics 
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(Continued) 
     
6 Identification of ✔Absence rules and   ✔Goal ✔Contracting party 
 impacts to be  and regulations  ✔Coalition principal/ 
 valued  economic instrument contracting party 
  ✔Scientific paradigms: ✔Coalitions indirect  
  dominance certain  stakeholders 
  economic paradigm ✔Interest group  
  politics 
7 Quantification of ✔Absence rules  ✔Goal ✔Contracting party 
 impacts into and regulations ✔Time constraints ✔Coalition principal/ 
 monetary units economic valuation  contracting party 
  ✔Scientific paradigms: ✔Coalitions indirect  
  dominance certain  stakeholders 
  economic paradigm ✔Interest group  
  politics 
8 Discounting ✔Absence rules and   ✔Goal ✔Contracting party 
  and regulations ✔Coalition principal/ 
  economic valuation contracting party 
  ✔Coalitions indirect  
  stakeholders 
  ✔Interest group  
  politics 
9 Sensitivity analysis ✔Absence rules and   ✔Goal ✔Contracting party 
  and regulations ✔Coalition principal/ 
  economic valuation contracting party 
  ✔ Coalition indirect 
  stakeholders 
  ✔Interest group  
  politics 
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Table A-2 Key Influences on the Choices in the Economic Valuation Process of          
Land Reclamation 
Choices Formal & Informal Characteristics Stakeholders  
  Institutional Context Economic Instrument Context 
Section 6.5 Section 6.2 & 6.6.1 Sections 6.3.1 & 6.6.2 Sections 6.4 & 6.6.3 
1 Phenomenon  ✔Policy paradigms ✔Principal 
 being studied 
2 Project-alternative ✔Rules economic  ✔Goal ✔(Coalition) Contracting  
  instrument parties 
   ✔Steering committee 
   ✔Advisory board 
   ✔Interest group politics 
  ✔Coalition indirect 
  stakeholders 
  ✔Coalition principal and 
  contracting parties 
3 The parties  ✔Absence rules  ✔Goal ✔(Coalition) Contracting  
 affected & regulations  ✔Use type parties 
  economic valuation  ✔Steering committee 
  ✔Advisory board 
  ✔Coalition principal and 
  contracting parties 
4 Geographical ✔Absence rules  ✔Goal ✔(Coalition) Contracting  
  boundaries & regulations  parties 
  economic valuation ✔Steering committee 
  ✔Advisory board 
  ✔Coalition principal and 
  contracting parties 
5 Identification of ✔Rules economic  ✔Goal ✔(Coalition) Contracting  
 impacts instrument ✔Use type parties 
  ✔Rules environment  ✔Steering committee 
   ✔Advisory board 
   ✔MER commission 
   ✔Coalition principal and 
   contracting parties 
6 Identification of ✔Rules economic  ✔(Coalition) Contracting  
 impacts to be   instrument parties 
 valued ✔Rules environment ✔Steering committee 
   ✔Advisory board 
   ✔Coalition principal and 
   contracting parties 
7 Quantification of  ✔Absence rules  ✔(Coalition) Contracting  
 impacts into & regulations  parties 
 monetary units economic valuation ✔Steering committee 
  ✔Rules environment ✔Advisory board 
   ✔Coalition principal and 
   contracting parties 
8 Discounting ✔Absence rules  ✔(Coalition) Contracting  
  & regulations  parties 
  economic valuation ✔Steering committee 
   ✔Advisory board 
   ✔Coalition principal and 
   contracting parties 
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 (Continued)   
    
9 Sensitivity analysis ✔Absence rules  ✔(Coalition) Contracting  
  & regulations  parties 
  economic valuation ✔Steering committee 
  ✔Advisory board 
   ✔Coalition indirect 
  stakeholders 
  ✔Coalition principal and 
contracting parties 
✔Interest group politics 
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Table A-3 Key Influences on the Choices in the Economic Valuation Process of the 
Development of 750 Hectares Nature and Recreation Area 
Choices Formal & Informal Characteristics Stakeholders  
  Institutional Context Economic Instrument Context 
Section 6.5 Section 6.2 & 6.6.1 Sections 6.3.2 & 6.6.2 Sections 6.4 & 6.6.3 
1 Phenomenon  ✔Policy paradigms:  ✔Goal ✔Principal 
 being studied institutionalization  ✔Coalition principal 
  environmental  project and delegated 
  problems, dominance principal CBA 
  rational arguments ✔Coalition indirect 
  ✔Scientific paradigms: stakeholders 
  increased popularity  
  economic valuation 
2 Project-alternative ✔Rules economic  ✔Goal ✔(Coalition) Contracting 
  instrument  parties 
  ✔Steering committee 
  ✔Advisory board 
  ✔Coalition principal & 
  contracting party 
3 The parties affected ✔Absence rules & 
regulations economic  
✔Use type 
✔Goal 
✔(Coalition) Contracting 
parties 
  valuation ✔Steering committee 
  ✔Advisory board 
  ✔Coalition principal & 
  contracting party 
4 Geographical ✔Absence rules  ✔Goal ✔(Coalition) Contracting 
  boundaries & regulations   parties 
  economic valuation ✔Steering committee 
  ✔Advisory board 
  ✔Coalition principal & 
  contracting party 
5 Identification of ✔Rules economic  ✔Use type ✔(Coalition) Contracting 
 impacts instrument ✔Goal parties 
   ✔Steering committee 
   ✔Advisory board 
   ✔MER commission 
  ✔Coalition principal & 
  contracting party 
6 Identification of ✔Rules economic  ✔Time constraints ✔(Coalition) Contracting 
 impacts to be  instrument ✔Budget constraints parties 
 valued   ✔Steering committee 
    ✔Advisory board 
   ✔Coalition principal & 
   contracting party 
7 Quantification of  ✔Absence rules  ✔(Coalition) Contracting 
 impacts into & regulations  parties 
 monetary units economic valuation ✔Steering committee 
   ✔Advisory board 
   ✔Coalition principal & 
   contracting party 
   
    
  
 
 
 
  
Valuation of Water 
 232 
(Continued) 
    
8 Discounting ✔Absence rules  ✔(Coalition) Contracting 
  & regulations  parties 
  economic valuation ✔Steering committee 
   ✔Advisory board 
   ✔Coalition principal & 
   contracting party 
9 Sensitivity analysis ✔Absence rules  ✔(Coalition) Contracting 
  & regulations  parties 
  economic valuation ✔Steering committee 
   ✔Advisory board 
   ✔Coalition principal & 
   contracting party 
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
233
Appendix 2   Abbreviations 
 
 
CPB   Centraal Planbureau 
CV   Contingent Valuation 
EE   Ecological Economics 
EIA   Environmental Impact Assessment 
EPA   Environmental Protection Agency 
ERE   Environment and Resource Economics 
GNP   Gross National Product 
HP   Hedonic Pricing 
IEE   Inventory Economic Effects 
IVM   Instituut voor Milieuvraagstukken 
LNV   Ministerie van Landbouw Natuurbeheer en Visserij 
MER   Milieu Effecten Rapportage 
MinEZ  Ministerie van Economische Zaken 
MinV&W  Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
NAM  Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij 
NEI   Nederlands Economisch Instituut 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NIE   New Institutional Economics 
NNP   Net National Product 
NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NPV   Net Present Value 
NRDA  Natural Resource Damage Assessment 
NWO Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk 
Onderzoek 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OEEI Onderzoeksprogramma Economische Effecten 
Infrastructuur 
OIE   Old Institutional Economics 
ONR   Organisatie Niet-Rijkspartijen 
PKB   Planologische Kernbeslissing 
PM   Pro-Memory 
PMR   Project Mainport Development Rotterdam   
PPP   Polluter Pays Principle 
PZH   Provincie Zuid-Holland 
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RIVM  Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu 
RMPM  Rotterdam Municipal Port Management 
SOC   Social Opportunity Cost of Capital   
SSE   Steady State Economy 
STPR  Social Time Preference Rate 
TC   Travel Cost 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
VERM  Verkenning Ruimtetekort Mainport Rotterdam 
VROM Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening 
en Milieu 
VWS   Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 
WCD  World Commission on Dams 
WCED  World Commission on Environment and Development 
WTA   Willingness to Pay 
WTP   Willingness to Accept 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
235
Appendix 3 List of Interviewed 
People for the Case 
Study Analysis 
 
 
1. Cost-Benefit Analyses on Gas Extraction 
 
- José Joordens, AidEnvironment 
- Liesbeth Bijvoet, AIDEnvironment 
- Marc Davidson, CE 
- Wim Groenendijk, NAM 
- Jan Bijlsma, Greenpeace 
- Martijn Lodewijkx, Greenpeace 
 
2. Two Cost-Benefit Analyses Related to the Rotterdam Port 
Development 
 
- Carel Eijgenraam, CPB 
- Jan Anne Annema, RIVM 
- Sjaak Boeckhout, NEI 
- Bas van Holst, PMR 
- Siebout Nooteboom, DHV 
- Hans Slootweg, Provincie Zuid-Holland 
- Ronald Houterman, Provincie Zuid-Holland 
- Arno Stekelenburg, Zuid-Hollandse Milieufederatie 
- Albert Doe, Gemeentelijk Havenbedrijf Rotterdam 
- Hans Opschoor, Institute of Social Studies 
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Dutch Summary  
(Nederlandse Samenvatting) 
 
 
In dit proefschrift wordt het proces van economische waardering van 
ecosystemen in Nederlands waterbeheer onderzocht. Het onderzoek gaat 
er vanuit dat economische waardering een belangrijke bijdrage kan leveren 
aan besluitvormingsprocessen in waterbeheer. Het analyseert hoe 
verschillende belanghebbenden het waarderingsproces gebruiken en hoe de 
context van dit proces invloed heeft op de uitkomst. Het doel van dit 
proefschrift is om tot conclusies en aanbevelingen te komen voor de 
structuur van waarderingsprocessen in waterbeheer. De aanbevelingen zijn 
er op gericht om inconsistenties in de uitkomsten te beperken. 
 
Economische waardering van ecosystemen plaatst een monetaire waarde 
op de effecten van ingrepen in de natuur. Waarderingsprocessen kunnen 
een bijzonder belangrijke rol spelen bij het benadrukken van de 
economische waarde van een ecosysteem bovenop de ecologische en 
sociaal-culturele waarden. Verder kunnen deze processen ook bijdragen tot 
het formuleren van economische argumenten voor duurzaam beheer van 
ecosystemen. Ondanks de belangrijke rol van waarderingsstudies is 
gebleken dat inconsistenties in de uitkomsten van deze studies een gegeven 
zijn. De reden voor deze inconsistenties is te vinden in de grote variëteit in 
methodologieën die gebruikers al naar gelang hun eigen voorkeur kunnen 
toepassen. Het is mogelijk dat deze inconsistenties de bruikbaarheid van 
waarderingsprocessen in Nederlands waterbeheer ondermijnen. 
Waterbeheer in Nederland wordt gekenmerkt door "integraal waterbeheer" 
waarin de afweging van alle relevante belangen wordt nagestreefd. Op lange 
termijn bestaat het risico dat besluitvormers steeds sceptischer worden over 
de meerwaarde van waarderingsstudies wanneer deze bestaan uit 
subjectieve keuzes van methodologieën gemaakt door één belanghebbende, 
terwijl hun besluiten de interesses van alle belanghebbenden moeten 
weergeven. In een poging om de inconsistenties te beperken wordt in dit 
onderzoek geanalyseerd hoe verschillende belanghebbenden economische 
waarderingsstudies in waterbeheer toepassen. Hierbij ligt de nadruk op het 
proces van economische waardering waarbij  strategische keuzes worden 
gemaakt door actoren met verschillende belangen in de uitkomst van de 
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waarderingsstudie. Het doel is om de volgende hoofdonderzoeksvraag te 
beantwoorden: 
 
Hoe worden de keuzes in economische waarderingsprocessen in waterbeheer 
beïnvloed door de context waarin deze keuzes worden gemaakt?  
 
Voor het beantwoorden van deze vraag wordt een analytisch perspectief 
gebruikt dat is gebaseerd op institutionele theorie waarin de context van 
formele en informele instituties het gedrag van de actoren bepaalt. Dit 
perspectief bekijkt het waarderingsproces binnen de volgende context: (1) 
actoren en hun onderlinge relaties; (2) formele en informele instituties, 
zoals regels, richtlijnen, beleids- en wetenschappelijke paradigma's; en (3) 
specifieke karakteristieken van het economisch instrument, zoals het doel 
en de beperkingen in tijd en budget. Deze elementen bepalen de keuzes die 
in een waarderingsproces worden gemaakt en kunnen de inconsistenties in 
hun uitkomsten verklaren. 
 
Het analytisch perspectief wordt toegepast op drie case studies. Deze cases 
bestaan uit kosten-batenanalyses in Nederlands waterbeheer waarvan het 
economische waarderingsproces een onderdeel is. Zowel de keuzes die 
gemaakt worden in deze waarderingsprocessen, als de context waarin ze 
worden toegepast worden geanalyseerd. De nadruk ligt op mogelijke 
relaties tussen deze elementen. 
 
De conclusies van dit onderzoek zijn als volgt: 
 
1. Keuzes binnen een waarderingsproces worden vooral beïnvloed door 
vier elementen in haar context: (a) het wel of niet aanwezig zijn van 
richtlijnen; (b) het doel waarvoor het onderzoek wordt uitgevoerd; (c) de 
deelname van bepaalde belanghebbenden in het proces en de wijze 
waarop hun ideeën kenbaar worden gemaakt; en (d) de tijd- en 
budgetbeperkingen die worden opgelegd aan het proces. 
2. De toepassing van het perspectief van institutionele theorie in dit 
onderzoek draagt bij tot het inzicht in keuzes die in 
waarderingsprocessen worden gemaakt en verklaart de inconsistenties in 
hun uitkomsten. 
3. Het nastreven van transparantie in waarderingsprocessen, wanneer deze 
onderdeel zijn van besluitvormingsinstrumenten zoals kosten-
batenanalyse, draagt bij tot een evenwichtige afweging van 
belanghebbenden in besluitvorming in waterbeheer. Een transparant 
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waarderingsproces wordt gekenmerkt door een situatie waarin het 
duidelijk is wie de keuzes hebben gemaakt en waarom. 
4. Transparantie in waarderingsprocessen wordt bevorderd door deelname 
van alle relevante belanghebbenden en de effectieve inbreng van hun 
interesses. 
5. Transparantie wordt verder verbeterd door de ontwikkeling van 
richtlijnen voor waarderingsprocessen. 
6. Voldoende tijd en budget resulteren in een transparanter 
waarderingsproces waarin inconsistenties van keuzes en hun uitkomsten 
beperkt worden. Dit bevordert de bruikbaarheid van 
waarderingsprocessen bij de besluitvorming in waterbeheer. 
 
De bijdrage van dit onderzoek aan zowel de theorie als de praktijk wordt 
behandeld aan de hand van deze zes conclusies. De theoretische bijdrage is 
met name te vinden in een beter inzicht in waarderingsprocessen en in de 
inconsistenties in hun uitkomsten. Verder belicht dit onderzoek het belang 
van transparantie bij de praktische toepassing van waarderingsprocessen in 
waterbeheer. Deze transparantie wordt nagestreefd door meer 
gestructureerde begeleiding van waarderingsprocessen door alle relevante 
belanghebbenden, het ontwikkelen van richtlijnen en de directe aansluiting 
van waarderingsprocessen op Milieu Effecten Rapportages (MER). Verder 
wordt de aanbeveling gedaan dat publieke participatie processen een groter deel 
moeten uitmaken van waarderingsprocessen. Dit leidt niet alleen tot betere 
participatie van belanghebbenden maar ook tot effectievere inbreng van 
hun belangen. Tenslotte wordt aanbevolen dat  voldoende tijd en budget 
beschikbaar wordt gesteld aan tenminste één uitgebreide waarderingsstudie 
in Nederland om daarop volgende waarderingsprocessen te sturen. 
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